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Angola: The withdrawal of fuel subsidies and the transformation of political legitimacy

Rui Verde

  1. The decrease in oil revenues in the State Budget and the need for state funding

Following the guidelines of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Angolan government is gradually withdrawing fuel subsidies. The IMF defends this position because it believes that this measure will generate significant savings for the government and improve the state’s fiscal sustainability, since fuel subsidies represent a high cost for the General State Budget (OGE), reaching 9.1 billion kwanzas between 2021 and 2024. In addition, there are concerns about fuel leaks to neighboring countries and distortions in the domestic market . [1]

In a recent interview with LUSA, Angola’s finance minister, Vera Daves, confirmed that further cuts in fuel subsidies will be made this year, assuming that this is a “path that must continue”, although the speed depends on various factors .[2]

The truth is that Angola’s State Budget is facing ever greater challenges due to its historical dependence on oil revenues, a factor that jeopardizes the country’s financial stability . For decades, oil represented the main source of revenue, financing investments in infrastructure, health, education and other key sectors. However, the volatility of international oil prices has highlighted the need to diversify public revenues, especially since 2014.

For this reason, in recent years, the Angolan government has adopted tax and fiscal reform measures, seeking to strengthen non-oil revenue. The creation of specific taxes, the modernization of collection systems and incentives to formalize companies have reflected an attempt to reduce dependence on the energy sector. Despite these efforts, the budget deficit and the pressure on public accounts continue to be worrying challenges, as demonstrated by the delays that sometimes occur in paying the salaries of state workers, and the widespread delays in paying for supplies and services .[3]

The practical result is that the state needs to tax the population and cut spending that is irrational from an economic point of view[4] , as is the case with the fuel subsidy. This changes the pre-existing relationship between the state and the people. In the past, the state didn’t need the people to finance itself, now it does.

 In fact, there are already around 5,205,380 individual taxpayers and 320,440 individual taxpayers with commercial activity in Angola, meaning that more than 5.5 million people are registered to pay taxes in the country[5] . While this is a remarkable number, it is also true that considering that there are around 14 million people with the potential to be taxpayers, there is still a lot of scope for broadening the tax base. At the same time, in 2022, Angola collected 4,638 billion kwanzas in non-oil taxes. Luanda province was responsible for 92.2% of this revenue. In the first quarter of 2023, non-oil revenue amounted to 976 billion kwanzas, an increase of 13% on the same period last year.[6][7] The key point is that non-oil revenue in Angola has shown significant growth in recent years . [8]

2-The need for taxes and subsidy cuts and the changing paradigm of political legitimacy

Since 2002, the political legitimacy of the Angolan system of government has rested on two factors: victory in the civil war and direct access to oil revenues.[9] In real terms, the people were not part of the equation for legitimizing power. José Eduardo dos Santos could govern without the people and without needing them. All he needed was military victory and oil money. The formal legitimizations of power, such as the 2008 elections or the 2010 Constitution, were just that, mere acts validating a previous reality that had been imposed.

Legally, the government was based on popular sovereignty and the Constitution, and all legal-formal acts were taken over time with a valid legal basis: elections, the Constitution, legislation, votes in parliament, etc. However, there was the notion that the constitutional and governmental system was based on a previous pact in which victory in the war and access to oil funds gave power to the government, which in return guaranteed the development of the country and the evolution of society. It is in this context that the political rationality of the fuel subsidy can be seen.

The point is that since 2014, when the price of oil fell enormously and Angola entered almost ten years of crisis, this political legitimacy has been destroyed. On the one hand, the generation and memories of the war have diminished. A large percentage of the Angolan population was born after the end of the civil war (2002). Around 65% of Angolans (more than two thirds) are under the age of 25, which means that 21 million Angolans are under this age group. This means that the legitimacy of the war already means little or nothing to them, as the victor has no right to exercise power.

In addition, the need to take revenue from the people and withdraw subsidies from them changes the 2002 social pact: if political power needs the people, then the people will participate in political power. There is no turning back from this equation that has been affirmed throughout history.

The payment of taxes has historically been a determining factor in the formation of political systems and the consolidation of democratic rights. In medieval England, the need to collect taxes led to the creation of institutions such as Parliament, where representatives of the nobility and the bourgeoisie discussed the king’s requests for money to pay for royal weddings or wars. The Magna Carta of 1215 was a milestone in establishing that taxation had to rely on some level of consent from the subjects, reinforcing the idea that government authority could not impose arbitrary taxes without representation. This principle evolved over the centuries, directly influencing the development of modern parliamentarianism .[10]

In the context of democracy, the concept of “no taxation without representation” became central. The Glorious Revolution of 1688 in England consolidated Parliament as a fundamental body in governance, restricting the absolute powers of the monarch and reinforcing the role of citizens in fiscal decision-making. The idea that taxes should be debated and legitimized by elected representatives helped shape democratic systems in Europe and North America. As nations sought greater popular participation, control over taxes became a crucial mechanism for defining citizens’ rights and strengthening representative democracy.

The relationship between taxation and independence became especially evident in the American Revolution (1775-1783). The British colonists in America rejected taxation without their direct participation in the decisions of the British Parliament. Legislation such as the Stamp Act of 1765 and the Tea Act of 1773 were seen as violations of colonial autonomy, leading to protests such as the Boston Tea Party. The refusal to accept taxation without representation resulted in the revolutionary movement that culminated in the independence of the United States, enshrining the idea that the legitimacy of a government depends on the participation of citizens in defining fiscal policies.

Thus, throughout history, the payment of taxes has not only been a means of financing states and governments, but also a catalyst for significant political transformations. Parliamentarianism, democracy and the independence of several countries were shaped by debates over who should have the power to define and collect taxes. The struggle for the right to influence tax policies contributed to the creation of institutions that ensured effective popular participation in government and the basis of its legitimacy.

3-Conclusion: the transformation of the political legitimacy paradigm in Angola

Political legitimacy in Angola is undergoing a significant transformation. The concept of the “right to govern”, previously associated with the MPLA, has lost its validity. This change reflects the growing awareness of the Angolan tax-paying population (and not recipients of fuel subsidies) of their role in sustaining the state, especially through the payment of taxes. The relationship between citizens’ tax contributions and the state’s ability to function has become a central element in the country’s political dynamics, transcending ideologies and public demonstrations.

This transformation marks a new phase in Angolan politics, where the power of the people is manifested in a more concrete way. The voice of citizens, based on their economic contribution, will redefine political arrangements and the structure of governance. This phenomenon highlights the importance of legitimacy that goes beyond mere legality, demanding a deeper connection between the rulers and the ruled.

The 2027 elections will represent a milestone in this context. For the first time, political legitimacy will be debated at the ballot box, transcending the legal sphere. This event promises to be a turning point in Angola’s political history, where the weight of social and economic transformation will have a direct impact on the choice of leaders and the definition of the country’s future.


[1] https://www.msn.com/pt-pt/pol%C3%ADtica/governo/governo-angolano-confirma-mais-cortes-nos-subs%C3%ADdios-aos-combust%C3%ADveis-este-ano/ar-AA1DGdmi

[2] https://www.angola24horas.com/sociedade/item/31715-governo-angolano-confirma-mais-cortes-nos-subsidios-aos-combustiveis

[3] https://observador.pt/2024/08/02/governo-angolano-diz-que-salarios-de-julho-dos-funcionarios-publicos-ja-foram-pagos/

[4] We have our doubts about this cut before the fuel market structure is reformed to make it a competitive market, but that’s a subject we won’t discuss here.  See:  https:

[5]https://www.ucm.minfin.gov.ao/cs/groups/public/documents/document/aw4x/mju4/~edisp/minfin1258130.pdf

[6] https://expansao.co.ao/angola/detalhe/luanda-arrecadou-922-do-total-da-receita-fiscal-nao-petrolifera-em-2022-60224.html

[7] https://forbesafricalusofona.com/impostos-arrecadados-pela-agt-em-angola-atingem-os-13-bilioes-kz-em-2022/

[8] https://www.opais.ao/economia/arrecadacao-nao-petrolifera-acima-dos-4-bilioes-de-kwanzas/

[9] Rui Verde, 2021, Angola at the Crossroads. Between Development and Kleptocracy, IB.Tauris. London.

[10] Rui Verde, 2000, The Harmonious Constitution. Judges and the Protection of Liberty. Newcastle upon Tyne.

Conditions and solutions for the removal of fuel subsidy in Angola

Summary of the proposed policy

In this document there are necessary conditions and possible solutions for the removal of the subsidy to fuel in Angola.

1-The necessary conditions are:

a) Creation of transparency mechanism of budgetary financial flows. The fate of savings made with the withdrawal of subsidies, emphasizing social aspects;

b) Modification of the oligopolistic market structure. Promotion of competition in the fuel distribution market. One hypothesis is the split of Sonangol distribuição in three entities and privatization of two of them.

2-The possible solutions are:

a) Focus on the subject

AA) direct subsidy to the most disadvantaged and social pass

AB) direct allowance to companies

AC) Tax Benefit /Negative Tax to AA) and AB)

b) Focus on the object

BA) Subsidized fuel prices continues for lower displacement vehicles

BB) subsidized fuel prices continue for transportation companies and similar

c) Composite systems

***

Elimination Fuel Subsidies: IMF and Vera Daves

It is an integral part of any intervention of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to have fuel subsidies withdrawn, where they exist. Of course, the same booklet was followed in Angola creating this burden on the Angolan government.

In terms of fiscal policy, in the recent Staff Report according to article IV the fund makes this the main measure to take at the level of fiscal policy, prescribing that: “Authorities need to take political action to increase non-oil tax revenues and gradually eliminate fuel subsidies while increasing support for vulnerable. These measures should help reduce vulnerabilities debt, create tax space and achieve their fiscal and medium-term debt goals. ”[1] (emphasis added).

Minister Vera Daves tunes for the same tuning fork, and in a recent interview said that the removal of fuel subsidies is “the elephant in the middle of the room, and with ballerina shoes”, stating that the political decision was made and was not implemented only because it is lacking to find the mechanism that reduces the impact on the most disadvantaged. And she explained that: “It is a blind subsidy, which everyone accesses, and with this revenue we could have a more directed policy instead of subsidizing those who do not need.” Adding arguments for the elimination of this measure as “fuel leakage to neighboring countries, lack of market share and the consequent loss of tax revenue, beyond the issue of inequality of treatment. There are several distortions to the market, but we are aware that the impact, especially through transport, is considerable. “It also recognized the negative impact on municipalities, industries and farms and the price of freight to transport food. And concluded by saying:” We have everything mapped, now the challenge is to take the dancer’s shoe thinking of measures that can mitigate the removal “from this allowance that costs between $ 3 and 4 billion, about $ 2.8 to 3.7 billion euros, per year. “It is a considerable value, given that the Integration and Intervention Program in the municipalities (PIIM) has 2 billion, so it would be two PIIM. ”[2]

It seems, therefore, that the IMF and Vera Daves are determined to eliminate fuel subsidies, apparently they do not know yet is how.

The political issue and the mechanism of transparency

It is evident that these eliminations, even making sense economically, and we will already address doubts in this context, have a large political impact and cannot be viewed as a “lightweight”. From Egypt to Iran to Sudan, France, changes in fuel prices have impacts on political stability, so the first assessment to do is political.

The great argument advanced by Vera Daves is the one that technically is called Crowding Out. By spending 2.8 to 3.7 billion euros, a year on fuel subsidies, the government does not spend them in the social sector, in education and health, for example. In fact, she argues, what is put in the lowering of the price of gasoline is taken from the well-being of the people. Accepting the argument, it must be sustained and convince the population. Accordingly, the first task would be to create a transparency mechanism (perhaps in the form of a digital site) that explained to the population how the background of subsidies would be channeled to other sectors, clarifying government plans. 1000 million for schools, 500 million for teachers, etc. Making a simple scheme and spreading it, everyone would realize the fate of money, and then over the early years there should be a public presentation of this flow. It would be explained by a scheme where the savings had gone with the removal of fuel subsidies. Consequently, the population would see that it had not been invented by the Minister of Finance, but that it was effectively happening.

A first preparatory measure of political nature is the creation of a transparency mechanism for all consultable to explain the path of money, how much it comes out of fuel subsidies and where it will end up in the various sectors of the budget. Thus, the population sees the benefits.

Fig. No. 1- Example of the transparency mechanism of the flow of funds taken from the subsidy to fuels, to be presented annually to the population

The problem of market structure

Entering the economic area there is a question that is raised and should be confronted. It is evident that the termination of fuel allowance will increase their prices.

In 2021, there were 951 gas stations in Angola, of which 432, would be controlled by small operators without brand. Sonangol Distribuidora is the largest in the distribution segment with a market share (sales) of 64%, Pumangol is the second largest player with 24% and the remaining 16% are distributed by Sonangalp and Tomsa (Total Marketing and Services Angola)[3].

The question is the definition of the structure of this market. A first analysis could appear to be facing a competitive market, but the weight of Sonangol and Pumangol, representing a total of 78% of sales market quota indicates that we are facing an oligopolistic type market, where few companies dominate the sector. It is known to price theory that oligopolistic markets have higher prices than perfect competition markets, where no one dominates the market. The oligopoly price is fixed by companies above the price level that would prevail in competition and below the monopoly profit maximizing price level. It is a market structure that constitutes a intermediate case, where there are few companies that compete with each other.[4] Consequently, removing the subsidy of fuel prices in an oligopoly situation would be equivalent at a higher price than the market equilibrium price and to put the population to finance higher profits from fuel distribution companies.

It is fundamental while the gradual withdrawal of prices begins to increase the number of relevant operators in the market and put them to compete with each other, without anyone mastering the market.

The most advisable was to split Sonangol Distribuidora in three different companies and immediately privatize two of them. Thus, we would have at least 5 relevant operators in competition.

Fig. No. 2- Sonangol Distribuição Scheme to ensure competition in the market

Forms of compensation/mitigation of the removal of subsidies

Described was the need to create a fund flow transparency mechanism for political consensus purposes, as well as the need to reform the market structure of the Downstream segment as a way to prevent oligopoly price formation, that is, higher than normal, it is time to make suggestions for compensation for the removal of subsidies.

The starting point is that there will be no savings of all values pointed out as a cost, 2.8 to 3.7 billion euros per year, and that there are sectors and populations that must be protected. We speak, of course, the populations with less income and the areas of transport and food and agricultural distribution.

Measures can start from various focuses:

a) Focus on the subject

AA) direct subsidy to the most disadvantaged and social pass

AB) direct allowance to companies

AC) Tax Benefit /Negative Tax to AA) and AB)

b) Focus on the object

BA) Subsidized fuel prices continues for lower displacement vehicles

BB) subsidized fuel prices continue for transportation companies and similar

c) Composite systems

Explaining each of the items and possibilities. We would have the following:

a) Focus on the subject

AA) direct subsidy to the most disadvantaged and social pass

A first hypothesis would be the granting of a fuel subsidy to all those who had a vehicle and/or used fuel in a given activity and showed an income below a given level. This wanted to say that the citizen who used fuel and had low income would receive a direct subsidy of the state in order to alleviating the negative effects of the price of fuel climbing.

In addition, a reduced social pass could be created, allowing any citizen to use transport without repercussion of the amount of fuel climb.

AB) direct allowance to companies

Another hypothesis would be that of direct allowance to transport and distribution companies. So that they did not reverberate the price of fuel in prices charged to the public, there would be compensation paid by the state that would cover the differential. Companies would receive funds so as not to increase prices.

AC) Tax Benefit /Negative Tax to AA) and AB)

In this situation, the instrument used for compensation would be the fiscal system, not the direct transfers of subsidies. It would be allowed to natural persons to a certain level of income and the companies of the affected sectors presented as tax deduction the value of the differential paid with the rise of prices. For example, if they previously paid 5 and then they would pay 10, they would have the opportunity to present an amount of 5 as a fiscal deduction, paying a lower tax.

In a superficial situation, such a deductive possibility would only apply to entities who paid tax, leaving out those who do not pay or are exempt. In these cases, a negative tax should be made, that is, a system through which low-income people would receive supplementary government payments rather than pay taxes. These supplementary payments would be equal to the additional amounts spent on fuel by these people.

b) Focus on the object

BA) Prices of subsidized fuel continues for lower displacement vehicles

In this hypothesis, what would happen would be the establishment of different levels of price for fuel according to the displacement of vehicles. Low-displacement vehicles would pay a lower price and vice versa. It would be a kind of progressive price.

BB) subsidized fuel prices continue for transportation companies and similar

In this case, the system would be the same as indicated above, with the difference that the beneficial price would be applied to the vehicles of transport companies and similar.

c) composite system

It is evident that the above systems can be mixed or complemented by each other, and it is up to the political decision-making to find the best technical combination.

Fig. No. 3- Possible compensatory solutions for the removal of subsidies to fuels

Need for financial calculations

There are no financial calculations in this work because the numbers are not known. The Minister of Finance presents an order of magnitude of current spending quantity with fuel subsidy, which is between 2.8 and 3.7 billion euros per year. Easily it is found that the differential is too large (900 million euros) to do a finer arithmetic of the situation.


[1] IMF, STAFF REPORT FOR THE 2022 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION, February 7, 2023, p. 7.

[2] https://angola24horas.com/component/k2/item/26418-governo-angolano-prepara-fundo-de-investimento-imobiliario-para-gerir-ativos-recuperados

[3] Data from Expansão: https://expansao.co.ao/expansao-mercados/interior/sao-951-postos-de-combustivel-e-454-de-bandeira-branca-101135.html

[4] See for example, George J. Stigler, https://cooperative-individualism.org/stigler-george_a-theory-of-oligopoly-1964-feb.pdf