In a usual situation, the agitation and tension that was felt in the months preceding the general elections of August 2022 in Angola, it would have given rise to the normality and quiet functioning of the institutions until the following electoral act occurred in 2027. However, the strong divisions that were felt and that kind of almost global strife that existed until August does not seem to decrease, creating a situation of constant aggression, without an end to the sight in the present system. Symptom of this is the recent interview given by the opposition leader to a Portuguese newspaper, which declares “neither I nor the party recognize MPLA’s victory, because we know that Unita had more votes. We heard people across the country. Society wanted us to take over the institutions, but we didn’t want chaos.[1] ”
Consequently, on the one hand, the main opposition party has assumed a policy that we will call the “double road.” Such a policy disputes government within the institutions, although not recognizing its legitimacy, also challenging the institutions themselves. The “double road” accepts that the opposition is made within institutions and outside them; In a way, institutions are seen as another instrument of a broader project of confrontation with the government. It is evident that this posture leads to a difficult manichaeism to manage and undermines any openness and respectability that is intended with the investment. The lack of respect for institutions makes everything too dependent on the will of the political decision makers and the conjuncture.
On the other hand, the government party is embarrassed to lead its announced reforms, it is as if the party were not one but two parties. A party mass is dissatisfied with the proposed changes, it wanted that João Lourenço to be just a more skilled manager than José Eduardo dos Santos, but not to introduce background reforms, another sector wants to be taken effective reforms and is bothered by the eventual slowness of these reforms. They have the notion that without a deep reformist process, Angola can become a state with no future.
There is thus a strong instability, for various reasons, in parties that form the sustainment of the political system.
The National Assembly does not seem to be a deliberative chamber of the nation’s feeling, but a mere stage of a broader dispute, becoming in a means and not an end, removing it the sovereign weight that would be inherent.
With a more frightening record the justice arises. The one who is the basic pillar of a democratic rule of law offers more doubts than certainties. In combating corruption, with honorable exceptions, the judicial system has been based on inefficiency and slowness, not already realizing where this structuring program of the state is walking. As we have already written: “It is true that the supreme court’s design contained in the 2010 Constitution helps to its dysfunctionality. In fact, the Angolan constitutional legislator wanted to make a court following the model of the US Supreme Court grafted in a judicial system of Roman-Germanic type, that is, Portuguese. Now a top court in the Portuguese, German or French judicial system has nothing to do with a top court in an Anglo-American system. They are different concepts and structures. What is asked for an American supreme court is not what one asks for a Portuguese Supreme Court. In the first case, only large and innovative law issues arrive there. It is already a kind of court of reflection, while in the second Roman-German case-the Supreme acts as a last instance of appeal for almost all cases. However, in Angola, a court was thought in the American way to operate in a Portuguese manner. Therefore, a light structure that was only dedicated to a small number of cases had to face the task of being a usual court of appeal for a myriad of cases. That could only give bad result, as it gave. In addition to the dysfunctionality of constitutional design, it has been understood that the judges of the Supreme Court do not have adequate preparation to deal with the complexities of economic and financial crime, not having throughout their career came across with these issues at the sophisticated level to which they have been appearing, which has led to some much criticized decisions and to a large procedural default.
“Beginning the country simultaneously a phase of great appeal to foreign investment, as well as betting on the fight against corruption, is well to see that a poorly designed and thought court has to be reformed and remodeled. [2]”
Overall, justice has not offered guarantees of speed and technical impartiality, and its actors have had a surprising tendency to get involved in consecutive scandals.
On the part of the population there is a timid idea, but discussed in many outside, that current institutions and political parties were designed for a war and confrontation environment, and these characteristics are in their core, and therefore are not able in dealing with a new Angola, where the central objectives are the development and well-being of the population. This means that it is considered that the “old” parties no longer correspond to the wishes and interests of the population, not offering consistent and appealing solutions. The abstention rate of the last general elections (54%) is a mirror of this situation.
A National Assembly that has become a mere-instrument-power and counterpower instrument, an inept justice and an anacronic party system, define this Angolan institutional system.
This whole situation, a little diffuse, but whose signs abound, can make the country in an ancracy. What is an ancracy? The ancracy has been defined as an unstable regime that combines elements of authoritarianism and democracy. The ancracy has an incomplete development of mechanisms of dissension and consensualization and is associated with permanent agitation or ingenability, which make the political process difficult[3]. The existence of an annocratic situation increases the likelihood[4] of a civil war. Putting the theme in another way, what it seeks to question is whether the Angolan situation is inherently unstable and can it resort to a civil war?
The answer is simple, although having two parts. No, Angola has not yet experienced an anocracy situation. However, structuring measures are required to exceed present blockages and dissatisfaction.
New Constitution and New Republic
It is necessary to create an agile state, with respected institutions, a functional public administration and a market economy with free and competitive actors, all contributing to the progress and well-being of the population.
The structures inherited from colonialism and wars must be transformed and exchanged for structures of modernity and development, taking into account the culture and history of Angola.
A new historical cycle with a new structure is critical.
The first measure is to establish a new constitution. The current 2010 Constitution is not consensual and, to some extent, is a legal misconception designed to please the personal desires of José Eduardo dos Santos. Fundamental will be to propose a new constitution, more Angolan and more protective of institutions, which marks a fresh start.
It is understood that this new constitution should address aspects as different as the possibility of separate (direct or indirect) election of the President of the Republic, giving him his own legitimacy and ensuring that the president presents himself as a national leader and not a party leader , the creation of a Second Legislative Chamber composed by the traditional authorities (allowing the introduction of different and plural voices in the legislative process, recovering African culture), the introduction of militant democracy mechanisms as the German fundamental law has (such as Karl Loewenstein[5] wrote Democracy should be able to resist those political agents who use democratic instruments to ensure the triumph of totalitarian or authoritarian projects of power, meaning that the Constitution must contain mechanisms of defense and repression of attempts to overthrow the constitutional regime, which now does not exist with sufficient strength in the Angolan Constitution). Obviously, that the reformulation of judicial power, the change in the symbology of the republic, would be other aspects of this new constitution.
A constitutional change is not enough without the organization and administration of the state. Also here the transformation project has to be comprehensive and seeking the release of colonial and Marxist models, introducing a public administration suitable for the new times. Examples may come from Asia, such as China and Singapore[6], or neighboring countries like Botswana or South Africa. The paradigm must be a merit -based administration based on effectiveness and service to the population. Of course, this implies the end of the clientelist influence on administration, deconcentration with autonomy and decision-making capacity, a completely new way of seeing the administrative procedure, not as a set of rules, but a set of good practices and goals dedicated for the common good and effectiveness.
It is evident that only a few topics are left here about advisable structural changes, according to our perspective, to transform Angola into a modern and prosperous state.
[1] Adalberto da Costa Júnior, interview to Nascer do Sol, 20-01-23
[3] Jennifer Gandhi e James Vreeland (2008). “Political Institutions and Civil War: Unpacking Anocracy”. Journal of Conflict Solutions. 52 (3): 401–425; Patrick Regan and Sam Bell, Sam (2010). “Changing Lanes or Stuck in the Middle: Why Are Anocracies More Prone to Civil Wars?”. Political Science Quarterly. 63 (4): 747–759.
[4] Patrick Regan and Sam Bell, Sam (2010). “Changing Lanes or Stuck in the Middle: Why Are Anocracies More Prone to Civil Wars?”. Political Science Quarterly. 63 (4): 747–759.
[5] Karl Loewenstein (1937) Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, in: American Political Science Review 31.
[6] M. Shamsul Haque (2009), Public Administration and Public Governance in Singapore in Pan Suk Kim, ed., Public Administration and Public Governance in ASEAN Member Countries and Korea. Seoul: Daeyoung Moonhwasa Publishing Company, 2009. pp.246-271.
https://www.cedesa.pt/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Const.-Angola.jpg380750CEDESA-Editorhttps://www.cedesa.pt/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/logo-CEDESA-completo-W-curvas.svgCEDESA-Editor2023-01-30 11:23:002023-01-24 11:18:46Angola: new Constitution, new Republic?
The starting point for this study is the statement of a renowned researcher during the II International Congress of Angolanistics according to whom the “next elections in Angola should be the least transparent and credible.”[1]
It is recalled that Angola had its first elections in 1992, after which there was a resurgence of the civil war that ended in 2002, and it only held elections again in 2008, followed by electoral acts in 2012 and 2017, so far, four electoral processes in Angola.
The next elections are scheduled for August 24, 2022.
In all the elections whose count has reached the end, the MPLA, the party in government since independence in 1975, won with the following results: 1992- 53.74%; 2008- 81.76%; 2012-71.84%; 2017- 61.05%.
Table no. 1- Winner of the elections in Angola (1992-2017)
1992
MPLA
53,74%
2008
MPLA
81,76%
2012
MPLA
71,84%
2017
MPLA
61,05%
Interestingly, in every election, even in 1992[2], which had wide international coverage and had over 400 foreign observers, the main opposition party alleged fraud.
In 1992, these allegations resulted in renewed civil war and undisguised massacre and violence. In fact, the resolution of the dispute only took place with the death of the opposition leader and the end of the war in 2002. In the other elections, there was final acceptance of the results and integration into the constitutional-legal functioning.
In 2008, 90 observers from the European Union were present, and the MPLA’s victory was overwhelming. It was, in fact, the time of the oil boom. Even so, the opposition claimed fraud, and demanded a repetition of the elections due to delays that marked the process, described by the opposition leader as “a disaster”, with numerous delays across the country. In any case, despite these protests, the elections were eventually accepted and the deputies took their seats. This time there was no war and a certain democratization of public life began.
2012 was again the year of elections, and again, there were reports of irregularities, but without the vocality of the past. The opposition took their seats in parliament and played their part.
In the year 2017, the African Union sent observers to the elections, with the aim of guaranteeing democratic elections, but the European Union decided not to send a large team of observers. The opposition contested the results, but ended up accepting them after decisions by the Constitutional Court that validated the elections.
There are patterns that repeat themselves. The first two are obvious, the victory of the MPLA and the permanent contestation of the process by the opposition. There is also the intervention of external observers, for example 400 in 1992.
Despite repeated accusations of fraud on the part of the defeated candidates, what is certain is that, with the exception of 1992, they always ended up accepting the results and taking their seats in the National Assembly.
Comparisons: Transparency and Democracy in 2022
The question that we are going to answer is whether the present elections, scheduled for August 24, 2022, represent a decrease in the electoral conditions of the past, as some researchers claim, or if, on the contrary, even though they are not perfect, they present a clear evolution in terms of transparency and democracy?
To assess the conditions, we will review current legislation, as well as the characteristics of the current public scrutiny compared to the past, as we believe that this is the realistic critical mechanism to assess the transparency of elections.
Legislation
Regarding the legislation in force, there are some aspects to emphasize, many of which have been the target of misunderstandings or not very literal interpretations. Elections are now regulated by Law No. 30/21 of 30 December, which amended Law No. 36/11 of 21 December — Organic Law on General Elections (OLGE). In the current legislation we have to highlight the following topics that focus on the electoral process:
i) Basic conditions: demonstration, right to broadcast and financing
During the electoral campaign period, freedom of assembly and demonstration for electoral purposes is governed by the provisions of the general law applicable to the exercise of freedom of assembly and demonstration, with the following specificities (article 66 of the OLGE):
a) Processions and parades may take place on any day and time, respecting only the limits imposed by freedom of work, maintenance of calmness and public order, freedom and traffic management, as well as respect for the period of citizens’ rest.
b) The presence of public authority agents at meetings and events organized by any candidate can only be requested by the competent bodies of the applications, with the organizing entity responsible for maintaining order when such a request is not made.
c) The communication to the competent administrative authority of the area about the intention to promote a meeting or demonstration is made at least 24 hours in advance.
What results from the law is a broad possibility of demonstration, with no constraints or noticeable obstacles.
It should be noted, moreover, that in the pre-campaign period there have already been large demonstrations without incident, either by the government party or by the opposition.
The opposition leader has moved freely in the territory from north to south, specifically, from Cabinda to Menongue and carried out large mass acts, without any impediment or confrontation. This fundamental aspect for the electoral process has been ensured.
In relation to the right to broadcast, article 73 of the OLGE provides that candidates for general elections are entitled to use the public broadcasting and television service, during the official period of the electoral campaign, in the following terms: a) Radio: 10 minutes a day between 3 pm and 10 pm; b) Television: 5 minutes a day between 6 pm and 10 pm.
The law guarantees what we might call the minimum amount of political intervention during the electoral campaign period.
The global funding of all political parties carried out by the State is also provided for and is imperative under the terms of article 81 of the OLGE, which provides that the State will allocate an amount to support the electoral campaign of candidates for the general elections, which is distributed equitably, and it can be used to support the List Delegates.
The letter of the law offers sufficient guarantees that certain minimums of equity and competition between parties are upheld for the 2022 elections[3].
ii) Voting and counting of votes
This is an area where there has been a lot of discussion and perhaps misunderstandings or misinterpretations. Therefore, it is important to underline the essential provisions of the law.
Firstly, polling stations, contrary to what one might think in light of some published analyses, play a central role in the process. From the outset, the List Delegate present at the Polling Station can request clarifications and submit, in writing, complaints regarding the electoral operations of the same Polling Station and instruct them with the appropriate documents, and the Polling Station cannot refuse to receive the complaints, and must initial them and attach them to the minutes, together with the respective resolution, whose knowledge will be given to the claimant. (Article 115 of the OLGE).
This means that there is a direct inspection by each of the parties in each of the Polling Stations. What we might call an atomist oversight. Every atom of the election is being verified.
Afterwards, it is still at the Polling Station that the polls are opened and the votes are counted, also contrary to what has been stated.
In fact, once voting is over, the Chairman of the Board, in the presence of the other members, opens the ballot box, followed by the counting operation in order to verify the correspondence between the number of Voting Ballots in the ballot box and the number of voters who voted at that Polling Station. (Article 120 of the OLGE).
Then, the President of the Polling Station orders the counting of the Ballots, respecting the following rules:
a) The President opens the bulletin, displays it and reads it aloud;
b) The first scrutineer records the votes allocated to each party on a sheet of white paper or, if available, on a large board;
c) The second scrutineer places, separately and in batches, after displaying them, the already read votes corresponding to each of the parties, the blank votes and the null votes;
d) The first and third tellers proceed to the counting of the votes and the Chairman of the Board to divulge the number of votes that fell to each party.
After this operation, which is well detailed in the law, the President of the Polling Station compares the number of votes in the ballot box and the sum of the number of votes for each lot. The List Delegates have the right to verify the lots without being able to complain in case of doubt to the Chairman of the Board who analyzes the complaint. (Article 121 of the OLGE).
Consequently, we have an electoral act that is supervised and the votes are counted locally at each Polling Station with the presence of delegates from each party.
This is what the law defines.
After this local operation, a Minute of the Polling Station is drawn up by the Secretary of the Table and duly signed, in legible handwriting, by the President, Secretary, Tellers and by the List Delegates who have witnessed the voting, being then placed in a sealed envelope that must be duly forwarded, by the quickest route, to the Provincial Electoral Commission. (Article 123 of the OLGE). Subsequently, the National Electoral Commission is responsible for centralizing all the results obtained and for distributing the mandates (article 131 of the OLGE). In summary, the national tabulation is based on the summary minutes and other documents and information received from the Polling Stations (article 132 of the OLGE).
It can thus be seen that the counting of results is carried out at the local level, with no centralization of the opening of the polls or the counting, the centralization is carried out a posteriori, based on the results obtained at the Polling Stations.
Looking at the legal provisions mentioned above, a transparent and properly supervised mechanism can be seen at the local level.
Added to this mechanism is the rule of article 116 of the OLGE which makes it mandatory that the technologies to be used in the scrutiny activities meet the requirements of transparency and security.
The same rule requires the audit of source programs, data transmission and processing systems and control procedures and makes it imperative that before the beginning of each election, the Plenary of the National Electoral Commission carry out an independent, specialized technical audit, for public tender, to test and certify the integrity of source programs, data transmission and processing systems and control procedures to be used in tabulation and scrutiny activities at all levels.
iii) The transparency of the President of the Republic election
The Voting Ballot is printed in color, on smooth and non-transparent paper, in a rectangular shape with the appropriate dimensions so that it can fit all the candidacies admitted to the vote and whose spacing and graphic presentation do not mislead voters in the exact identification and signage of the application one has chosen.
The serial number, the statutory designation of the political party, the name of the candidate for President of the Republic and the respective passport-type photograph, the acronym and the symbols of the political party or coalition of political parties, arranged vertically, are printed on each Ballot, one below the other, in the order of the draw carried out by the National Electoral Commission, after the approval of the candidacies by the Constitutional Court (article 17 of the OLGE).
This means that despite the presidential election method chosen by the Constitution, voters clearly know who they are voting for for President of the Republic. It has the face and name indicated.
iv) Electoral litigation
The assessment of the regularity and validity of elections is ultimately the responsibility of the Constitutional Court (article 6 OLGE). This rule commits the Constitutional Court (CC) all final decisions on elections, not the National Electoral Commission (NEC).
The fact that the CC has the final word and not the NEC is an added jurisdictional guarantee. At the present time, as we will see later, this is relevant because the CC has been the subject of a great deal of public scrutiny, making it more difficult to make decisions that have no legal basis.
Public Scrutiny
It is natural, above all for the supporters of a realistic vision of the law[4], in which we include ourselves, according to which what is important is not what is written in the law, nor even the meta-legal principles on which it is based, but its application and practical result, one is not satisfied with the mere legal enumeration, even if it appears well constructed and promising, as it seems to us to be the case with the present Organic Law on General Elections.
It is necessary to invoke other real factors that allow a more objective assessment of the electoral phenomenon in Angola, as expected for 2022.
We understand that the key factor is the public scrutiny that the electoral process is having. Public scrutiny understood as a thorough examination and diligent investigation of a phenomenon carried out by society in general, and not just by specific bodies that may or may not be aligned with a given political or ideological option.
Our argument is that the greater the public scrutiny to which an electoral phenomenon is subject, the greater its transparency and democracy and the lower the probabilities of fraud, with a direct relationship between scrutiny and transparency.
Now, the brief excursus that we carried out on the several elections that took place in Angola, and removing the one from 1992, which due to its specificity and historical context has no place in this comparison, and considering that some of our contributors personally followed the 2012 and 2017 elections, allows us to advance with some trends in relation to aspects of scrutiny by members of civil society or non-political structuring bodies of the community. These themes lead us to a qualitative comparison between 2008 and 2017.
First, let’s highlight the Catholic Church. Possibly, as a result of certain accusations of collaboration with the colonial power and some clash with the post-independence Marxist ideology, the Catholic Church, in general, had committed itself in the previous elections to a discreet and little public intervention role, not contributing for a strong debate about the electoral process in the previous elections (2008 to 2017).
This will not happen in 2022, following in the footsteps of its counterpart in the neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in which the Catholic Church played a decisive role in the 2018/2019 electoral transition between Kabila and Tshisekedi, the Angolan Catholic Church has adopted a manifesto leading role in the preparation of the Angolan elections. Its bishops and priests are active in their pastoral care and in their homilies and have an intense public activity, demanding adequate elections[5].
It is precisely this Catholic activism, bearing in mind that according to statistics, around 40% of the Angolan population is Catholic[6], which allows us to conclude that the scrutiny that the Catholic Church is carrying out of the elections will not leave a large part of the population indifferent and obliges by itself to increased transparency in the process. In other words, Catholic scrutiny and its multiple organizations is, in itself, an intrinsic factor of transparency.
A second factor that we notice different in relation to other Angolan elections is the role of social networks. These will cover about a quarter of the voting population[7], but perhaps more of those who actually vote. By frequenting social networks, one can easily glimpse the intensity with which they talk about the elections and how they discuss their realization and the need for transparency. A candidate for deputy for the opposition party and activist constantly present on the networks like Hitler Samussuku has 52,000 followers on Facebook and his posts often reach more than 1000 likes. This is just a random example, but many others could be mentioned.
Never before have social networks in Angola been so alive and active as in this period, contesting, discussing and affirming positions.
As in the situation of the Catholic Church, we understand that this digital scrutiny has a double function. By itself it is synonymous with transparency and at the same time it increases transparency by placing the discussion on the elections in the public space.
We have here two factors intrinsically conducive to electoral transparency: the activism of the Catholic Church and digital activism.
Finally, it is worth mentioning the issue of international observers. In the difficult year of 1992, according to public information, 400 international observers were present[8], in 2017, more than 1000 observers will have been present[9], currently, according to publications that have focused on the subject, 2000 national observers are expected for 2022 and an undisclosed number of international observers. It should be said that in view of the aforementioned activism of the Church and in the digital world, national observers will play a very intense role, contrary to what could happen in the past.
Conclusions
The issue we studied here is not the platonic perfection of the Angolan elections, but the evolution of electoral transparency since 2008 with the forecast for 2022.
What we have found, taking into account two indices, legislation and public scrutiny, is that, at the moment, there is a law strong enough to hold free and fair elections, and that public scrutiny, namely by the Catholic Church and its satellite organizations and also through social networks, has never been as high as it is today.
To that extent, even with imperfections, it is expected that these elections will be more transparent than in the past, because if this does not happen, public opinion will feel better and more deeply than in the past.
[3] We do not discuss in this work the problem of public service imbalance in the pre-campaign period. It will possibly be the object of another study pointing out solutions and needs for a holistic view of the situation encompassing all sources of news: public, private, foreign and digital.
[4] See for exemple Rui Verde, Juízes: o novo poder, 2015.
https://www.cedesa.pt/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/28263904.jpg10801920CEDESA-Editorhttps://www.cedesa.pt/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/logo-CEDESA-completo-W-curvas.svgCEDESA-Editor2022-06-29 12:53:002022-06-23 17:59:15Theories of electoral fraud, legislation and public scrutiny in Angola
Angola’s history has been one of constant and overcoming challenges, and its survival as a single entity has been threatened since independence in 1975. It is never too much to remember that independence itself was declared at different times and in different places by different entities, with greater or less legitimacy. Agostinho Neto proclaimed the independence of the People’s Republic of Angola at 11 pm on November 11, 1975, in Luanda. Holden Roberto, leader of the FNLA, announced the Independence of the People’s Democratic Republic of Angola at midnight on November 11, in Ambriz and Jonas Savimbi did the same for UNITA in what was then Nova Lisboa on the same day, declaring the birth of the Republic Social Democratic Republic of Angola.
Immediately, a civil war followed that more or less sporadically, covering larger or smaller areas, lasted until 2002. Attempts at external invasion were also frequent, South Africa, even before independence, entered Namibia and Mobutu’s Zaire the same to the north. Then it was Cuba’s turn, at the invitation of the Luanda government to also enter the country to counter the other invasions[1]. Indirect interventions by the then superpowers also abounded, and it is unnecessary to recall the threats of disintegration that the country experienced until the end of the civil war in 2002.
After that date, the threats posed to Angola diminished, although many remained latent and others emerged, such as those linked to the capture of the State and corruption[2].
Currently, there is an increase in external threats after 2002, not assuming the dramatic contours of the years after independence, but posing demanding challenges to the forces defending sovereignty, territorial integrity and national public order.
Separatism
Internally, we can see the rekindling of separatist attempts, both in Lundas and in Cabinda, which could be a trigger for other initiatives. In relation to Cabinda, reports have recently appeared on social media, replicated in some media of clashes between the armed wing of the Front for the Liberation of the State of Cabinda (FLEC) and the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA)[3]. These attacks, real or virtual, follow several complaints from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) about Angolan incursions into its territory in apparent hot pursuit of FLEC members. Last August, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the DRC, Célestin Mbala Musense, criticized alleged incursions by the Angolan Navy into the country’s territorial waters in operations against rebels in Cabinda and claimed that FAA soldiers were multiplying incursions into the country, persecuting FLEC rebels[4].
Alongside this possible military upsurge, which is uncertain and about which there is no reliable information, there is a duly publicized current of opinion that invokes the need for a solution, although it is not clear what it is, or is tired of a confrontation.
The truth is that the Constitution of Angola (CRA) in its articles 5 and 6 is determinant: “… no part of the national territory or of the sovereign rights that the State exercises over it may be alienated.” It should be noted that this formulation implies that any territory always remains an integral part of the State, but does not prohibit different statutes and approximations, such as the establishment of autonomies always integrated into the national whole and of local authorities, more or less decentralized.
There is, therefore, a constitutional duty to combat any attempt at territorial secession, the CRA admitting the use of force to make this happen (“energetically fought”). In this context, the FAA will play a crucial role in preventing any dismemberment. In addition to constitutional law, it is also easy to see that any separation or “detachment” of Cabinda from Angola would have a disintegrating effect on the country, which as we know, historically, is a recent construction in progress.
This leads to the second threat of the same separatist type that exists in the Lundas. In January 2021, there was a bloody confrontation, the contours of which were duly described in Rafael Marques’ text, “”Miséria & Magia.[5]” In addition to socio-economic aspects, the event has been seen as linked to independence attempts by a self-styled Movement of the Portuguese Protectorate Lunda Tchokwe (MPPLT).
It is evident, in the first place, it is the duty of the State and the government to deal with the grievances of local populations, taking into account their developmental, economic and social demands. It is primarily a question of politics and progress. However, it is not worth ignoring that in the end, national integrity and sovereignty will always have to be guaranteed, and the FAA may play a decisive role in ensuring territorial cohesion.
That is why it is considered that a real threat to the sovereignty of Angola are the separatist impulses or intentions of part of its territory, with the FAA as the mainstay of the State to guarantee the integrity and unity of the State.
State capture and corruption
The second internal threat is linked to the aforementioned capture of the State and the fight against corruption. The option of political power was to hand over the fight against corruption to the common judicial means, therefore, this is not a function of the FAA, but of the police forces, criminal investigation and judiciary. The FAA only enters in what refers to the “capture of the State”. If forces or entities that benefit from corruption try to affect the normal functioning of the Rule of Law and Justice, weakening political power, it can be understood that the FAA will have a duty to defend constitutionality and legality, not intervening in specific judicial proceedings, but guaranteeing the conditions of tranquility and peace for the normal judiciary bodies to do their work. This is a difficult line to draw for the actions of the military, so the posture here must be understood as one of surveillance and symbolic support for the activity of the police forces and not of direct intervention.
If separatism and “state capture” are threats to sovereignty and peace in Angola, from the external point of view there are more and varied threats that have to be listed and have increased in recent years, requiring special attention from the FAA. The following stand out as external threats:
i) instability in neighboring countries, namely the DRC;
ii) the spread of terrorism designated as Islamic;
iii) crime and maritime piracy;
iv) increased competition between world powers with interests in African goods.
A few quick words about each of these segments:
i) instability in neighboring countries, namely the DRC
Although for the first time in 2018/2019 there was a peaceful transition of power in Congo (DRC), the truth is that the situation in this huge country is far from under control. The porosity with the Angolan border is a fact that is usually mentioned, but the main problem is that Tshisekedi, the President of the Republic and the state apparatus do not seem to control vast areas of the country that, according to some, are subject to militias promoted by Rwanda to search richness for processing in that country. A recent article by the Angolan professor and member of the Angolan government party, Benjamim Dunda, states that “What some do not know is that Rwanda is the gateway to the looting of excessive mineral resources in the DRC. Much of the endless instability of the neighboring nation of Mobutu has Kagame’s fingerprints. The Rwandan Patriotic Army (EPR) and Ugandan military, militarily occupy part of the territory of the DRC. Coltan (columbite and tantalite) is currently the most coveted ore in the technology industries worldwide. 80% of the world’s reserves are in the Democratic Republic of Congo.[6]” Without Dunda’s exalted tone, Laura McCreedy, from the International Peace Institute’s Center for Peacekeeping Operations, is on the same wavelength, referring already this month to reports of the resumption of proxy violence – attributed to Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi – as well as recent offensive operations against Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) by Ugandan forces and the alleged presence of Rwandan police and Burundian troops in eastern DRC, which is particularly alarming[7].
What appears is that there is a latent conflict in the DRC that is far from being resolved, to which is added a kind of asymmetric invasion, using the techniques popularized by Vladimir Putin in Crimea and Ukraine, by forces from Rwanda and perhaps Uganda within the DRC. This could soon provoke a more intense and not so covert war in the country with obvious effects in Angola. We shouldn’t forget that Angola was present in the so-called First Congo Civil War (1996-1997) and Second Congo Civil War (1998-2003), in addition to having directly or indirectly intervened in subsequent relevant moments in the DRC’s history. Consequently, it will not be indifferent to the evolution of the situation in the DRC and to this kind of discreet or disguised invasion that takes place, with the FAA having at least a deterrent role.
ii) the spread of terrorism designated as Islamic
The Angolan religious reality would not suggest an imminent danger from Islamic terrorism. However, there are two factors that must be taken into account to increase the degree of danger of Islamic terrorism in Angola.
The first factor is that what is often called “Islamic terrorism” does not have a real religious connotation, but represents a kind of franchise or brand adopted by insurrectionary movements or guerrillas in economically and socially degraded areas. This means that it is possible that in disaffected areas in Angola there may arise “Islamic” terrorist movements, which have nothing but Mohammedan but the designation, adopted to instill fear and terror in the populations and authorities. In fact, it seems clear that several Islamic terrorist movements that emerge in Africa are not the result of a command or central planning, but are more or less autonomous cells that imitate and mutually inspire, seeking common elements in propaganda and methodologies. As Chatham House experts Alex Vines and Jon Wallace put it, “[In Africa, the] line between jihadism, organized crime and local politics is often blurred and further complicated by global factors such as climate change, population and migration.[8] ” This means that the aforementioned “broth” can arise in Angola, and suddenly, the Islamic flag will be attractive to insurrectionary groups dissatisfied with the government.
Added to this first factor is the spreading across the African continent in relation to Islamic terrorism and which is gradually surrounding Angola. In the neighboring DRC, although still far from the Angolan borders, there is already talk of Islamic terrorism regarding the ADF (Allied Democratic Forces), with links between this organization and the Islamic State. In Tanzania, there are small attacks such as those in October 2020, in the village of Kitaya in the Mtwara region; attack that was claimed by Islamic extremists operating from northern Mozambique. Obviously, the case of Cabo Delgado in Mozambique is paradigmatic of the combination that can be foreseen for Angola, a socio-economic discontent allied to the emergence of Islamic terrorism. Further north, whether in the Central African Republic, Chad or Nigeria, there is a permanent threat from terrorist groups that identify themselves as Islamic.
The porosity of the borders, allied to the socio-economic difficulties, become powerful magnets for the expansion of terrorism that can become an internal threat in Angola, and it is certainly already a border threat and spreading across the African continent.
iii) crime and maritime piracy
From Cape Verde to the Angolan coast, attacks on ships have increased in recent years. In this vast maritime region, pirates – initially concentrated around the Niger Delta – extended their activities to all Nigerian coasts, as well as Benin and Togo. Since 2011, no less than 22 acts of piracy have been recorded in Benin, affecting traffic in the port of Cotonou, which has dropped by 60%. The massive economic impact of maritime crime – which includes illegal fishing, drug trafficking and weapons – on the coasts of West Africa increases every year. The Gulf of Guinea is now considered the continent’s maritime red zone[9].
Angola’s position has been clear, assuming itself as a strategic engine in the fight against piracy, pointing to the creation of a government funding strategy in the Gulf of Guinea and in the Great Lakes region, recognizing that crime has been growing in this area, endangering the region itself from a national, international and regional point of view. It is in this perspective that Angola attaches great importance to the maritime spaces that have to be controlled. In fact, of the 90 percent of crimes committed in the Atlantic Ocean, 70 percent occur in the Gulf of Guinea, which is worrying.
iv) increased competition between world powers with interests in African goods
This situation is more general and perhaps less imminent in causing disruption than the previous ones, however it exists and in the medium term could be the main threat to Angola. Some authors speak of a new “race for Africa”, such as those that took place at the end of the 19th century in connection with the Berlin Conference and after independence in the context of the Cold War. Angola was obviously a central part of both “races”. The first served to delimit its borders and complete the Portuguese colonial intervention, while in the second, it was one of the main battlefields of the US-Soviet Union confrontation. The prestigious English magazine The Economist summarized in 2019 the new, and third, rush to Africa, writing that there is a third wave in the works. The continent is important and is becoming increasingly important, mainly because of its growing share of the global population (by 2025 the UN predicts that there will be more Africans than Chinese). Governments and companies around the world are racing to strengthen diplomatic, strategic and commercial ties[10]. In fact, those who first discerned the continent’s opportunities were the Chinese who, since the beginning of the 21st century, have invested heavily in Africa, with Angola as their main partner, at least in terms of debt. The rest of the world has only just woken up to Africa. But in fact, we see Turkey in search of new markets and allies since it abandoned its alignment with the European Union, the Persian Gulf countries in the same line looking for diversification projects for their economies, and the European Union, led by Germany and France, with Italy and Spain also intensively recovering old ones and arranging new contacts, either for economic reasons or to try to stop the illegal immigration that affects their countries and can cause their governments to lose elections. Also Russia, in the mix of imperial recovery and business demand, returns to Africa. Only the United States of America has pursued a dormant policy towards the continent since Donald Trump, not yet understanding very well what they are doing in substance, apart from some noises against China and/or about Islamic terrorism. However, this lethargy can end.
At the moment, China is far ahead in the new race for Africa. As soon as Europeans and North Americans definitively understand – we are still in an ambivalent stage – that the Chinese presence in Africa is a threat to their geopolitical and economic interests, competition will intensify. It should be remembered that China currently absorbs around 60% of cobalt exports from Africa; 40% iron; and 25-30% of its exports of chromium, copper and manganese.
Consequently, Angola’s role as holder of key raw materials and a stabilizing force for the DRC, another immense repository of resources, will be decisive.
The current moment of the FAAs
In view of the above, it is easy to understand that these times is of great demand for the FAAs, who can once again be called upon to perform functions of national survival.
At this time, according to the most credible sources, the FAAs are comprised of approximately 107,000 active soldiers (100,000 Army; 1,000 Navy; 6,000 Air Force); there are still an estimated 10,000 in the Rapid Intervention Police (2021)[11].
Military expenditure is around 1.7% of GDP, therefore, below the 2% that the United States intends as a parameter for NATO countries (North Atlantic Treaty Organization of which Angola is obviously not a part, but whose parameter can serve as an ideal value of military expenditure). It is not an exaggerated expense, on the contrary, one might think.
Most Angolan military weapons and equipment are of Russian, Soviet or Warsaw Pact origin; since 2010, Russia remains the main supplier of military equipment to Angola[12].
Regarding its military capability in 2022, Angola is ranked 66th among 140 countries considered by Global Fire Power[13]. Its forces include 320 tanks, 1210 armored vehicles, and several artillery pieces. It should be noted, however, that tanks are essentially old, acquired in the 1990s from the Soviet Union. From our research, we could only find a reasonably modern (2016) tank-destroyer type vehicle, the PTL-02 Assaulter purchased from China. As for the naval forces, despite having an extended coastline and responsibilities in the Gulf of Guinea, the country only has 37 patrol boats and no medium or larger ships such as corvettes, frigates or cruisers.
As for the Air Force, there are 299 planes, of which 71 are fighters, 117 are helicopters and 15 are attack helicopters.
A recent analysis by Africa Monitor, which, it should be noted, has reflected a critical stance on the part of João Lourenço’s government, presents an alleged factuality, which, even if it is exaggerated or represents an overly pessimistic perspective, paints a less than encouraging picture of the readiness and material from the Angolan Air Force and Navy. Second, this publication, the navy fleet has its operational levels chronically “impaired by non-compliance with maintenance requirements and/or unpreparedness of its crews.[14]” In the Air Force, too, paralysis will be the keyword. According to the same newspaper, “the units of the transport helicopter fleet that were still operating (Russian-built Mil Mi-8) will be paralyzed, either aircraft from the 1980s-1990s, or units reconditioned later”, there is a “inability to ensure the maintenance of combat helicopters (Mil Mi-24)” and also in “a situation of near paralysis (…) Sukhoi (Su-22, Su-25, Su-30, Su-27).[15] ”Specialists with whom we have contacted directly and who prefer to remain anonymous assure that in recent years there has been no significant purchase of military material. So apparently there may be a need for reinforcement with these branches of the military.
In summary, there are three types of needs in the Armed Forces: obsolete and not modernized material, lack of equipment maintenance and unpreparedness of some cadres for specific activities. This obviously makes it important to intervene in the FAAs in order to increase their budget and increase their operational capacity in the face of the challenges described.
FAA modernization vectors
From all the above, two basic assumptions result that lead us to a simple conclusion. The assumptions are that threats to Angola’s sovereignty and integrity have increased in recent years after a period of some calm after 2002. Today the country faces a new “race for Africa” by the great and emerging powers, the threat of so-called Islamic terrorism spreads across the continent and piracy and criminality in the Gulf of Guinea along the coast is a reality. Added to this is the renewal of internal separatist tendencies and the strong reaction of the formerly dominant oligarchy to the fight against corruption. These facts correspond, at this moment, to some FAAs with some gaps in terms of material, readiness and training, which may, eventually, make an adequate reaction unfeasible in the event of an increase in any of the exposed threats.
It follows from the equation of these assumptions that an FAA modernization policy in terms of equipment, training and readiness/maintenance is essential. On the contrary, what many would claim, a reinforcement of the military budget and a modernizing reform of the Armed Forces is necessary.
The General State Budget for 2022 does not yet fully reflect these needs. If we look at it, from 2021 to 2022 there is a nominal increase in defense spending of 19.7%. It is enough to think that official inflation is around 27% in 2021[16] to realize that in real terms defense spending is decreasing, probably leading to cuts in the military sphere. In turn, defense spending is equivalent to 1.4% GDP[17].
We understand that the modernization of the FAA has a qualitative vector that must be defined by specialists in the area and involve the readiness of the Armed Forces, their implementation capacity and levels of sustainability, as well as the quality of the force they can exert. However, the vector that we focus on in this report is quantitative and we present the very simple suggestion already adopted by the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which is to place defense expenditure at around 2% of GDP[18] . This is not a magic number and can be subject of much criticism, but it represents an objective and quantifiable parameter, and in fact gives political power a measurable instrument to achieve[19] , which can be an advance in good governance and transparency policies that intend to implement in Angola.
[1] Cfr. Pedro Pezarat Correia (1991), Descolonização de Angola: jóia da coroa do império português, Lisboa: Inquérito; Silva Cardoso (2000) Angola, anatomia de uma tragédia, Lisboa: Oficina do Livro; «Involvement in the Angolan Civil War, Zaire: A Country Study». United States Library of Congress;
Donald S. Rothchild (1997). Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation. Brookings Institution Press. pp. 115–116; Ndirangu Mwaura, (2005). Kenya Today: Breaking the Yoke of Colonialism in Africa. pp. 222–223; Chester A Crocke, Fen Hampson, Pamela Aall, Pamela (2005). Grasping The Nettle: Analyzing Cases Of Intractable Conflict.
[2] For a good definition of these themes in South Africa, but with conceptual application to Angola, see Judicial Commission of Inquiry into State Capture Report: Part 1 [Zondo Report] (2022).
[19] About the criticisms and advantages see Jan Techau (2015), THE POLITICS OF 2 PERCENT. NATO and the Security Vacuum in Europe. Carnegie Foundation.
https://www.cedesa.pt/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/FAA.jpg345473CEDESA-Editorhttps://www.cedesa.pt/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/logo-CEDESA-completo-W-curvas.svgCEDESA-Editor2022-02-14 14:00:002022-02-14 14:37:31The new threats and the reinforcement of the Angolan Armed Forces
1. Introduction. Fight against corruption in Angola. Goals and facts
Corruption has become such a widespread phenomenon in Angola that it has jeopardized the survival of the state itself and the country’s economic viability. The so-called fight against corruption is not a matter of the police and combating criminal activity. It is something much bigger and much more important. In fact, what is called corruption in Angola is a more widespread phenomenon of large-scale appropriation of national resources and “privatization of sovereignty”[1]. It consists of varied behaviors that fulfill various criminal types such as fraud, abuse of trust, embezzlement, tax fraud, money laundering, among others, and not just the crime of corruption. What this phenomenon entails is the capture of the State and the Economy by the corrupt forces and the use of their mechanisms of power for their own benefit. It is a systemic degradation of the country’s political and economic body. Ultimately, corruption in Angola prevents the functioning of political institutions and the economy in a free market environment[2].
We believe that it was the perception of the seriousness of corruption for the political and economic development of the country that led João Lourenço to determine as one of the fundamental goals of his presidential mandate the fight against it. It is not worth mentioning the numerous speeches and actions initiated on the topic, to confirm that the fight against corruption has effectively become an insurmountable point of the presidential mandate.
If this goal is clear and justified, the questions arise at the level of implementation. Some criticize what they call the selectivity of the cases taken to court, others the slowness and still others the trampling of legal forms.
We do not see that there is selectivity in the fight against corruption. Just observe the judgments that have taken place and we will see that the people who have been sentenced are different. We have in the case of “Thai fraud”, a former Director of the foreign investment office, Norberto Garcia and a former Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, General Nunda. Both were acquitted and now occupy important positions, Garcia in the presidential office and Nunda as Ambassador in London. Then we have Augusto Tomás, former Minister of Transport, who was sentenced to effective imprisonment, José Filomeno dos Santos, son of the former President of the Republic, sentenced to five years in prison and awaiting the result of the appeal in freedom, just like Valter Filipe, former Governor of the National Bank of Angola. Finally, we recently had Manuel Rabelais sentenced to 14 years in prison. Rabelais was the strong man of social communication at the time of José Eduardo dos Santos. He also awaits the outcome of the appeal in freedom. It can be seen that they are not all, not even the majority, of the family of José Eduardo dos Santos, only one is a son; have different prison issues and different results. No selectivity is confirmed.
Different is the procedural slowness and some disruption with legal forms. Even recently, the Attorney General of the Republic in relation to the alleged case related to Isabel dos Santos, which will possibly be the most important and outstanding process in Angola, said that it was overdue because it was too complex[3]. And many other lawsuits drag on and raise legal doubts. Not going into details here, what is worth noting is, at this moment, (April 16, 2021), there is only one very relevant political process that has been res judicata and served time. The other two cases of very relevant people are on appeal, and nothing else has come to trial.
This scenario for a situation of extreme urgency like the one described above is very short. There is no doubt that the fight against corruption was an urgency and priority of the State and that it was assumed as such by the President, what is verified is that the judicial results are still limited. Our opinion is that this lack of results is a consequence of a good faith option of the political power that does not work. This option was to combat corruption with the normal and customary means existing in the Angolan judicial system. The use of the judicial system as it stands to fight corruption is not satisfactory. We will see the reason why such an option does not work and the alternatives.
2. The option to fight corruption within the pre-existing judicial system
When the political power chose the fight against corruption as its main goal, it decided to make this fight through the pre-existing judicial bodies and with the usual regular people. There was no organic or personnel renewal, just mere adjustments, the Vice-AGR moved up to AGR (Pesident), the Presidents of the Supreme Court and Constitutional Court switched positions and some slightly hasty laws on asset recovery were passed. So, few moves to launch the fight against corruption. This option must have corresponded to a formalistic opinion given by the most eminent Angolan jurists according to which, the fight against corruption should be carried out within the rule of law and with the existing legal means. Only in this way would the necessary rights of defense and credibility of the processes be guaranteed. And in the face of foreigners it could always be said that there would be no abuse on the part of the authorities as it was the installed judicial system that was operating within the usual regulations of the rule of law.
This legal normality seems correct, but in reality, it is what prevents a real, swift and effective fight against corruption. What we are watching is the machine and people who were captured in the past by corrupt interests to make this fight against corruption. For this reason, cases are physically lost in the courts, others turn into a mess, others come up with unacceptable decisions and others extend inexplicably. In fact, handing over the existing judicial structure the fight against corruption cases turns out to be a mistake. If that structure was also corrupt, it cannot, for reasons of elementary logic, be judging corruption, the patronage relations of the past, the favors owed, the usual venality, are too strong, for suddenly a blanket of integrity to remove everything. What we have been seeing is that the judiciary system is unable to fight corruption. Lawsuits with beginning, middle and end are rare. It is as if there is a dysfunctionality between the intentions of the Executive Branch and the concretizations of the Judiciary Branch.
The reality is that we are asking for a structure that collaborated and benefited from the corruption that is now combating it; in the end, to turn against itself. Safeguarding, that in this structure there are agents of change, judges, prosecutors, police, employees, who must be praised for their hard work, the fact is that they are an exception – even if they are large – and do not prevent the judicial structure as a whole from being conservative and risk-averse to fighting yesterday’s allies.
To that extent, the fight against corruption may turn out to be inglorious and not work, given the various existing structural obstacles.
3. Historical examples of overcoming the atavistic magistrates
It is not the first time that magistrates, due to their conservatism and risk aversion, call into question the intentions of new regimes. There are impressive historical examples, which also contribute to solutions to this problem.
Briefly, we will refer to two situations.
The first to mention occurred after the French Revolution and the establishment of the legal regime that followed, namely at the level of administrative law. This right was considered key to the development of the new regime as it would regulate the activity of the new State and its relations with citizens. Being the revolutionary state and wanting to institute a regime based on new values - Freedom, Equality and Fraternity – feared that the judges, belonging to the privileged classes and one of the pillars of the Ancien Régime, would prevent these demands and become insurmountable obstacles to the new measures. To remedy this danger as early as 1790, an August law would define a code of relations between the judiciary and the administration, prohibiting the courts from participating in the exercise of legislative and executive powers, in particular by preventing the ordinary judge from intervening in the activity of the administration . A year later, a new Penal Code provides for sanctions against judges who rule on the functioning of an administrative body. The logic that presided over administrative law after the French Revolution was a logic of tightness vis-à-vis the judiciary, for the Revolution to move forward, the judges had to be removed. This logic has evolved and has allowed the creation of a new judicial system, autonomous from the ordinary judicial system. Thus, alongside administrative laws, administrative courts and administrative judges emerged, a body foreign to previous judges[4].
Another situation in which there was a need to circumvent the conservatism of judges linked to an old regime, occurred in Austria, after the end of the First World War (1918). There, a Republic replaced the old Habsburg Empire, and a new class of judges was needed to enforce the new Republican values. It is in this context that the Constitutional Court and Hans Kelsen’s new conceptualization on the subject arises. A new court is set up with different judges.
This means that in several historical circumstances, when political power felt that judges and courts did not correspond to new times and values, it became necessary to create new parallel, complementary or supplementary judicial systems. It is a suggestion of this kind that is made in relation to the present time in Angola[5].
4. Rule of law for corruption
Many argue that in Angola there are already adequate mechanisms to fight corruption and that it is imperative to respect the rule of law, considering that this is represented by the systems and laws as they are at the moment. We cannot subscribe to this thesis for two reasons. The first is based on a theoretical point of view, while the second has an eminently practical character.
In theoretical terms, the rule of law is no more, nor less than respect for the law approved according to pre-established criteria, therefore, the opposite of arbitration. The rule of law implies that there is a law and that everyone respects it. Several legal thinkers add to this formal assumption, that the rule of law also contains a substantive element linked to equality – all are equal before the law, and to freedom – there is a presumption in favor of freedom in the implementation of legal norms. Others go even further by equating the rule of law with a range of fundamental rights and democratic principles[6]. We did not follow this last version, staying for the second. However, this is not important, it is important to note that the rule of law admits that there are specific rules for certain situations. A typical example is the constitutional rules for the State of Emergency (see Articles 58 and 204 of the Angolan Constitution), another example is the system of autonomous administrative law as it exists in France or Portugal. In Portugal, we have a very clear situation of a system completely separate from the ordinary judicial system, with its own laws, specific courts, judges with independent careers in what concerns administrative law, the right of state power and its relationship with citizens. Therefore, from a theoretical point of view and the rule of law, it is not difficult to design mini legal systems dedicated to certain matters.
If, from a theoretical point of view, there can be a different rule of law for issues of great economic and financial crime and state capture (alias corruption) with different rules from the normal rule of law, from a practical point of view it is clear that this is the only way they will be able to combat the corruption installed in the sovereign power of the State. Only by establishing a mini-system that is impervious to influence and with its own rules will this be feasible.
The truth is that each national legal system admits several subsystems according to the subjects or properties outlined. This does not violate any conception of the rule of law, on the contrary it creates rules and obligations for all, transparent and clear, in certain areas. In short, there will be a rule of law for normality and a rule of law for corruption.
5. The proposal: creation of the mini-anti-corruption judicial system
The proposal presented here is simple: to create an anti-corruption judicial mini-system from scratch, or more precisely a legal system relating to major crimes of an economic and financial nature and the capture of the State.
This legal system would operate independently of the other judicial bodies and would consist of four parts:
i) A special body with judicial powers for investigation and prosecution. This body would be a mix of judicial police and public prosecutors having powers to investigate, apprehend, search and detain, ask for international judicial cooperation and in the end make an indictment or file a major corruption case. It would only work in these cases and would be composed of a body of agents with focused and dedicated training.
ii) A system of courts dedicated to these crimes. For the judgment and appeal of cases of serious economic-financial crime and capture of the State, there would be a system of courts solely dedicated to this matter. This system of courts would imply a revision of the Constitution with regard to Article 176 nº3 and nº5. Jurisdiction should be allowed for major crimes of an economic and financial nature and also abolish the ban on courts with exclusive jurisdiction to judge certain types of offenses.
iii) An autonomous and dedicated body of judges would be another part of this mini-system against corruption. Certain judges would specialize in these matters who would fill the seats in the courts.
iv) Finally, this system should have a simplified procedural law drafted in the same way as the current American or French law that allows for quick and fair judgments.
Alternatively, and in case it is not intended to carry out a constitutional review on the subject, instead of creating a system of exclusive courts with its own judges, it could always establish specialized sections to fight corruption in the existing judicial courts. Courts in the provincial capitals or Luanda alone, as well as the Appeal and the Supreme Court, would have specialized sections for corruption. In this case, article 176 was respected when new courts were not created with exclusive powers to judge certain types of infraction, but at the same time we would have sections of ordinary courts or rooms dedicated to the topic. This is already constitutionally possible and the remaining proposed mini-system remained as described.
[1] The expression is characterized by Achille Mbembe, On the postcolony, 2001.
[2] On the impact of corruption in Angola see Rafael Marques, The space of freedom between corruption and justice, 2019, in MakaAngola (https://www.makaangola.org/2019/12/o-espaco-de-liberdade-entre -a-corrupcao-ea-justica /), Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, Magnificent and Beggar Land: Angola Since the Civil War, 2015 and Rui Verde, Angola at the Crossroads. Between Kleptocracy and Development, 2021.
[4]Jean-Louis Mestre, « Administration, justice et droit administratif », Annales historiques de la Révolution française 328 | avril-juin 2002. http://journals.openedition.org/ahrf/608
[6] See a detailed analysis of the concepts of the rule of law and their historical and spatial differences in Rui Verde, Brexit. The triumph of chaos? 2019
https://www.cedesa.pt/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/martelo-juiz.jpg400720CEDESA-Editorhttps://www.cedesa.pt/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/logo-CEDESA-completo-W-curvas.svgCEDESA-Editor2021-05-14 18:11:562021-05-14 18:11:59Rule of Law and Corruption in Angola: for a mini-system of justice against corruption
The present Angolan Constitution (CRA) dates from 2010 and has never been revised. Recently, President João Lourenço announced that he had taken the initiative to propose a constitutional revision.
A first comment that this action raises is that the Angolan president has a courageous policy facing the several challenges that have been placed on him: combating corruption, economic reform, quick reaction to Covid-19. At the moment, the fruits of this determined confrontation are not yet reaping, and there lies some paradox, a reformist president risks being submerged by his own reforms.
The present proposal for constitutional revision is minimalist, and so it was assumed by the government. In this sense, it risks creating expectations in the population that later will not be met. However, it represents a very important step in the discussion of the Angolan political model and the fact is that the constitutional discussion will be more important even though the effective changes that will eventually be inserted in the Constitution.
The purpose of this text is to highlight and analyze the main proposals for constitutional revision in the area of economics and finance.
2. The proposed constitutional review law in the economic and financial area
The first proposed modification is found in article 14 of the CRA, which concerns private property. The expression “promotes[1]” is introduced, with the meaning of being a function of the State in addition to guaranteeing and protecting private property and free enterprise, also the promotion of private enterprise. Positive State behavior is introduced, that of promoting free private initiative.
Later on, a new number 4 is added to Article 37 that regulates the “Right and limits of private property”. This number establishes the possibility of nationalization in the case of “ponderous reasons of national interest”. It also introduces confiscation as a sanctioning measure, which is permitted when there is a serious offense against laws that protect the economic interests of the State.
Naturally, it is in the Title about the Economic, Financial and Tax Organization that some modifications in the economic area are added. Article 92 will contain new paragraphs 2 and 3. The new wording proposed for paragraph 2, aims to “clarify the scope and meaning of the principle of community property, as a type of property enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution, which defines the nature of the economic system by calling the regulation of the exercise of this type of property the rules of customary law that do not contradict the economic system, the social market regime and the fundamental principles of the Constitution ”. Paragraph 3 establishes the legal existence of the unstructured sector of the economy, i.e., it refers to the informal economy, pointing to its progressive institutionalization.
Then we have article 100 on the National Bank of Angola (BNA). In paragraph 1 of this article, it is determined that the BNA will be the “central bank and issuer of the Republic of Angola” and will have as primary functions: to guarantee price stability in order to ensure the preservation of the value of the national currency and ensure the stability of the financial system. Therefore, the BNA’s functions are limited to combating inflation and the stability of the financial system.
Then, in paragraph 2, “the new legal nature of BNA is enshrined, as an independent administrative entity, with an eminently regulatory nature, and the content of the principle of independence of this type of entities is signaled”. “Transmission of recommendations or issuance of directives to the governing bodies of the BNA on its activity, structure, functioning, decision-making” is hereby prohibited on the priorities to be adopted in the pursuit of constitutional and legally defined attributions, by the Executive Branch or any other public entity.
Subsequent paragraphs of the same article state that: “The Governor of the National Bank of Angola is appointed by the President of the Republic, after hearing in the National Assembly’s Specialized Labor Committee.” And they stipulate a detailed procedure for that appointment. There is a duty of parliamentary hearing, but the final decision rests with the President of the Republic.
Another change concerns the General State Budget (GSB). Article 104 proposes an amendment “in order to remove a current idea that the budget of local authorities is part of the GSB”. The GSB will provide for transfers to be made to municipalities, but not their income and expenses.
3-Analysis and comment on the proposed changes to the economic and financial Constitution
The articles to be amended are 14, 37, 92, 100 and 104.
ARTICLE 14
In relation to article 14, the State will be responsible for promoting private initiative. In addition to the rhetorical aspect of such a statement, in practical terms, this rule allows the State to assist the private sector in a consistent manner, for example, expanding free zones and tax benefits for the private business, subsidizing private companies, creating partnerships with the private sector. The State shouldn’t be merely passive and adopt a positive and active attitude towards the private sector. It is a good sign for the market.
ARTICLE 37
Article 37 is of a different nature and constitutes the only constitutional amendment directly related to the fight against corruption. In the face of a constitutional gap, the general principles on which nationalization and confiscation can take place will now be established. This last part is essential to achieve the recovery of assets that is underway in which it becomes very difficult to understand the legal framework.
It is now clear that the state can confiscate assets when there has been a serious offense against laws that protect its economic interests. In simple language, it is now clear that those who have been charged at the expense of public funds may be without these assets, with no need for a final criminal case, but only the conclusion that they have carried out a serious offense against the laws that guarantee economic interests of the State. This rule is to be applauded in the present context of combating corruption.
ARTICLE 92
If the promotion of private initiative and the speeding up of the recovery of assets obtained from corrupt activities are measures that deserve praise, more doubts raises the rule of article 92 regarding the informal economy. More than “its progressive framing in the structured economy system” (proposed wording of Article 92, paragraph 3), which essentially means the payment of taxes and fees, what the Constitution should advocate was the adoption of supportive policies to the informal sector of the economy, which is a real buffer from the lack of work and an incubator for potential successful small and medium-sized companies[2].
It has already been pointed out that in southern Africa, the informal economic sector is a crucial element of survival, given that 72% of all non-agricultural employment resides in the informal sector and the majority of new jobs show up there. The informal economy provides income and employment to all people, regardless of education or experience. In Angola, the majority of employed people are also involved in the informal economy, as otherwise they would not be able to support all of their expenses. To that extent, it is necessary to be very cautious in establishing rules about the informal economy because it helps the Angolan government[3].
ARTICLE 100
In terms of public opinion, the core of the constitutional change in economic and financial terms will be found in article 100 referring to the BNA. This article contains three main lines:
The BNA is the “guarantee price stability in order to ensure the preservation of the value of the national currency and ensures the stability of the financial system”. Thus, the BNA’s functions related to inflation and the financial system are precisely determined;
The BNA becomes an independent administrative authority and therefore “independent in the pursuit of its duties and in the exercise of public powers”. It is the famous independence of the central bank, which today is defended by most economic doctrine.
The Governor of BNA is appointed by the President of the Republic, after hearing the National Assembly. It should be noted that the National Assembly has no right of veto, but of hearing.
The enshrining of central bank independence corresponds to the modern dominant trend in economic doctrine. The arguments in favor of central bank independence can easily be summed up. Governments are thought to tend making wrong decisions about monetary policy. In particular, they are influenced by short-term political considerations. Before an election, the temptation is for the government to cut interest rates, making economic cycles of expansion and retraction more likely. Thus, if a government has a history of allowing inflation, inflation expectations start to rise, making it more likely.
An independent central bank can have more credibility and inspire more confidence. Having more confidence in the central bank helps to reduce inflationary expectations. Consequently, it becomes easier to keep inflation low. Thus, there is an attempt to introduce additional credibility in monetary policy and to increase the fight against inflation. It should be noted that inflation is an evil that has endured in the Angolan economy for too long.
This measure is correct and should be considered positive.
ARTICLE 104
The last change concerns the clarification of the differentiation between the General State Budget and the Municipalities, as part of the material preparation for the installation of the municipalities.
Conclusion
Minimalist, the proposed constitutional revision in the area of economics and finance aims to reinforce the signs of the market economy and macroeconomic stability, highlighting as an essential element of this law the consecration of central bank independence and its focus on combating inflation.
*****
Attachment: New proposed wording of the norms referring to the economic and financial sector
“Article 14
(Private property and free enterprise)
The State respects, and protects the private property of natural or legal persons and promotes free economic and business initiative, exercised under the terms of the Constitution and the Law ”.
“Article 37
(Right and limits of private property)
1. […].
2. […].
3. […].
4. Own law defines the conditions under which the nationalization of private goods can occur for ponderous reasons of national interest and of confiscation for serious offense to the laws that protect the economic interests of the State ”.
“Article 92
(Economic Sectors)
1. […].
2. The State recognizes and protects the right to community property for the use and enjoyment of means of production by rural and traditional communities, under the terms of the Constitution and the law.
3. Own law establishes the principles and rules to which the unstructured sector of the economy is subject, aiming at its gradual inclusion in the structured economy system ”.
“Article 100
(National Bank of Angola)
1. The National Bank of Angola, as the central bank and issuer of the Republic of Angola, guarantees price stability in order to ensure the preservation of the value of the national currency and ensures the stability of the financial system, under the terms of the Constitution and the law.
2. As an independent administrative authority, the National Bank of Angola is independent in the performance of its duties and in the exercise of public powers to which it is concerned, in accordance with the Constitution and the law.
3. The Governor of the National Bank of Angola is appointed by the President of the Republic, after hearing the Specialized Labor Committee of the National Assembly, competent by reason of the matter, under the terms of the Constitution and the law, observing, for this purpose, the following procedure:
a) the hearing is triggered at the request of the President of the Republic;
b) the hearing of the proposed entity ends with the vote on the report in accordance with the law;
c) It is up to the President of the Republic to make the final decision in relation to the nomination of the proposed entity.
4. The Governor of the National Bank of Angola sends to the President of the Republic and to the National Assembly, a report on the evolution of monetary policy indicators, without prejudice to bank secrecy rules, the treatment of which, for the purposes of control and inspection by the National Assembly it is ensured under the terms of the Constitution and the law ”.
“Article 104
(General State Budget)
1. […].
2. The General State budget is unitary, estimates the level of revenue to be obtained and sets the authorized expenditure limits, in each fiscal year, for all services, public institutes, autonomous funds and social security and must be prepared in such a way as to that all the expenses provided for therein are financed ”.
3. The State Budget presents the report on the forecast of funds to be transferred to local authorities, under the terms of the law.
4. The law defines the rules for the preparation, presentation, adoption, execution, inspection and control of the General State Budget.
5. The execution of the State Budget complies with the principles of transparency, accountability and good governance and is supervised by the National Assembly and the Court of Auditors, under the terms and conditions defined by law ”.
[1] All citations without a specific source mentioned are from the 2021 Constitutional Review Law Proposal Rationale Report made public by the Government.
[2] Alain de Janvry e Elisabeth Sadoulet, Development Economics, 2016, p. 19
https://www.cedesa.pt/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/revisao-constitucional.jpg10331550CEDESA-Editorhttps://www.cedesa.pt/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/logo-CEDESA-completo-W-curvas.svgCEDESA-Editor2021-05-14 12:31:302021-05-14 12:34:55The economic and financial sector in the Angolan constitutional review - In particular, the enshrining of the independence of the central bank
1- Introduction. The discussion on fighting corruption in Angola
The fight against corruption was established as a main goal in the beginning of João Lourenço’s presidential term. What we want to know in this analysis is whether this fight has gone from rhetoric to practice, and, above all, what elements can identify a clear response to a theme that has become the subject of political dispute in Angola. To reach provisional conclusions – since the process against corruption has not ended yet – we will analyse some structural elements of the fight against corruption, such as the discourse of political power, the legislation adopted, the bodies created, international cooperation, the cases under investigation, the asset recovery and the universe of legal charges. Balancing all these elements together we will draw a picture of the current fight against corruption.
This text seeks to ascertain whether there is a fight against corruption in Angola, using the mentioned index elements. It does not take a general assessment of this fight, this will only be done at the end of the presidential term, nor does it investigate the failures and improvements necessary for that fight, which has been done in other studies. Here we want to gather elements and conclude about the praxis of fighting corruption in Angola.
2- Structuring elements of the fight against corruption
2.1- The political discourse
The fight against corruption began with a strong appeal from the political power that started with the inauguration of the President of the Republic. At that time, in September 2017, João Lourenço elected the fight against corruption as one of his priorities, stating that he will confront the corruption that “rages in state institutions.” The President emphasized the “direct negative impact on the State” of corruption, saying that it threatens “the foundations of the country” and concluding that this will be “one of the most important fronts of struggle in the coming years”[1]. Later, in February 2020, after several speeches of the same content, when the possibility of an agreement between the State and Isabel dos Santos was publicly raised, the President went out on a rally to vigorously reaffirm the priority of fighting corruption and denying any agreement with Isabel dos Santos[2]. Recently, on the anniversary of the Attorney General’s Office (AGO), he reaffirmed his commitment to this fight and praised the role of the AGO[3].
Three different moments, and three clear and solemn speeches on the fight against corruption by the President of the Republic and the holder of the executive power. The same rhetoric has been followed by other policy makers over the past few years. There have been no hesitations or setbacks in grammatical constructions. Therefore, from the point of view of political discourse, there is no doubt that there has been a strong and permanent commitment since 2017 in the fight against corruption, with the first analytical element being fulfilled. It is necessary to comply the following elements.
2.2.- Anti-corruption legislation
The political discourse was accompanied by legislation with a focus on combating corruption. The government passed two laws on the repatriation of capital, which it considered to be the cornerstone of its anti-corruption policy. These laws are the Law on the Repatriation of Financial Resources, alias the Law on Voluntary Repatriation (LVR), Law No. 9/18, of June 26, and the Law on Coercive Repatriation and Extended Loss of Assets, alias the Repatriation Corercive Law. (RCL), Law No. 15/18, of 26 December. These laws will represent the executive’s commitment to ensure that funds diverted by corruption, return to their rightful owner, the State. We will see further below which are the effects of applying these laws in terms of values. Later, in 2020, the National Assembly passed a new Penal Code and a new Penal Procedure Code. Although these laws are structuring for the entire State and the legal system, it should be noted that the new Penal Code has a specific chapter on Crimes Committed in the Exercise of Public Functions and in Prejudice to Public Functions (articles 357 to 375) which includes corruption (art. 358 to 361), undue receipt of advantages (art. 357), influence peddling (art. 366) and embezzlement (art. 362), among others. The entire sanctioning typology of criminal law has been revised and systematized to make it easier to understand and adapt.
Also, in the area of public contracts, there were several changes aimed at strengthening transparency and the fight against corruption. Public contracting legislation was amended by Law No. 41/20, of 23 December. In 2018, the government approved the Primer on Ethics and Conduct in Public Contracts, the Practical Guide for the Prevention and Management of Risks of Corruption and Related Infractions in Public Contracts and the Guide for Reporting Corruption and Related Infractions in Public Contracts. In the area of financial information, mechanisms to control illicit flows and to prevent money laundering were clearly reinforced. Note should be taken about Law No. 5/2020 of 27 January on the prevention and fight against money laundering, the financing of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, resulting from the ratifications of the United Nations Conventions against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances, against Transnational Organized Crime and on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Important, too, was Presidential Decree No. 2/18 of 9 January, which approved the Organic Statute of the Financial Information Unit, hereinafter referred to as the FIU and the Supervisory Committee, as a public service specialized in the coordination at national level of reinforcements for the prevention and repression of money laundering, financing of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
We see, therefore, there is a massive update of legislation against corruption and money laundering. The rhetoric was lumped by the legislative act, the words to the norms. The next element of analysis concerns the organic.
2.3- Anti-corruption agencies
The government chose not to create new bodies, and to base the execution of the anti-corruption policy on the already existing institutions: Attorney General’s Office (AGO), Banco Nacional de Angola, Financial Information Unit, Criminal Investigation Service (CIS), etc.
However, at the level of the AGO, it created a sub-body with specific functions in the fight against corruption: the National Asset Recovery Service. This service was created by Law 15/18, of December 26, Law on Coercive Repatriation and Extended Loss of Assets. According to article 13 of that Law, the main task of this National Service is to proceed with the location, identification and seizure of assets, financial and non-financial assets or products related to crime, whether those assets are in Angola or abroad. In addition, the Service has the expertise to ensure international cooperation among its counterparts, as well as to exercise the other attributions conferred by law, in which it is worth mentioning the initiation of any civil, administrative or fiscal action in order to recover the assets taken out illegally from the State.
The practical functioning of the Service has been based on the opening of patrimonial investigations attached to the criminal proceedings that are under terms in the judicial authorities, to investigate and identify the location of assets that may be the subject of a confiscation order and the adoption of measures necessary for its recovery. Within this scope, the Service carries out all necessary measures (sending rogatory letters to its counterparts, ordering seizures and requesting foreclosures) to ensure that the assets do not dissipate. It should be noted that this body does not act alone, but in cooperation with the bodies that have the main processes. However, the truth is that it has stood out for the amount of seizures and measures taken.
There are several examples of the Asset Recovery Service’s activity. In July 2020, it ordered the seizure of three buildings, office and residential, called Três Torres, in Luanda. The buildings, known as Três Torres and recently built, include Torre A Offices, and Torre B and C Residencial, are located in the urban district of Ingombota, in Luanda, the country’s capital. At the time, Deutsche Welle said that: “The name of Manuel Vicente, ex-president of Sonangol and ex-vice president of the country, is pointed out, on the grapevine, as being connected to the buildings[4].” In September 2020, the Service determined the seizure of the minority shareholding of 49% of AAA Ativos in the SBA, as well as buildings of the AAA group, belonging to Carlos São Vicente, within the scope of the patrimonial investigation process linked to the criminal process that it concerns. In 2021, five housing projects were seized, namely Tambarino Project (Lobito, Benguela), Palanca Negra (Malanje), Mifongo Project (Malanje) and the Ex-Petro projects, in Golf II and Nova Vida III, both in Luanda. At the same time, as part of a lawsuit against the former chairman of the board of the Banco de Poupança e Crédito (BPC), Paixão Júnior, the Service also seized containers of material for the erection of a yoghurt factory in Benguela that was delivered to the Smart Solution company.
These are mere examples of a broad work that is being developed by this service dynamically directed by Public Prosecutor Eduarda Rodrigues. This Service could possibly be the embryo of a more global and comprehensive anti-corruption body, as we have argued.
2.4.- International judicial cooperation
Along with the asset recovery work carried in the sub-organ described above, there has been a wide appeal to international judicial cooperation. First, it is important to highlight the requests addressed and fulfilled to Portugal. The activity with Portugal has been immense, since the rogatory letters referring to Isabel dos Santos and her associates that have already led to multiple “freezes” of social participation in Portuguese lands. It was recently reported that the Central Court of Criminal Investigation (TCCI) arrested the bank accounts in Portugal of three Isabel dos Santos’ friends, at the request of the judicial authorities of Angola. The seizure of the accounts of Mário Leite da Silva, Paula Oliveira and Sarju Raikundalia was carried out in the context of a rogatory letter sent from Angola to Portugal in January 2020. In that letter, the Angolan authorities requested the preventive seizure in Portugal of assets by Isabel dos Santos and his three friends up to a total value of 1.15 billion euros, as a guarantee of possible future compensation to Angola[5].” Carlos São Vicente and others were also the subject of rogatory letters and requests to Portugal.
The Angolan AGO reported days ago that requests for cooperation have already been made to Switzerland, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, Singapore, Bermuda, the United Arab Emirates, Mauritius, the Kingdom of Monaco, Malta, the Isles of Man and others. Within the scope of international cooperation, the Attorney General’s Office has already requested the seizure of assets worth approximately US $ 5 billion.
3- Benchmarks
3.1.- Quantitative indices
All the activity that has been described has shown quantifiable results that are reproduced here:
• Since the beginning of the fight against corruption, the Angolan State has definitively recovered in cash and assets a total of around 5.3 billion dollars.
• In addition, it asked to seize US $ 5.4 billion in foreign jurisdictions.
• In Angola, assets worth around US $ 4 billion have already been arrested and seized. Such assets are still subject to the respective lawsuits still pending, awaiting a final decision at first instance or on appeal.
• 1522 criminal cases were opened regarding corruption-related crime and alike.
3.2. Qualitative indices
In terms of criminal charges, the prosecutor’s office has handed down charges against a variety of senior dignitaries. Noteworthy are the accusatory orders against: General Sachipengo Nunda, former Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, Norberto Garcia, former director of the External Investment Agency, Valter Filipe, former Governor of the central bank, José Filomeno dos Santos, former CEO from the Sovereign Fund, Augusto Tomás, former Minister of Transport, Manuel Rabelais, former Minister of Social Communication, Carlos São Vicente, former President of the AAA Group.
In addition to these public figures, there are a myriad of cases at the provincial level that are replicated in each one. Recently, it was noted that the former director of the Regional Office Planning, Urbanism and Environment in the province of Bengo was sentenced to two years in prison for the crimes of active and passive corruption and undue receipt of 125 million kwanzas. In the same process, the former director of the legal office of the Provincial Government of Bengo, and the ex-director of the office of the former governor were also sentenced to one year in prison for the crimes of passive corruption and degree of influence and having benefited from monetary values in the business.
In what concerns the “freezing” of assets, the assets of Manuel Vicente and generals Dino and Kopelipa, among others, were seized or handed over. Regarding the latter two, it should be noted that as representatives of the companies China International Fund Angola – CIF and Cochan, SA, the generals handed over the shares they held in the company Biocom-Companhia de Bionergia de Angoala, Lda., in the Kero Supermarket chain and in the company Damer Gráficas-Sociedade Industrial de Artes Gráficas SA. Still in relation to Manuel Vicente, the President of the Republic determined the nationalization of 60% of the shareholdings of the commercial company Miramar Empreendimentos, SA “, which covers” 43% of the shares belonging to the Suninvest — Investimentos, Participações e Empreendimentos, SA “and” 17% of the shares belonging to Sommis, SGPS. These shares belong to Manuel Vicente.
Obviously, it is also necessary to mention the seizures of assets referring to Isabel dos Santos and her associates.
4-Conclusions
In this study we tried to assess, with precise elements, the reality of the fight against corruption in Angola at this moment. Take an “x-ray”. We conclude that there is a powerful rhetoric to support the fight against corruption, that appropriate legislation has been passed, a specific sub-body has been created with a view to recovering assets, an entity that has shown itself to be quite committed. International judicial cooperation is quite broad. From the asset recovery point of view, between seizures and definitive deliveries, perhaps US $ 10 billion have already been obtained. Various accusations have already been made against several senior individuals.
What is to be concluded from this list is the scope of those who have already been the target of an accusation or action to recover assets. It cannot be said that there is selectivity, because in fact we have a representative sample of the former senior officials, nor can it be said that there is no action. There were many and diverse. It does not mean that the scope of the fight cannot and should not be extended. In sum, there is a wide-ranging fight against corruption in Angola, which translates into the elements that we have identified here.
However, this does not mean that this fight does not need several improvements and has several flaws, which we have already identified in previous studies, namely, the lack of specialization and of its own extensive investigation and justice bodies, the need for promptness, and the creation of modern mechanisms to prevent the continuation of corrupt practices.
https://www.cedesa.pt/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/pgr-ang.jpg600900CEDESA-Editorhttps://www.cedesa.pt/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/logo-CEDESA-completo-W-curvas.svgCEDESA-Editor2021-05-13 11:49:002021-05-11 11:50:57A radiography of the fight against corruption
Introduction: the magnitude of the unemployment problem and the need for a systematic government response
In Angola, in the third quarter of 2020, the unemployment rate stood at 34%[1]. This number corresponds to a chain increase (i.e., compared to the previous quarter) of 9.9% and homologous (referring to the same period in 2019) in the order of 22%[2]. In view of these data, whatever the perspective adopted, it is easy to see that unemployment is a fundamental and serious problem facing the Angolan economy and societies.
Fig. Nº 1- Recent evolution of the unemployment rate in Angola (2017-2020). Source: INE-Angola
So far, the government recognizes this problem, but is betting on the recovery of the economy at the private sector level, to resolve the issue, believing that the State can do little to face the situation. The solution lies in economic growth and business dynamism, says the executive. The President of the Republic, João Lourenço, was clear in the last speech of the State of the Nation when he stated: “priority of our agenda [is): to work for the resuscitation and diversification of the economy, to increase the national production of goods and basic services, to increase the range of exportable products and increase the supply of jobs. ” João Lourenço makes an indelible link between the diversification of the economy and the increase in national production and the decrease in unemployment.
Basically, the government relies on the traditional postulate stated by the American economist Arthur Okun, according to which there would be a linear relationship between changes in the unemployment rate and the growth of the gross national product: with each real GDP growth in two percent would correspond to a one percent decrease in unemployment[3]. The truth is that several empirical studies do not confirm this empirical relationship at all, and in recent years in several countries around the world, an increase in GDP has not led to a sharp decrease in unemployment, while in other cases it has, therefore, it is difficult establish a permanent relationship between unemployment and GDP. In addition, the magnitude of unemployment in Angola would imply that in order to decrease the rate for the still frightening 24%, GDP would have to grow 15% …
The fundamental issue is that the problem of unemployment in Angola is not cyclical, but structural, this means that it is closely connected to the permanent deficiencies of the Angolan economy and does not have a mere dependence on the economic cycle.
The fact that the problem of unemployment is structural and of an economic recovery for the years 2021 and onwards is only between 2% and 4% of GDP[4], according to the current IMF projections, imply that such economic animation will have little impact on employment.
In this sense, it is essential to understand that the solution to the problem of unemployment does not depend only on the market and the economic recovery, it requires, at least in the short term, the muscular intervention of the State. It is in this context that this proposal for a pilot experience arises.
Fig. No. 2- GDP growth projections Angola (2021-2024). Source: IMF
A pilot job guarantee experiment in Angola
Starting from the first experience of universal employment guarantee in the world, designed by researchers at the University of Oxford and administered by the Austrian Public Employment Service, which takes place in the Austrian city of Marienthal[5], the same methodology would apply to a specific location in Angola, possibly, to a specific municipality in Luanda.
According to this regime to be implemented on an experimental basis in a municipality in Luanda, a universal guarantee of a properly paid job would be offered to all residents who have been unemployed for more than 12 months.
In addition to receiving training and assistance to find work, the participants would have guaranteed paid work, with the State subsidizing 100% of the salary in a private company or employing participants in the public sector or even supporting the creation of a microenterprise. All participants would receive at least one minimum wage set in accordance with the Presidential Decree that regulates the matter appropriate to a life with dignity.
The pilot Design would work as follows:
i) All residents of the chosen Luanda municipality, who have been unemployed for a year or more, will be unconditionally invited to participate in the pilot design.
ii) Participants begin with a two-month preparatory course, which includes individual training and counseling.
iii) Subsequently, participants will be helped to find suitable and subsidized employment in the private sector or supported to create a job based on their skills and knowledge of the needs of their community or will still be employed by the State.
iv) The job guarantee ensures three years of work for all long-term unemployed, although participants may choose to work part-time.
Fig. No. 3- Brief description of the pilot employment design
In addition to eliminating long-term unemployment in the region, the program aims to offer all participants useful work, be it in paving streets, in small community repairs, in a day care center, in the creation of a community cafe, in access to water and energy , basic sanitation, in the reconstruction of a house, or in some other field.
The pilot project is designed to test the policy’s results and effectiveness and then be extended to more areas of the country.
Financing
“As part of the asset recovery process, the State has already recovered real estate and money in the amount of USD 4,904,007,841.82, of which USD 2,709,007,842.82 in cash and USD 2,194,999,999.00 in real estate, factories, port terminals, office buildings, residential buildings, radio and television stations, graphic units, commercial establishments and others. ”
Thus, the President of the Republic spoke in the most recent speech by the State of the Nation mentioned above.
Now, nothing better than to allocate part of these recovered funds to the promotion of employment. Consequently, an amount withdrawn from there would be used to create an Employment Development Fund which we would simply call, because of the origin of the amounts, “Marimbondos Fund”. This Fund would receive part of the recovered assets and would use them to finance initiatives to promote employment such as the one presented here. Money withdrawn in the past from the economy would return to this one to foster work for the new generations.
With this self-financing model, any constraints imposed by the International Monetary Fund or the need for budgetary restraint would be removed. The promotion of employment would have its own funds resulting from the fight against corruption. There doesn’t seem to be a better destination for money than that.
https://www.cedesa.pt/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/hiring.jpg373700CEDESA-Editorhttps://www.cedesa.pt/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/logo-CEDESA-completo-W-curvas.svgCEDESA-Editor2021-05-11 12:04:042021-05-11 12:04:07Proposal for a pilot job guarantee design in Angola
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