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Angola: the American challenge and the Chinese reaction

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Angola’s new foreign policy under João Lourenço (2017)

After the end of the Civil War (2002), José Eduardo dos Santos (JES) opted for a “low profile” foreign policy for Angola. Apart from the intensification of relations with China, which essentially had economic objectives, and muscular interventions in African border countries, generally when Angola’s internal security could be at stake, the former President of the Republic did not develop an active policy in the world, preferring it to forget about Angola’s existence.

JES’s non-foreign policy had two fundamental consequences. It took Angola out of the concerns of the major powers, preventing the country from being looked at greedily on the world stage, and in doing so, it allowed the “capture of the state” by private interests to take on unthinkable contours[1] . Angola has become a kind of private property for a few, in the face of the generalised indifference of the world and the glee of sophisticated profiteers.

João Lourenço effectively changed the compass of Angolan foreign policy, promoting what we will call a sovereigntist policy of variable geometry from 2017 onwards.  In other words, Lourenço wanted to put Angola on the world’s radar and the country assumed itself as a regional power, with a role to play in the peaceful stabilisation of Central and Southern Africa; also open to investment and committed to global affairs[2] .

This Laurentian perspective has meant a strong rapprochement with the United States, the Arab countries of the Gulf, but also maintaining relations with China and Russia, and economic realities now impose a stronger bond with India.

While Angola’s new active presidential diplomacy is clear and perceptible, the big question mark is the reaction of the other countries, particularly the major powers, such as the United States, which has an ambiguous history in relation to Angola, as well as China, which is used to playing a decisive role in Angola.

The United States and the Lobito Corridor

It seems that, initially, the United States didn’t understand João Lourenço’s moves. It was at the end of the Trump administration, which had no interest in Africa, there was still, albeit in degradation, an idea of cooperation between America and China, and Russia had not invaded Ukraine. Africa and Angola, in particular, were of no interest to the Americans, except for the traditional oil companies.

However, everything changed at the beginning of the 1920s. The world’s geostrategic situation once again placed Africa as a field of conflicting interests, both in terms of obtaining raw materials (an area in which China was far ahead and in which the US became interested in order to guarantee its strategic autonomy) and in counting support for the Ukrainian War and its aftermath. In this sense, with a new US ambassador in Angola, Tulinabo S. Mushingi, and Luanda’s persistent rapprochement with Washington, the Americans realised that they had a possible new and powerful ally in Angola.

As a result, Angola appeared to become one of the United States’ strongest allies in Africa. Symbols of this were João Lourenço’s trip to Washington for a meeting at the White House with President Joe Biden (December 2023)[3] , and the constant visits by US officials to Luanda (Antony Blinken, five US senators, Samantha Power, Lloyd Austin, among others).

Many projects were announced, most notably the famous Lobito Corridor, which has become the flagship of this intense Angola-US co-operation.

Without going into an in-depth description of this project, the main thing to remember is that it is a railway linking the African interior, including the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia and Angola itself, to the port of Lobito. Just recently, the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) was announced, mobilising 4.9 billion dollars to date, presented as a significant step by the United States of America, the European Union and private partners to strengthen the commitment to sustainable development and regional integration, benefiting Angola, Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo[4] . And at the recent G7 summit in Puglia, Italy, the leaders of the West’s most advanced economies reaffirmed their support for multi-billion dollar infrastructure projects across Africa in order to realise the continent’s economic potential and transformation, specifying the Lobito Corridor as a top priority[5] .

Many observers have claimed that this is a response to Chinese mining domination of Africa[6] . This is unlikely to be the case, since a large part of the minerals to be transported through the Corridor are in mines under Chinese control. Although, according to the Wilson Center, China currently controls only around 8 per cent of Africa’s mining sector, less than half of its Western competitors, this is still an increase from 6.7 per cent in 2018. And as far as the potential beneficiaries of the Lobito Corridor are concerned, what worries the US is China’s monopoly on mining in Africa’s copper belt (Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia) and its recent substantial investments in lithium production in Zimbabwe, which holds Africa’s largest lithium reserves. These investments allow China to dictate the global supply chain for renewable batteries and electric vehicles (EVs). In the DRC, the country with the world’s largest reserves of high-quality cobalt and copper, China currently owns 72 per cent of the cobalt and copper mines, including the Tenge Fungurume mine, which alone produces around 12 per cent of the world’s cobalt output. China’s mining operations in these three countries give Beijing a significant lead in the production of semiconductors and batteries, and therefore in the field of climate security technologies. This leaves the rest of the world increasingly dependent on Chinese innovation and industry to drive global energy transitions and tackle climate change. Furthermore, in the DRC, China owns at least 7 cobalt processing entities, but mainly sends raw minerals back to China for processing and manufacturing in order to meet global demand for critical minerals and finished products[7] .

Naturally, this data on China’s mining influence in the DRC and Zambia makes it clear that the Lobito Corridor will never be an American alternative to Chinese domination of Central African minerals. In fact, to be commercially successful, American transport will need the support of Chinese miners.

Well-placed sources tell us that the objective is less the transport of minerals and more the creation of an agro-industrial development area parallel to the corridor, whose products will be transported through it. It is in this objective that the American option for the Cart Group comes into play. At the aforementioned recent G7 summit, significant funding was announced for the Carrinho Group, which is considered to be a leading Angolan company in the agro-industrial sector, to develop the Lobito Corridor. Apparently, the Carrinho Group, a sort of “darling” company of the Americans, has the task of transforming Angola into a regional food hub, with investments aimed at building and acquiring infrastructure for storing food products[8] . The Carrinho Group has thus become a key part of the American strategy for Africa.

Even so, however, it should be noted that even in the current structure of the Corridor, there is a relevant Chinese company, Mota-Engil, which, although it has a Portuguese name, has the Chinese state as its reference shareholder. The truth is that China Communications Construction Co., Ltd. holds 32.41 per cent of the share capital, and the CEO of Mota-Engil himself, Carlos Mota Santos, has already admitted that CCCC is owned by the State of the People’s Republic of China[9] .

So, at the end of the day, the Lobito Corridor will never be a US project to counter China, but it will certainly have to be a Sino-American co-operative project if it is to succeed. Whether or not this is possible, we’ll see in the future.

The Chinese attitude

For years, while ensuring its exponential economic growth, China adopted a soft and discreet international diplomacy, not confronting but modelling, following the precepts of Deng Xiao Ping, who favoured an international approach known as “taoguang yanghui”, which emphasized the need to avoid polemics and the use of cooperative rhetoric. It is clear that with Xi Jiping, China has entered a new, more assertive phase on the international stage, known as the “warrior wolf”, which does not avoid confrontation, allowing China to occupy the place it recognizes as its own on the world stage.

In this context of assertiveness, contrary to what might have been expected in the past, China has reacted to the American rapprochement with Angola swiftly, above all by expeditiously reoccupying spaces that the Americans or their Western allies have not been able to occupy or where they have been sloppy.

From a political point of view, the Chinese reaction was visible during João Lourenço’s most recent trip to Beijing (March 2024). Although the official statements were of great friendship and success, the Chinese authorities made their disenchantment with João Lourenço known in certain reasonably public circles, contradicting the official narrative of the trip. It was a discreet game, unnoticeable to many, but it existed, demonstrating the Chinese will not “throw in the towel” in Angola.

And the reality is that China’s political will has subsequently asserted itself in China’s field of choice: the economy.

Three recent announcements affirm the renewed Chinese vigour in Angola.

Firstly, a Chinese group is going to build Angola’s first motorway, some 1,400 kilometers long, linking the south to the north of the country. The Chinese state-owned company China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) will build a 1,400 kilometer motorway linking the southern part of Angola with neighbouring Namibia to the northern part of Angola with the Democratic Republic of Congo. Construction is expected to begin at the end of 2025 or in 2026[10] .

This project shows China returning to large-scale infrastructure projects in Angola, something that was thought to be over. However, this is not the case.

Secondly, there is the Angolan government’s intention to terminate the contract with the company that won the tender to build the Soyo refinery, which has had difficulties obtaining funding. This is a consortium led by Quanten, which won an international public tender in 2021 for the construction of the Soyo refinery, made up of four companies, three of which are American (the consortium leader Quanten LLC, TGT INC and Aurum & Sharp LLC) and one Angolan (ATIS Nebest)[11] .

In this case, we have an American failure to secure financing, which leads to the cancellation of a contract, opening the door to China’s entry, because, remember, China had already been involved in the construction of the Soyo refinery during the time of José Eduardo dos Santos, and a Chinese company had come second in the international tender that awarded the contract to Quanten[12] . Now the door is open for the second-placed Chinese, the CMEC consortium made up of China Machinery Engineering Corp,[13] or other Chinese-led interested parties to move into Soyo.

It’s clear that here we are confronted with a typical American problem of our time, the excessive belief in the power of marketing and in financial engineering that is impractical in Africa. To quote the CEO of Mota-Engil, Carlos Mota Santos, the American problem is that “all North American or European investment, with one or two exceptions, is more opportunistic. They are property funds and vulture funds, I don’t see them investing in any industry.”[14]

Finally, we have a third sign of Western withdrawal, now from Siemens, and the opening of more doors to China in an area in which it also has expertise, that of surface metros (let’s remember that the recent fleet of the Porto metro in Portugal has already been equipped with Chinese trains).

Now it’s the case of the surface metro in Luanda. The Germans from Siemens Mobility have pulled out of the project based on a public-private partnership and the Angolan government intends to take on the construction costs itself with funding from China[15] .

It’s a big turnaround, and once again demonstrates the inability or unwillingness of Western companies to invest in Angola. First Quanten failed in Soyo, now Siemens in the Luanda metro. Angola is once again fully open and in need of China to ensure its development.

Slow United States and energetic China

What appears to be the case at the moment is that American and Western goodwill is not enough. The reality is simple. Angola needs money, as it did in 2002 for reconstruction, and once again China seems committed to taking the lead.

The United States seems to want to be with Angola, but when it comes to decisive moments it has no practical or operational solutions, getting lost in plans, projects, trips, financial engineering and announcements of intent. On the other hand, China seems to have realized that a new opportunity is opening up in Angola, and is apparently in a position to take advantage of this new opportunity.

The future will tell.

[1] Rui Verde, 2021, Angola at the Crossroads: Between Kleptocracy and Development, London

[2] See our previous report at https://www.cedesa.pt/2021/05/18/os-realinhamentos-da-politica-externa-de-angola/

[3] https://observador.pt/2023/12/06/embaixador-dos-eua-destaca-ano-verdadeiramente-historico-apos-encontro-entre-biden-e-joao-lourenco/

[4] João de Almeida, https://www.facebook.com/dealmeida31

[5] https://www.afdb.org/pt/noticias-e-eventos/comunicados-de-imprensa/lideres-do-g-7-reafirmam-empenho-em-infraestruturas-de-milhares-de-milhoes-de-dolares-para-africa-prometem-mais-apoio-iniciativas-do-banco-africano-de-desenvolvimento-71926

[6] https://www.club-k.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=52349:o-corredor-do-lobito-a-resposta-de-washington-a-iniciativa-belt-and-road-em-africa&catid=5&lang=pt&Itemid=1070#google_vignette

[7] https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/addressing-chinas-monopoly-over-africas-renewable-energy-minerals

[8] https://www.club-k.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=54293:grupo-angolano-carrinho-recebe-financiamento-do-g7-para-impulsionar-infraestrutura-no-corredor-do-lobito&catid=41026:nacional&lang=pt&Itemid=1083

[9] https://eco.sapo.pt/2023/04/20/mota-engil-insiste-numa-decisao-e-diz-que-e-incontornavel-no-projeto-do-novo-aeroporto/

[10] https://www.angonoticias.com/Artigos/item/77289/grupo-chines-vai-construir-primeira-autoestrada-de-angola

[11] https://www.rtp.pt/noticias/economia/angola-admite-rescindir-contrato-com-empresa-que-vai-construir-refinaria-do-soyo_n1578622

[12] https://expansao.co.ao/expansao-mercados/interior/consorcio-euaangola-tem-tres-anos-para-construir-refinaria-101446.html

[13] https://www.noticiasaominuto.com/economia/1710487/consorcio-quantem-vence-concurso-para-a-construcao-da-refinaria-do-soyo

[14] https://eco.sapo.pt/2023/04/20/mota-engil-insiste-numa-decisao-e-diz-que-e-incontornavel-no-projeto-do-novo-aeroporto/

[15] https://www.angonoticias.com/Artigos/item/77319/angola-avanca-com-metro-de-luanda-e-desiste-de-ppp-negociada-com-os-alemaes-da-siemens-mobility

In search of a new paradigm for Angola-China relations

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Overcoming the debt issue

Apparently, João Lourenço is due to visit China soon, and Beijing already has an ambassador in Luanda again. So, there are marked dynamic movements in the Angola-China relationship.

It’s not the Angolan President’s first visit to Beijing, but it is the first after his public and effective rapprochement with the United States, and at a time when the issue of debt to China has become the main aspect of relations between the two countries.

With regard to debt, there is one indisputable fact. Angola has made a substantial reduction in its capital debt since 2017. In fact, in that year the amount of capital owed was 23.204,9 billion dollars, while at the end of 2023 it only stood at 17.921,0 billion US dollars, a reduction of exactly 5.283,9 billion dollars according to official figures from the National Bank of Angola (BNA), in capital alone, not including interest.[1] This means that even during years of crisis – don’t forget that the Angolan economy contracted between 2016 and 2020[2] – the Angolan state was able and willing to pay its debt to China.

So the question is not one of capacity, but one of sacrifice, or rather opportunity cost. The capital taken from the state budget to pay China is capital that is not used in other sectors, such as human development, education, health, sanitation, etc. In addition, of course, the budgetary instability caused by fluctuating oil prices always puts great pressure on the treasury’s liquidity to meet payments.

It is for this reason, and after the great Angolan effort of more than 5 billion dollars made during João Lourenço’s presidency, that this should be the time to decompress in the payment of the debt to China.

In addition to this, there is another fact, which has already been dealt with sufficiently[3] , which is the so-called “odious debt”. It now appears that a large part of the debt Angola contracted from China ended up illegally in the hands of private Angolan entities that did not use the funds for the common good, but for their own undue profit. Recent reports indicate that the entire mechanism for embezzling funds was structured with the participation of Chinese entities mandated by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party[4] . If confirmed, and it has not been duly certified, this action places the amounts of “odious debt” in a separate category, which should be the subject of separate negotiation by the diplomacies of the two countries, so as not to give rise to any proceedings in an arbitration court, as is provided for in the bilateral financing agreements.

Once the issue of debt has been framed, it is clear that now is the time to move beyond debt and create a new paradigm for relations between Angola and China

The new paradigm between Angola and China: emptying the China-US Manichaeism

It could be thought that João Lourenço’s rapprochement with Joe Biden, promoting an effective strengthening of Angola’s relations with the United States, would lead to a necessary estrangement and distancing from China.

We don’t share that view. On the contrary, it is understood that the Manichean vision that supports this view is not supported by facts.

Firstly, in the economic sphere, despite the American rhetoric that began with the Trump administration and continued with Biden, what is certain is that relations between the two countries – the US and China – remain intense. American companies – and Western companies in general – are still very dependent on Chinese markets and production chains. The more aggressive rhetoric has only benefited a few intermediary countries that receive Chinese investment and then export the products resulting from that investment to the US with a “non-Chinese label”, and in the end the ties remain strong. In this sense, for example, Tesla’s Elon Musk is inviting Chinese suppliers of parts for his cars to replicate their production chains from China to Mexico[5] . Recently, the CEO of Apple – Tim Cook – met with Chinese officials and reaffirmed his commitment to the Chinese market and his desire to forge closer ties with the Beijing government[6] . Another current example is ExxonMobil, the American energy giant that plans to invest in a multi-billion dollar petrochemical complex in Guangdong province[7] . In fact, if everything goes according to plan, the project, which has a total investment of 10 billion dollars, will have its first phase completed before the end of the year. Not to mention Starbucks, the American multinational, which now has more than 6,800 shops in China alone, and which in 2023 invested more than 200 million dollars in a new campus in China, a sign of how crucial the Chinese consumer continues to be for the global coffee chain, despite a certain economic slowdown .[8]

In addition, the success of the Lobito Corridor, on which both Angola and the United States are betting, necessarily requires Chinese competition – which dominates the bulk of the raw materials – in order to be successful.

These real facts about the economic infrastructure point to a necessary triangulation between intermediary countries, China and the United States, which translates into an ideal role for Angola, which is rightly positioned as a “bridge” between Asia and the West. This reciprocal rapprochement can therefore be beneficial rather than disadvantageous, if Angola takes advantage of its role as a hinge in a skillful and intelligent way.

The new paradigm between Angola and China: exchanging loans for productive investment

The essential fact is the need for a paradigm shift. Angola cannot sustain its treasury and development on loans that have to be paid back. This doesn’t mean that it won’t use them and resort to them when it needs to, but the strategy has to be different, and different means investment. What we want from China is investment, not more loans.

Let’s look at China’s policy in Portugal. There, China essentially makes investments, buys shares in companies and becomes a partner in others. It brings capital to Lisbon to invest in the production process, not to earn interest. The main Chinese investments in Portugal are concentrated in sectors such as banking, energy and insurance. Take the case of EDP. Chinese investment in EDP – Energias de Portugal, S.A. is significant. China Three Gorges (CTG) has been EDP’s largest shareholder since 2011. Last year, the shares held by CGT were valued at 4,634 million euros[9] . In the health sector, the Chinese private group Fosun stands out as the largest shareholder in the Luz Saúde Group.  This group, which is one of Portugal’s leading healthcare organizations, is controlled by the Chinese Fosun and the insurance company Fidelidade (which, in turn, also has the Chinese Fosun as a shareholder)[10] . The group currently manages 30 hospitals, clinics and health centres. In 2022, its operating profits totaled 600 million euros, up 11 % on the previous year[11] .

In 2023, Portugal attracted more foreign industrial investment and the largest came from China.[12] This is “the Chinese electric car battery factory CALB, which has already started the environmental licensing process for a new plant in Sines, a project worth 2060 million euros, for which 90 hectares of land have been set aside and 1800 jobs have been promised[13] “.
 This is the kind of relationship that Angola should begin to have with China. Not a relationship of dependence on loans, but of direct Chinese investment in the Angolan economy.

There are several areas for Chinese investment in Angola, but we would highlight the possibilities of car factories, given the huge increase in this industry in China and the fact that it is becoming the largest in the world. Equally important is the telecommunications and electricity sector, which is so lacking in Angola. Another sector to invest in could be textiles, after the failure of Ethiopia, shortening the logistical supply lines to the US and Europe in relation to Vietnam.

Other hypotheses should be studied, but here are some suggestions for Chinese investment in Angola: creating a cluster in the automobile industry, telecommunications and electricity, textiles.

[1] PUBLIC EXTERNAL DEBT BY COUNTRY (STOCK): 2009 – 2023, https://www.bna.ao/#/pt/estatisticas/estatisticas-externas/dados-anuais                  

[2] https://pt.countryeconomy.com/governo/pib/angola

[3] Rui Verde, 2023, O tratamento jurídico a conferir à dívida pública angolana à China que resulta de apropriação privada, Communication to the III International Congress of Angolanistics
Biblioteca Nacional /Lisboa

[4] https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/sam-pa-ccp-02062024151947.html

[5] https://oglobo.globo.com/economia/noticia/2024/02/16/elon-musk-atrai-fornecedores-chineses-para-se-instalarem-bem-ao-lado-dos-eua.ghtml

[6] https://www.adrenaline.com.br/hardware/ceo-da-apple-reafirma-seu-compromisso-com-a-china/

[7] https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202402/1307530.shtml

[8] https://edition.cnn.com/2023/09/19/business-food/starbucks-china-coffee-center-intl-hnk/index.html

[9] Idem.

[10] https://observador.pt/2020/10/21/luz-saude-dos-chineses-da-fosun-foi-quem-fez-mais-negocios-com-o-estado-na-pandemia/

[11] https://jornaleconomico.sapo.pt/noticias/luz-saude-tem-dimensao-para-entrar-no-psi-diz-lider-da-bolsa-nacional/

[12] https://www.publico.pt/2024/03/03/economia/noticia/portugal-captou-investimento-estrangeiro-industrial-maior-veio-china-2082344

[13] Idem.

2022 Angolan elections and the United States

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Recently, rumors have circulated in Luanda and received echo in generally well-informed portals[1] about a possible increased interest of the United States in the Angolan elections, which would lead the Western power to demand that the elections have impartial international observers to guarantee the electoral truth, as well as the threat of possible sanctions against the João Lourenço government if it did not comply with these American recommendations. Specifically, it is announced that the Biden Administration has been threatening the application of financial sanctions, visa restrictions and travel bans against government officials who undermine elections in their countries[2]. From there it is extrapolated that it will be doing the same in relation to Angola.

This apparent position represents a break with the relative passivity with which the United States of America in the past has faced the general elections in Angola, at least since 2008, it is necessary to try to understand if this change in US policy verifiably exists and in what terms.

Firstly, the sources we consulted state that they are not aware of any reversal of US foreign policy towards Angola, noting that the rumors essentially originate from documents sent by Angolan Non-Governmental Organizations to the State Department, which has always happened and will happen and also in the usual inquiries that the American Embassy in Luanda carried out, but which it has always carried out in the past and will carry out in the future. Therefore, nothing new.

Secondly, and this is the object of our study, it is interesting to investigate whether the structural conditions of US foreign policy imply a more accentuated intervention/concern with the elections and the situation in Angola, which could lead to serious misunderstandings between the Biden Administration. and the executive of João Lourenço.

The Biden Administration’s foreign policy, curiously, in its broad lines follows the policy adopted by Donald Trump, breaking only in specific aspects, such as the weather emergency or some multilateralism. Thus, Biden’s foreign policy is based on a commitment to dealing with the relationship with China, a pragmatism in most relations and a lack of interest in Africa.

The withdrawal, as it took place, from Afghanistan is a typical example of this approach, in which Americans do not want to get involved in “nation building” projects or actively promoting values ​​in other countries. They now prefer a strategy that benefits them commercially, guarantees stability and helps control China.

The idealism of the neoconservatives who embraced George Bush Jr., in his attempt to build democracies and the rule of law in Iraq and Afghanistan, is no longer part of the American foreign policy guide. So don’t expect this idealism to come to Africa. There will be no interventions in Africa to promote any kind of American values, not even muscular interventions of any kind.

What exists on the North American side is a desire for the African continent to be as stable as possible and the supply of essential raw materials ensured in the most adequate way possible.

This October, in the prestigious Foreign Affairs magazine, they wrote “President Joe Biden’s administration has been similarly slow out of the blocks on Africa. Aside from its focused diplomatic response to the horrific civil war in Ethiopia and a few hints about other areas of emphasis, such as trade and investment, Biden has not articulated a strategy for the continent.[3]”

Consequently, in terms of the structural lines of American foreign policy, it appears that with the withdrawal from Afghanistan, any wish for “Nation building” or intervention in a third country that does not directly threaten the national interest has been abandoned.

Additionally, the focus was placed on China and its control and more generally on Asia.

The US State Department’s statement from May this year is very clear on the importance of China and the role it plays in the American approach: “Strategic competition is the frame through which the United States views its relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The United States will address its relationship with the PRC from a position of strength in which we work closely with our allies and partners to defend our interests and values.  We will advance our economic interests, counter Beijing’s aggressive and coercive actions, sustain key military advantages and vital security partnerships, re-engage robustly in the UN system, and stand up to Beijing when PRC authorities are violating human rights and fundamental freedoms. When it is in our interest, the United States will conduct results-oriented diplomacy with China on shared challenges such as climate change and global public health crises[4]”.

If the structuring lines of American foreign policy are those mentioned above, and Africa does not occupy a relevant place, it is worth pointing out, however, what the United States wants or expects from Africa. Essentially, it can be summed up in a colloquial phrase: The US wants Africa not to bother them and provide some economic profits.

Following this strategy, the US has handed over a good part of the anti-terrorist fight to France and counts on African countries to guarantee local stability, pursuing strong alliances with some of them. Only if US national interests and security are affected by Islamic terrorism will the United States intervene strongly. It should be noted that the US also has its trauma here, which occurred in Somalia, and so well portrayed in the beautiful film Black Hawk Down[5], masterfully directed by Ridley Scott. There is no US willingness to get inside any imbroglio in Africa. This idea is reinforced by the donwsizing proposals regarding its Africom (United States Command for Africa).

To this extent, the US has a very practical view of the balance of power and needs for Africa. And in reality its history with Angola demonstrates this. In fact, even when in the 1980s they reportedly supported Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA against José Eduardo dos Santos’ MPLA, they were careful that such support did not disrupt the activities of their oil companies operating in territory dominated by the MPLA government. At the time, Cuba sent an additional 2,000 soldiers to protect Chevron’s oil rigs (in Cabinda). In 1986 Savimbi called Chevron’s presence in Angola, already protected by Cuban troops, as a UNITA “target”. So, we had Savimbi backed by the Americans to invective an American company protected by the Cubans[6]. Later, it was rumored that a company linked to the conservative Dick Cheney, future vice president of George Bush Jr., had a role in the location and death of Jonas Savimbi[7].

This means that the US attitude towards Angola has always been ambivalent, and it will not be now that it will embark on a path of confrontation, when Angola became an important ally for two very realistic reasons.

Firstly, Angola, specially under the leadership of João Lourenço, has played a role of pacification in its area of ​​influence. Remember that Angola helped a peaceful and electoral broadcast in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), tries to establish some peacefulness between the triangle DRC, Uganda and Rwanda, besides having contributed decisively to the recent peace in the Central African Republic (CAR). In fact, in the latter country, President Touadéra highlighted the crucial role played by the Angolan state in achieving peace. Angola is an ally of US peace in Africa and obviously the Americans will not neglect Angola’s diplomatic and military support and collaboration for African tranquility.

It is also a strong bulwark against any penetration of Islamic terrorism.

Secondly, it is clear that Angola is currently pursuing a new foreign policy, intending to “detach itself” from the excessive dependence on China. Now, given its experience with China, which pioneered intervention in Africa and the current attempt to a more Western foreign policy, Angola constitutes an experimental platform par excellence for US policy towards China, where the true implications of this policy will be tested and how far the US effort to counterbalance China will go.

To that extent, an American failure with Angola will be a global failure of its strategic approach to China. Here, as in the Cold War in relation to the Soviet Union, the reality of American action in relation to China will be measured.

Thus, it does not seem that the Biden Administration embarks on any hostility or change in relation to the João Lourenço government, as this does not correspond to American interests in relation to Africa and even in relation to China. All rumors in another sense should be seen as part of the Angolan infighting and not any muscular American positioning.

[1] CLUB-K, 2021,  https://club-k.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=46062:eua-ameacam-sancoes-contra-regimes-africanos-que-recorrem-a-fraude-eleitoral&catid=11:foco-do-dia&lang=pt&Itemid=1072

[2] idem

[3] Foreign Affairs, 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2021-10-08/africa-changing-and-usstrategynotkeeping?utm_medium=promo_email&utm_source=lo_flows&utm_campaign=registered_user_welcome&utm_term=email_1&utm_content=20211026

[4] USA State Department, 2021, https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-china/

[5] Black Hawk Down, 2001, https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0265086/

[6] Franklyn, J. (1997), Cuba and the United States: a chronological history

[7] Madsen, W. (2013). National Security Agency surveillance: Reflections and revelations 2001-2013

The realignments of Angola foreign policy

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1-Introduction. Angola’s geopolitical repositioning

At the moment, when we finish this report, the President of the Republic of Angola is in Paris with the President of the French Republic. This meeting represents one of the points in the ongoing realignment of Angola’s foreign policy. One has only to remember that in the last days of José Eduardo dos Santos, the French were “punished” due to their role in Angolagate.

Angola is not an indifferent country. It has played a geopolitically relevant role throughout its short but intense history after independence. First, it was one of the violent stages of the Cold War, where Americans and Soviets clashed with the virulence that they could not adopt in other geographic locations. Angola ended up being a Soviet bastion of great nomination, where they in reality won when in confrontation with the United States. After the Soviet phase, Angola was once again innovative and became the first African country to receive the new China that opened up to the world and sought in Africa a continent for its expansion and testing of its ideas. Angola has become a partner par excellence of China.

Obviously, this being a simplification, from the point of view of the major trends, the geopolitical position of Angola started to be aligned with the Soviet Union and after its fall, with China. Not being a country that is enraged anti-Western, very far from that, because Angola has a profound influence of European culture, the country has anchored itself in other places over time.

For several reasons, at this moment, Angola is rehearsing a different geopolitical approach that tends to devalue the role of both Russia and China, and to find new references and political dialogues. This text will focus on this devaluation, the new vectors that influence the Angolan repositioning, the countries that will now play a more relevant role in Angola’s external concerns, in addition to a short note on Portugal. Angola’s influence in southern Africa and its stabilizing role in Congos will not be addressed.

2-The decline of the Angolan relationship with Russia and China

The decline in the Soviet (now Russian) relationship with Angola is easy to describe. The Soviet Union’s commitment to Angola was part of a long-term strategy for the involvement of the North Atlantic through the countries of the South. The incursion into Africa that was accelerated by the “loss” of influence in the Middle East in the 1970s due to the cut promoted by Sadat from Egypt and by the Kissinger’s full exploitation. Suddenly, the Soviet Union found itself without one of the main supports it had in the Middle East and from where it hoped to condition the Americans. What is certain is that this situation led to a deepening of several alternatives, among which Angola later stood out. Naturally, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the end of the Cold War, with the consequent disintegration of the Soviet Union, meant that Russian interest in Africa waned considerably. The Russia that emerged after Gorbachev’s collapse was no longer interested in any global competition with the United States, but in its survival and transformation. He quickly lost interest in Angola.

It is true that at the present time, Putin has recovered some of the imperial dynamics and is looking for some influence in Africa, but it is still of short reach and has resulted in the sending of mercenaries from the Wagner group, which have had little efficiency, namely in Mozambique. In Angola, there is no significant behaviour by Russia, especially as an essential and determining partner. There are obviously contacts and relationships. There is a lot of talk about the Russian influence on Isabel dos Santos, who might be a citizen of that country, but the fact is that there are no visible Russian investments or ties with Luanda with obvious relevance. In 2019, Russian investments in Angola of 9 billion euros were announced, but there is no known sequence of that. In addition, Angola’s external public debt to Russia is zero according to data from the National Bank of Angola (BNA), having been fully settled by 2019.

It is more difficult to wind up the declining relationship with China. In fact, Chinese investment in Angola has been growing, at least until 2020, and the Angolan external public debt vis-à-vis China in 2020 represented US $ 22 billion, equivalent to more than 40% of the total. The Chinese implantation in Angola is profound, suffice to mention in sociological terms the relevance of the City of China.

However, there is evidence that the Chinese preference is decreasing, or at least, being mitigated. The first indication refers to the negotiations for a new loan that took João Lourenço to China at the beginning of his term. The first information for the press reported large amounts to be made available by China, of around 11 billion dollars. The reality is that there were several procrastinations on that loan, which apparently ended up involving a reduced amount of US $ 2 billion that might have suited to make payments of Angolan debt to Chinese companies.

What is certain is that if we observe the evolution of the Angolan public external debt to China, we will see that there was a remarkable leap between 2015 and 2016, from about US $ 11.7 billion to US $ 21.6 billion, which the debt reached the peak in 2017, 23 billion dollars and that since then has been decreasing with a significant cadence. It seems that China does not want to be involved with Angola any more, preferring to go on managing the current involvement.

If on the part of China it is possible to glimpse some recalcitrance in the relationship with Angola, on the Angolan side there are also obstacles. The first of them is the nature of the Angolan debt to China. Many claim that a good part of this debt is what is called “odious debt”, that is, it served to benefit corrupt private interests and not the country’s development. There is the impression that the opacity with which doing business with China has allowed the creation of situations of corruption that are too evident and harmful to the country. Thus, China’s debt is partly seen as a debt of corruption. In addition, quality problems have arisen in some Chinese buildings in Angola financed by Chinese debt. It is not clear whether this lack of quality is due to any Chinese negligence or objectionable behaviour on the part of Angolan officials, but it is certain that the image persists.

This means that since China is still a key partner for Angola, it is currently in a kind of reassessment phase. It is necessary to resolve the problem of the debt of the past linked to corruption, of the way of contracting too opaque on the part of China and also issues related to quality. It is a demanding task, but required to reactivate the Chinese and Angolan common interest.

If the relationship with Russia does not have the relevance of the past and with China is in a phase of reevaluation and reconditioning, it is clear that Angola, above all, given the changes as it passes, will have to actively seek new partners.

3-The new vectors of Angolan action: goals and countries

The Angolan relationship with Russia and China concurred with the need to assert its own sovereignty, independent of external interference, and also to obtain funds for war and post-war reconstruction. João Lourenço’s current foreign policy is placed at a slightly different level, in which it is important to gather external support for the two major reforms that are being carried out internally: economic reform and the fight against corruption. Both reforms need external collaboration, without which they may not survive.

Economic reform is based on the so-called Washington consensus proposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), although international intellectuals and bureaucrats have already abandoned this designation and refuse it. Even so, it implies the adoption of policies to raise taxes and restrict expenditure with the respective fiscal consolidation. Naturally, this type of policy is recessive, in the short term, it increases the economic crisis in Angola. The great way to overcome this effect is to obtain foreign investment and a lot. In fact, says the theory followed, that with these disciplinary reforms of the IMF, foreign investors start to trust the governments that follow them and feel safe to invest. In short, foreign investment is the necessary counterweight to the IMF reforms and the key to their success. Consequently, it is not surprising that one of the main vectors of Angolan foreign policy is the approach to countries with a remarkable reproductive investment capacity and with proven evidence.

In what concerns the fight against corruption, the panorama that is presented is that, in general, it is the countries with the potential to invest in Angola, those in which judicial collaboration is required to recover assets or trace illegal financial movements. The Angolan oligarchies that diverted public funds sent them to the most advanced countries or those with the greatest financial potential.

Therefore, there is a group of countries that currently are of great interest to Angola: they are those with an efficient investment capacity and with a financial system through which many of the illicit movements of Angolan funds have passed, as well as where assets bought, possibly with these funds. At the moment, neither China nor Russia are countries where more investment is expected, nor were the places chosen, apparently, to park illicit goods or assets. Or if they were, there is no knowledge of what is going on there and it is sheltered.

It is in this context that a number of countries have assumed relevance. A first group is the Western Europe countries that have stood out in visits and announcements of investments in Angola. At the beginning of April 2021, the Prime Minister of Spain, Pedro Sanchez, paid a visit to Angola. This visit was accompanied by a great Spanish commitment, affirming Angola as one of Spain’s preferred partners in Africa, and this as a great Spanish bet. It was announced that Angola was the “prow” of a project in Madrid that he called “Focus Africa 2023.” Last year, it was the turn of German Chancellor Angela Merkel to visit Angola within the framework of an Angola-Germany Economic Forum and more broadly of a German Marshall Plan for Africa. Also, President Macron announced a visit to Angola, which has been postponed due to Covid-19. In turn, the Italian President had already visited Angola in 2019. In relation to the United Kingdom, there have been no visits of such high level, but some interest in Angola is beginning to be noticed due to the impositions of Brexit, which they demand new markets for the UK, although there is a huge lack of knowledge.

Visits have followed several promises of investment from Western Europe. The Italian oil company (ENI) plans to invest seven billion dollars (5.9 billion euros) over the next four years in research, production, refining and solar energy, it announced in early April 2021. Before, British businessmen said they intend to invest around US $ 20 billion in Angola. Germany and France also have several projects underway.

This axis of Western Europe has become vital in Angolan foreign policy, as these countries need new markets and investments, to get out of excessive dependence on China, and in the British case, also to look for post-Brexit alternatives, and being mature markets, they have to find out where the youth and the future is, and that is in Africa.

With João Lourenço able to convey the image that governs a competent government and with stable macroeconomic rules and turned to the free market, Spanish, French, British, Italian or German investors will feel safe to invest. At the same time, many of the fortunes out of Angola lay there, so there will be an opportunity to create mechanisms for their recovery or redirection.

It should be noted that, contrary to what one might think, this Westernization of Lourenço’s foreign policy does not pass through Portugal, but indicates a direct approach between European countries and Angola and vice versa.

To this Western European axis it is necessary to add another one, the Gulf axis. The Gulf countries, in which the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia stand out. These countries, previously dependent on oil, have entered into a diversification policy. Dubai for some years now and with tremendous success. Saudi Arabia is still taking its first steps, with the so-called Vision 2030, but what is certain is that they want to invest outside their traditional scope and find new markets. In fact, Dubai already has several investments in Luanda and one of its companies has now taken over the Port of Luanda and in Saudi Arabia, Luanda has now opened an Embassy, ​​which reveals its interest in the kingdom. On the other hand, we know, Dubai is a quite important international financial center and where several Angolan financial movements have gone through, as well as being used in tax evasion schemes in the diamond trade. Allegedly, contrary to what has been its practice, Dubai will be collaborating with requests for Angolan legal aid, representing a typical example of the new geopolitical axis that we are describing, countries with potential for investment and judicial collaboration in the fight against corruption.

In summary, we conclude that a new Angolan geopolitical approach focuses on the countries of Western Europe and the Persian Gulf. But it doesn’t stop there.

4-India’s potential

The amount of trade between Sub-Saharan Africa and India has grown steadily, and today India is a key trading partner for Africa. With regard to Angola, the country is today the third most important exporter in sub-Saharan Africa to India, when in 2005 it was irrelevant. In 2017, the Ambassador of India issued a statement in which he highlighted: “Trade between Angola and India increased 100% to US $ 4.5 billion in 2017, (…) At the end of July, outside the 10th BRICS summit , in Johannesburg, the President of Angola, João Lourenço, met with the Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, and the two reaffirmed the need to increase trade and cooperation in areas such as energy, agriculture, food and pharmaceutical processing. ” As India grows and becomes a very important player worldwide, it is normal for Angola to look at this country with a new vision. It is a millionaire market to which an immensity of Angolan exports can reach.

5- The United States of America. The ultimate prize

The relationship between Angola and the United States has been ambiguous. In fact, even in the days when the US administration supported Jonas Savimbi and UNITA, there was a relationship with Luanda linked to oil and the protection of American multinationals operating in territory dominated by the MPLA government.

Currently, the United States represents everything Angola wants, the country of the dollar with an enviable investment capacity and financial innovation, with a universalizing legal structure that allows it to use multiple legal instruments around the world to pursue the fortunes of corruption. It is also from the United States that Angola needs to raise the various “red flags” that were erected during the time of José Eduardo dos Santos and made Angolan financial life much more difficult. The United States is the key country for this new Angolan phase of foreign investment and fight against corruption, because from here the definitive stimulus for progress can come.

In a way, João Lourenço was unlucky to come across Trump when he needed the USA. It is known that Trump had no interest in Africa, that he only served for his wife to take a trip in colonial style attire. Worse would have been impossible. But American indifference does not have to be an obstacle to a greater Angolan commitment to relations with the superpower. In the early 1970s, Anwar Sadat from Egypt also decided that he wanted to get closer to the United States. These occupied with a thousand and one crises, among which Vietnam stood out, paid no attention to Sadat, who continued to follow his line, expelling Soviet advisers and starting a rapprochement with the Americans.

Historical comparisons and evolutions aside-Sadat ended up murdered for having signed a peace agreement with Israel on American auspices- what seems more logical for Angola at this stage is to accentuate a closer relationship with the United States, even if they are not attentive. And they won’t be, because between Covid-19, China and Russia, and multiple small internal crises have a lot to deal with. However, effective and real US support for the new Angolan policy is essential for the country to come out of the doldrums and no longer have external financial constraints, so a vigorous approach to the US administration would be advisable on the part of Angola, despite of the mutual distrust that exists.

6-Portugal is different

Regarding the visit of Pedro Sanchez, Spanish Prime Minister, Angola came up with some criticisms of the Portuguese government, accusing him of inaction and of being overtaken by Spain. This is nonsense. Not even Portugal can think of having a monopoly on relations with Angola, nor is there any danger in Portuguese-Angolan relations. Portugal is always a separate case, its influence comes less from the government and more from soft power, from the umbilical connection that remains between the peoples of both countries. Luanda continues to stop when Sporting wins the championship or Benfica have a very important game, the favorite destination of most Angolans is Portugal, easy personal relationships are established between Portuguese and Angolans. Portuguese businessmen always look to Angola as a possibility for expanding their business. The relations between Angola and Portugal have an underlying relationship between the peoples before the intervention of the governments.

At the official level, the Portuguese government is generally welcoming towards Angola. Around 2005, he welcomed the wishes of Angolan investment, currently he accepted the requests for judicial cooperation from Angola in relation to Isabel dos Santos, as it ended up sending Manuel Vicente’s case to Angola after great pressure from Luanda. Let’s say there is a manifest porosity of the Portuguese position, easily adapting to the positions and needs of Luanda. This position, combined with the interest of the Angolan elites in Portugal, has ended up consolidating a good relationship between the two countries, despite a bump or two. It is clear that after April 25, 1974, Portugal lost interest in Africa, making its accession to Europe and becoming a modern western country its number one priority. This project has been a little tangled since 2000, but it has not led Portugal to a revision of its European focus yet, it only forced it to take a longer look at Africa, after decades of disinterest. Perhaps there is a time when Portugal wants to focus its foreign policy on Portuguese-speaking countries, but this is not the time, as it is not for Angola, which wants to embrace other “voices”, such as the English-speaking and French-speaking countries, thus, the best that governments can to do is to make life as easy as possible for its population who wish to work in common and mutually support each other’s requests, but little else.

Conclusion

The summary of the new Angolan geopolitical position is that Angola is betting on vectors linked to foreign investment and fighting corruption, assuming relevance in foreign policy, partnerships with Western Europe, Spain, France, Italy, Germany, United Kingdom, with the Persian Gulf, Emirates and Dubai, and with India. At the same time, a strengthening of relations with the United States is anticipated. Portugal will always have a place apart.

Reference Bibliography:

-Banco Nacional de Angola-Statistics- www.bna.ao

-Douglas Wheeler and René Pélissier, História de Angola, 2011

-Ian Taylor, India’s rise in Africa, International Affairs, 2012

-José Milhazes, Angola – O Princípio do Fim da União Soviética, 2009

-Robert Cooper, The Ambassadors: Thinking about Diplomacy from Machiavelli to Modern Times, 2021

-Rui Verde, Angola at the Crossroads. Between Kleptocracy and Development, 2021

-Saudi Vision 2030- https://www.vision2030.gov.sa/en

-Tom Burgis, The Looting Machine. Warlords, Tycoons, Smugglers and the Systematic Theft of Africa’s Wealth, 2015.

-Public and informational facts taken from Lusa, DW, Jornal de Negócios, Jornal de Angola, Angonotícia and Novo Jornal.