Angola and the New Post-International Order (of Trump and others)

1-For decades, there have been calls for a New World Order. Generally, these calls came from the so-called Third World countries at the time, and from left-wing intellectuals and ideologues who wanted a fairer, more united world, without so many financial rules and not based on the dictates of US capitalism.[1] In fact, an international order had been established at the Bretton Woods Conference and the San Francisco Conference (both in the United States) to create, respectively, the international financial structure and organizations and the United Nations from 1944/1945, with a view to creating a world in which international law was a reality and international relations were based on rules, the economy on free trade and peace was the ultimate goal of coexistence between peoples.
Despite many bumps in the road, this order based on rules, free trade and a trend towards globalization has endured, if not as a practice, at least as a paradigm or benchmark.
Everything began to change in the 2010s. In a number of countries, leaders with authoritarian tendencies emerged who understood that in order to develop their countries and give them the projection to which their size and history entitled them, they had to break with the internationalist paradigm of 1944/1945 and impose a revision of the world order.
This vision was not the solidarity-based and fair alternative of the past, but a reinvention of the power of the affirmative sovereign state with imperial tendencies that prevailed in the 19th century. A new paradigm of great powers in which the reference is their strength has once again taken shape. It was Putin in Russia, Xi Jinping in China, Modi in India, among others. All of them once again have as their main objective the emergence of their countries as great powers, and are willing to do this through the use of force, not necessarily military force, although in some cases it is also[2]
The United States and the European Union have not reacted to these attempts to change the international paradigm. They have remained complacent in advancing their agendas, which over time have become confused and irrational, mixing millenarian desires with destructive social engineering, betting on societies of leisure and consumption, with no benchmarks. Western electorates are beginning to react to the dysfunction of policies with their needs, and the extreme right is emerging in force in Europe and Trump in the United States. Trump’s first term could have been a blip. It wasn’t. His election in 2024 was the catalyst moment for the death of the international paradigm.
International relations can no longer be thought of as based on law, rules, respecting agreements or established facts. Alliances will change, countries’ interests and identities will be strengthened. Force will play a key role in re-establishing an international paradigm. Trump is leading the American reaction to this “death” of the 1944/1945 international system. And he is taking on board the new signs, already enunciated by Putin and Xi Jinping: international treaties are no longer relevant, alliances are changing, borders are not sacred, countries are not equal, democracy and free trade are not the only possible systems and certainly do not represent the end of history. Trump doesn’t hesitate to claim Greenland, Panama and even Canada. Just as Putin has already taken Crimea and is trying to take back Ukraine. When it will be Taiwan’s and China’s turn is unknown, but it all depends on calculations of strength and probability. This is the post-international system.
The European Union, also an essentially American creation in the post-war period, within the system devised for peace and prosperity by Acheson and Marshall, among others, did not understand the historical movements and above all did not understand from President Obama’s mandate onwards that it was no longer an American priority. Now, its creator (the USA) has withdrawn its support. It has to live for itself. It’s a dysfunctional structure with no unambiguous decision-making power in which countries with different interests live. The old European powers, Germany, France, the United Kingdom and perhaps Spain and Italy, will probably have to take over the running of affairs in an articulated way, but in which the national interest takes precedence, in order to reorient Europe.
2-Of course, this radical change in the international paradigm has very important implications for Africa, which are already being felt, and for Angola, which are not yet particularly visible, but will soon become so.
Recently, Africa seems to have returned to the 19th century and the time of the “race to Africa”. Its natural resources, its strategic position in the Global South, its demography, which is a sign of vitality for the future but also a threat of migration to Europe, and the persistent fragility of its institutions, have once again made the continent the target of interest and intervention by various external countries. Russia has set its sights on creating a belt of countries aligned in the Sahel, signing several military agreements, pushing ahead with the so-called Africa Corps (formerly Wagner) and planning to set up nuclear power plants with several African countries. It is possibly the most active power in Africa at the moment.[3] China is always more discreet, but its economic influence is growing and it is an essential partner for many African governments. Little is decided in Africa without China. As someone quoted a Vietnamese saying, China is “an oil slick that spreads without anyone noticing, but sticks to your feet[4] “. Other countries such as Turkey and the Persian Gulf countries are also making rapid strides in Africa, as is India, albeit more slowly.
The European Union has strong relations with Africa, it has several programs and realizes the importance of Africa, but it hesitates, between the problems that migration brings and the regulations it imposes on its companies, it drags its feet, without a defined strategy for Africa, it realizes that it is important, but it prevaricates. France used to dominate African affairs. It is now clearly losing its influence. The European decolonization complex also contributes to its ambiguous attitude[5] . Europe has the know-how and the funding, but it doesn’t leverage it enough
The United States seemed to realize what was happening with the Biden administration. They created a consistent strategy, returned to Africa, were developing projects and pairing up with the European Union, taking it out of its hesitations. Everything went downhill with Trump’s new mandate. The US has become absent, there is an American absenteeism in Africa.[6] Trump hadn’t even managed to get the African team set up by the end of March.
3-There have already been consequences of this new post-international paradigm in Africa, with an impact on Angola. The major advance by the combined forces of M23 and Rwanda to conquer Goma and Kivu in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), creating a clearly relevant intervention zone, took place after Trump took office, cementing the idea that the international order has changed and borders can be changed. The same effect may have been at the origin of the fact that Tshisekedi and Kagame left Angolan mediation to resolve their dispute and went to Qatar. Angola had the US as a support in this negotiation, which gave it negotiating strength. With Trump’s absenteeism, that Angolan advantage no longer exists – at least for now – and there is a strange appetite for holding talks in the Gulf countries. The war in eastern Congo is in danger of becoming even bigger. The American attitude is having effects that could be dramatic .[7]
In this sense, it must be emphasized that all of this has consequences for Angola. In the Second Congo War, Kagame was defeated with the Angolan contribution, and therefore has a “score to settle” with Angola. M23 won’t stop there and the Islamic Republic of East Africa is putting pressure on Cabo Delgado and possibly, according to some analysts, is already in Angola.[8]
In fact, the disruption of the international order and Trump’s absenteeism, which as we have seen is already having consequences in the DRC and the possible spread of Islam, have consequences for Angola, some at a political level and others at a security level.
On a political level, it is clear that the choices and adoption of democratic governance processes are strictly an Angolan matter. It is not and will not be the international community that imposes any political model. Clearly, the time of the end of history described by Francis Kukuyama[9] as democracy and a free economy is no more. Each country is left to its own devices. In fact, the very extinction of the Voice of America, which propagated these goals throughout the world, is the greatest example of this end. Don’t expect outside intervention in any way in the Angolan general elections in 2027. Those appeals to the international community no longer make any sense.
However, it is at the level of sovereignty, border definition and security that the greatest challenges for Angola arise in this new post-international order. A revisionist process of borders in Africa is underway. As we know, the borders in Africa after independence were largely inherited from the colonial period. During the Berlin Conference (1884-1885), the European powers divided the African continent among themselves, often ignoring local cultural, ethnic and geographical realities.
After independence, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) adopted the principle of uti possidetis juris, which stated that colonial borders should be maintained to avoid territorial conflicts. Over the years, there have only been two successful attempts to redefine borders, the creation of Eritrea in 1993 and South Sudan in 2011.
However, this principle of border stability is now being called into question. The M23 incursion with the support of Rwanda may want to establish new borders in the area. This will no longer depend on international law, but on force.
As a result, Angola’s borders are under threat, the call for secession of territories (Cabinda; Lundas?) will become stronger and the validity of the OAU declaration will be called into question. At the same time, migration caused by changes in other countries (DRC, for example) will put pressure on Angola’s borders. It is clear that this is also a time of threat to any country, by another that feels stronger, or that wants to sow instability as may be the case with Rwanda in relation to Angola or any Islamic republic proclaiming .[10]
In this sense, it would be useful for Angolan security to think about creating external perimeters as buffers to stabilize and maintain territory, especially in the event of serious upheaval in DRC territory, from the most sensitive areas, such as Cabinda and the Lundas, huge border lines with potential sources of danger.
The ongoing redefinition of the international system will inevitably lead Angola to a need to strengthen its internal unity and possibly to increase (and revise) its national security doctrine in order to combat threats to the stability of the state and its borders.
[1] For example, Antônio Carlos Wolkmer, 1989, The third world and the new international order
[2] Michael Kimmage, (2025) The World Trump Wants, Foreign Affairs. March/April 2025, Vol.104. N.2.
[3] Eugénio Costa Almeida, speech at the CEDESA dinner-debate on March 25, 2025.
[4] Maria José de Melo, IDEM above.
[5] IDEM.
[6] Rui Verde, speech at the CEDESA dinner-debate on March 25, 2025.
[7] IDEM
[8] Eugénio Costa Almeida, cit.
[9] Francis Fukuyama, 1992, The End of History and the Last Man,
[10] Eugénio Costa Almeida, IDEM.