Angola: The withdrawal of fuel subsidies and the transformation of political legitimacy
/in Research documents /by CEDESA-Editor
Rui Verde
- The decrease in oil revenues in the State Budget and the need for state funding
Following the guidelines of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Angolan government is gradually withdrawing fuel subsidies. The IMF defends this position because it believes that this measure will generate significant savings for the government and improve the state’s fiscal sustainability, since fuel subsidies represent a high cost for the General State Budget (OGE), reaching 9.1 billion kwanzas between 2021 and 2024. In addition, there are concerns about fuel leaks to neighboring countries and distortions in the domestic market . [1]
In a recent interview with LUSA, Angola’s finance minister, Vera Daves, confirmed that further cuts in fuel subsidies will be made this year, assuming that this is a “path that must continue”, although the speed depends on various factors .[2]
The truth is that Angola’s State Budget is facing ever greater challenges due to its historical dependence on oil revenues, a factor that jeopardizes the country’s financial stability . For decades, oil represented the main source of revenue, financing investments in infrastructure, health, education and other key sectors. However, the volatility of international oil prices has highlighted the need to diversify public revenues, especially since 2014.

For this reason, in recent years, the Angolan government has adopted tax and fiscal reform measures, seeking to strengthen non-oil revenue. The creation of specific taxes, the modernization of collection systems and incentives to formalize companies have reflected an attempt to reduce dependence on the energy sector. Despite these efforts, the budget deficit and the pressure on public accounts continue to be worrying challenges, as demonstrated by the delays that sometimes occur in paying the salaries of state workers, and the widespread delays in paying for supplies and services .[3]
The practical result is that the state needs to tax the population and cut spending that is irrational from an economic point of view[4] , as is the case with the fuel subsidy. This changes the pre-existing relationship between the state and the people. In the past, the state didn’t need the people to finance itself, now it does.
In fact, there are already around 5,205,380 individual taxpayers and 320,440 individual taxpayers with commercial activity in Angola, meaning that more than 5.5 million people are registered to pay taxes in the country[5] . While this is a remarkable number, it is also true that considering that there are around 14 million people with the potential to be taxpayers, there is still a lot of scope for broadening the tax base. At the same time, in 2022, Angola collected 4,638 billion kwanzas in non-oil taxes. Luanda province was responsible for 92.2% of this revenue. In the first quarter of 2023, non-oil revenue amounted to 976 billion kwanzas, an increase of 13% on the same period last year.[6][7] The key point is that non-oil revenue in Angola has shown significant growth in recent years . [8]
2-The need for taxes and subsidy cuts and the changing paradigm of political legitimacy
Since 2002, the political legitimacy of the Angolan system of government has rested on two factors: victory in the civil war and direct access to oil revenues.[9] In real terms, the people were not part of the equation for legitimizing power. José Eduardo dos Santos could govern without the people and without needing them. All he needed was military victory and oil money. The formal legitimizations of power, such as the 2008 elections or the 2010 Constitution, were just that, mere acts validating a previous reality that had been imposed.
Legally, the government was based on popular sovereignty and the Constitution, and all legal-formal acts were taken over time with a valid legal basis: elections, the Constitution, legislation, votes in parliament, etc. However, there was the notion that the constitutional and governmental system was based on a previous pact in which victory in the war and access to oil funds gave power to the government, which in return guaranteed the development of the country and the evolution of society. It is in this context that the political rationality of the fuel subsidy can be seen.
The point is that since 2014, when the price of oil fell enormously and Angola entered almost ten years of crisis, this political legitimacy has been destroyed. On the one hand, the generation and memories of the war have diminished. A large percentage of the Angolan population was born after the end of the civil war (2002). Around 65% of Angolans (more than two thirds) are under the age of 25, which means that 21 million Angolans are under this age group. This means that the legitimacy of the war already means little or nothing to them, as the victor has no right to exercise power.
In addition, the need to take revenue from the people and withdraw subsidies from them changes the 2002 social pact: if political power needs the people, then the people will participate in political power. There is no turning back from this equation that has been affirmed throughout history.
The payment of taxes has historically been a determining factor in the formation of political systems and the consolidation of democratic rights. In medieval England, the need to collect taxes led to the creation of institutions such as Parliament, where representatives of the nobility and the bourgeoisie discussed the king’s requests for money to pay for royal weddings or wars. The Magna Carta of 1215 was a milestone in establishing that taxation had to rely on some level of consent from the subjects, reinforcing the idea that government authority could not impose arbitrary taxes without representation. This principle evolved over the centuries, directly influencing the development of modern parliamentarianism .[10]
In the context of democracy, the concept of “no taxation without representation” became central. The Glorious Revolution of 1688 in England consolidated Parliament as a fundamental body in governance, restricting the absolute powers of the monarch and reinforcing the role of citizens in fiscal decision-making. The idea that taxes should be debated and legitimized by elected representatives helped shape democratic systems in Europe and North America. As nations sought greater popular participation, control over taxes became a crucial mechanism for defining citizens’ rights and strengthening representative democracy.
The relationship between taxation and independence became especially evident in the American Revolution (1775-1783). The British colonists in America rejected taxation without their direct participation in the decisions of the British Parliament. Legislation such as the Stamp Act of 1765 and the Tea Act of 1773 were seen as violations of colonial autonomy, leading to protests such as the Boston Tea Party. The refusal to accept taxation without representation resulted in the revolutionary movement that culminated in the independence of the United States, enshrining the idea that the legitimacy of a government depends on the participation of citizens in defining fiscal policies.
Thus, throughout history, the payment of taxes has not only been a means of financing states and governments, but also a catalyst for significant political transformations. Parliamentarianism, democracy and the independence of several countries were shaped by debates over who should have the power to define and collect taxes. The struggle for the right to influence tax policies contributed to the creation of institutions that ensured effective popular participation in government and the basis of its legitimacy.
3-Conclusion: the transformation of the political legitimacy paradigm in Angola
Political legitimacy in Angola is undergoing a significant transformation. The concept of the “right to govern”, previously associated with the MPLA, has lost its validity. This change reflects the growing awareness of the Angolan tax-paying population (and not recipients of fuel subsidies) of their role in sustaining the state, especially through the payment of taxes. The relationship between citizens’ tax contributions and the state’s ability to function has become a central element in the country’s political dynamics, transcending ideologies and public demonstrations.
This transformation marks a new phase in Angolan politics, where the power of the people is manifested in a more concrete way. The voice of citizens, based on their economic contribution, will redefine political arrangements and the structure of governance. This phenomenon highlights the importance of legitimacy that goes beyond mere legality, demanding a deeper connection between the rulers and the ruled.
The 2027 elections will represent a milestone in this context. For the first time, political legitimacy will be debated at the ballot box, transcending the legal sphere. This event promises to be a turning point in Angola’s political history, where the weight of social and economic transformation will have a direct impact on the choice of leaders and the definition of the country’s future.
[1] https://www.msn.com/pt-pt/pol%C3%ADtica/governo/governo-angolano-confirma-mais-cortes-nos-subs%C3%ADdios-aos-combust%C3%ADveis-este-ano/ar-AA1DGdmi
[2] https://www.angola24horas.com/sociedade/item/31715-governo-angolano-confirma-mais-cortes-nos-subsidios-aos-combustiveis
[3] https://observador.pt/2024/08/02/governo-angolano-diz-que-salarios-de-julho-dos-funcionarios-publicos-ja-foram-pagos/
[4] We have our doubts about this cut before the fuel market structure is reformed to make it a competitive market, but that’s a subject we won’t discuss here. See: https:
[5]https://www.ucm.minfin.gov.ao/cs/groups/public/documents/document/aw4x/mju4/~edisp/minfin1258130.pdf
[6] https://expansao.co.ao/angola/detalhe/luanda-arrecadou-922-do-total-da-receita-fiscal-nao-petrolifera-em-2022-60224.html
[7] https://forbesafricalusofona.com/impostos-arrecadados-pela-agt-em-angola-atingem-os-13-bilioes-kz-em-2022/
[8] https://www.opais.ao/economia/arrecadacao-nao-petrolifera-acima-dos-4-bilioes-de-kwanzas/
[9] Rui Verde, 2021, Angola at the Crossroads. Between Development and Kleptocracy, IB.Tauris. London.
[10] Rui Verde, 2000, The Harmonious Constitution. Judges and the Protection of Liberty. Newcastle upon Tyne.
Angola and the New Post-International Order (of Trump and others)
/in Research documents /by CEDESA-Editor
1-For decades, there have been calls for a New World Order. Generally, these calls came from the so-called Third World countries at the time, and from left-wing intellectuals and ideologues who wanted a fairer, more united world, without so many financial rules and not based on the dictates of US capitalism.[1] In fact, an international order had been established at the Bretton Woods Conference and the San Francisco Conference (both in the United States) to create, respectively, the international financial structure and organizations and the United Nations from 1944/1945, with a view to creating a world in which international law was a reality and international relations were based on rules, the economy on free trade and peace was the ultimate goal of coexistence between peoples.
Despite many bumps in the road, this order based on rules, free trade and a trend towards globalization has endured, if not as a practice, at least as a paradigm or benchmark.
Everything began to change in the 2010s. In a number of countries, leaders with authoritarian tendencies emerged who understood that in order to develop their countries and give them the projection to which their size and history entitled them, they had to break with the internationalist paradigm of 1944/1945 and impose a revision of the world order.
This vision was not the solidarity-based and fair alternative of the past, but a reinvention of the power of the affirmative sovereign state with imperial tendencies that prevailed in the 19th century. A new paradigm of great powers in which the reference is their strength has once again taken shape. It was Putin in Russia, Xi Jinping in China, Modi in India, among others. All of them once again have as their main objective the emergence of their countries as great powers, and are willing to do this through the use of force, not necessarily military force, although in some cases it is also[2]
The United States and the European Union have not reacted to these attempts to change the international paradigm. They have remained complacent in advancing their agendas, which over time have become confused and irrational, mixing millenarian desires with destructive social engineering, betting on societies of leisure and consumption, with no benchmarks. Western electorates are beginning to react to the dysfunction of policies with their needs, and the extreme right is emerging in force in Europe and Trump in the United States. Trump’s first term could have been a blip. It wasn’t. His election in 2024 was the catalyst moment for the death of the international paradigm.
International relations can no longer be thought of as based on law, rules, respecting agreements or established facts. Alliances will change, countries’ interests and identities will be strengthened. Force will play a key role in re-establishing an international paradigm. Trump is leading the American reaction to this “death” of the 1944/1945 international system. And he is taking on board the new signs, already enunciated by Putin and Xi Jinping: international treaties are no longer relevant, alliances are changing, borders are not sacred, countries are not equal, democracy and free trade are not the only possible systems and certainly do not represent the end of history. Trump doesn’t hesitate to claim Greenland, Panama and even Canada. Just as Putin has already taken Crimea and is trying to take back Ukraine. When it will be Taiwan’s and China’s turn is unknown, but it all depends on calculations of strength and probability. This is the post-international system.
The European Union, also an essentially American creation in the post-war period, within the system devised for peace and prosperity by Acheson and Marshall, among others, did not understand the historical movements and above all did not understand from President Obama’s mandate onwards that it was no longer an American priority. Now, its creator (the USA) has withdrawn its support. It has to live for itself. It’s a dysfunctional structure with no unambiguous decision-making power in which countries with different interests live. The old European powers, Germany, France, the United Kingdom and perhaps Spain and Italy, will probably have to take over the running of affairs in an articulated way, but in which the national interest takes precedence, in order to reorient Europe.
2-Of course, this radical change in the international paradigm has very important implications for Africa, which are already being felt, and for Angola, which are not yet particularly visible, but will soon become so.
Recently, Africa seems to have returned to the 19th century and the time of the “race to Africa”. Its natural resources, its strategic position in the Global South, its demography, which is a sign of vitality for the future but also a threat of migration to Europe, and the persistent fragility of its institutions, have once again made the continent the target of interest and intervention by various external countries. Russia has set its sights on creating a belt of countries aligned in the Sahel, signing several military agreements, pushing ahead with the so-called Africa Corps (formerly Wagner) and planning to set up nuclear power plants with several African countries. It is possibly the most active power in Africa at the moment.[3] China is always more discreet, but its economic influence is growing and it is an essential partner for many African governments. Little is decided in Africa without China. As someone quoted a Vietnamese saying, China is “an oil slick that spreads without anyone noticing, but sticks to your feet[4] “. Other countries such as Turkey and the Persian Gulf countries are also making rapid strides in Africa, as is India, albeit more slowly.
The European Union has strong relations with Africa, it has several programs and realizes the importance of Africa, but it hesitates, between the problems that migration brings and the regulations it imposes on its companies, it drags its feet, without a defined strategy for Africa, it realizes that it is important, but it prevaricates. France used to dominate African affairs. It is now clearly losing its influence. The European decolonization complex also contributes to its ambiguous attitude[5] . Europe has the know-how and the funding, but it doesn’t leverage it enough
The United States seemed to realize what was happening with the Biden administration. They created a consistent strategy, returned to Africa, were developing projects and pairing up with the European Union, taking it out of its hesitations. Everything went downhill with Trump’s new mandate. The US has become absent, there is an American absenteeism in Africa.[6] Trump hadn’t even managed to get the African team set up by the end of March.
3-There have already been consequences of this new post-international paradigm in Africa, with an impact on Angola. The major advance by the combined forces of M23 and Rwanda to conquer Goma and Kivu in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), creating a clearly relevant intervention zone, took place after Trump took office, cementing the idea that the international order has changed and borders can be changed. The same effect may have been at the origin of the fact that Tshisekedi and Kagame left Angolan mediation to resolve their dispute and went to Qatar. Angola had the US as a support in this negotiation, which gave it negotiating strength. With Trump’s absenteeism, that Angolan advantage no longer exists – at least for now – and there is a strange appetite for holding talks in the Gulf countries. The war in eastern Congo is in danger of becoming even bigger. The American attitude is having effects that could be dramatic .[7]
In this sense, it must be emphasized that all of this has consequences for Angola. In the Second Congo War, Kagame was defeated with the Angolan contribution, and therefore has a “score to settle” with Angola. M23 won’t stop there and the Islamic Republic of East Africa is putting pressure on Cabo Delgado and possibly, according to some analysts, is already in Angola.[8]
In fact, the disruption of the international order and Trump’s absenteeism, which as we have seen is already having consequences in the DRC and the possible spread of Islam, have consequences for Angola, some at a political level and others at a security level.
On a political level, it is clear that the choices and adoption of democratic governance processes are strictly an Angolan matter. It is not and will not be the international community that imposes any political model. Clearly, the time of the end of history described by Francis Kukuyama[9] as democracy and a free economy is no more. Each country is left to its own devices. In fact, the very extinction of the Voice of America, which propagated these goals throughout the world, is the greatest example of this end. Don’t expect outside intervention in any way in the Angolan general elections in 2027. Those appeals to the international community no longer make any sense.
However, it is at the level of sovereignty, border definition and security that the greatest challenges for Angola arise in this new post-international order. A revisionist process of borders in Africa is underway. As we know, the borders in Africa after independence were largely inherited from the colonial period. During the Berlin Conference (1884-1885), the European powers divided the African continent among themselves, often ignoring local cultural, ethnic and geographical realities.
After independence, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) adopted the principle of uti possidetis juris, which stated that colonial borders should be maintained to avoid territorial conflicts. Over the years, there have only been two successful attempts to redefine borders, the creation of Eritrea in 1993 and South Sudan in 2011.
However, this principle of border stability is now being called into question. The M23 incursion with the support of Rwanda may want to establish new borders in the area. This will no longer depend on international law, but on force.
As a result, Angola’s borders are under threat, the call for secession of territories (Cabinda; Lundas?) will become stronger and the validity of the OAU declaration will be called into question. At the same time, migration caused by changes in other countries (DRC, for example) will put pressure on Angola’s borders. It is clear that this is also a time of threat to any country, by another that feels stronger, or that wants to sow instability as may be the case with Rwanda in relation to Angola or any Islamic republic proclaiming .[10]
In this sense, it would be useful for Angolan security to think about creating external perimeters as buffers to stabilize and maintain territory, especially in the event of serious upheaval in DRC territory, from the most sensitive areas, such as Cabinda and the Lundas, huge border lines with potential sources of danger.
The ongoing redefinition of the international system will inevitably lead Angola to a need to strengthen its internal unity and possibly to increase (and revise) its national security doctrine in order to combat threats to the stability of the state and its borders.
[1] For example, Antônio Carlos Wolkmer, 1989, The third world and the new international order
[2] Michael Kimmage, (2025) The World Trump Wants, Foreign Affairs. March/April 2025, Vol.104. N.2.
[3] Eugénio Costa Almeida, speech at the CEDESA dinner-debate on March 25, 2025.
[4] Maria José de Melo, IDEM above.
[5] IDEM.
[6] Rui Verde, speech at the CEDESA dinner-debate on March 25, 2025.
[7] IDEM
[8] Eugénio Costa Almeida, cit.
[9] Francis Fukuyama, 1992, The End of History and the Last Man,
[10] Eugénio Costa Almeida, IDEM.
CEDESA dinner on March 25, 2025
/in Research documents /by CEDESA-EditorTrump and Africa: Victory for China and Russia?

The Dinner-Debate included in CEDESA’s celebrations of the 50th anniversary of Angola’s Independence took place on March 25 at the Pestana Palace in Lisbon, with the theme Trump and Africa: Victory for China and Russia?
In attendance were academics, journalists and businesspeople with links to Angola, a diverse group of personalities who debated the topic in a lively and free manner, without factionalism and in a constructive way.
We had a former PSD deputy-coordinator of the Assembly of the Republic’s Foreign Affairs Committee who moderated the debate, journalists from LUSA, Jornal de Negócios, Correio da Manhã, DW and RTP Africa, and professors from Portuguese and foreign universities.
There was a great deal of interest in the topic, highlighting the intensification of Russia’s efforts to establish itself in Africa through military agreements, the constant and pragmatic presence of China, new players such as India and Turkey, the possibilities opening up for the European Union, and the absenteeism of the US, which has already led to an increase in conflicts in Africa. The African situation is unstable, borders can change and wars can spread. These were the main conclusions.
Attendance was richer and more relevant.








Angolan economy: time for accelerated reforms
/in Research documents /by CEDESA-Editor
1-The International Monetary Fund’s report on Angola (Feb.2025)
None of the IMF’s various interventions in Angola have succeeded in changing the country’s economic structure and helping to launch it on a path of development, demonstrating the fragility of the IMF’s models of action in Africa.[1]
When the IMF comes up with equivocal results, it uses ambiguous communiqués that allow for different interpretations and, of course, disempower the institution. This is the case with the organization’s most recent statement on Angola, which is a real exercise in ambivalence.
However, despite this, or above all because of it, this communiqué[2] is a valuable tool from which to draw some conclusions and clues for the future of the Angolan economy, essentially the need for effective and real acceleration of economic reform in the direction of competition, productivity and radical modification of the financial functioning of the state.
On February 24, 2025, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded its Article IV consultation on Angola. It then issued a communiqué, which has now been made public.
On a positive note, the IMF points out that Angola’s economy recovered in 2024, mainly due to the oil sector. GDP growth is estimated to have reached 3.8 percent, exceeding previous projections, although this growth has been extended to the non-oil sector. The public debt/GDP ratio fell in 2024, benefiting from higher nominal GDP growth and sustained primary fiscal surpluses. This is the good news: the economy is growing due to the oil sector, while at the same time having a spill over effect on the other sectors.

Fig. 1- Evolution of Angola’s real economy as a percentage. Source: IMF 2025
At the same time, the IMF is cautious and somewhat frightened by a number of problems:
-General State Budget (public accounts) slippage due to higher capital expenditure and delay in removing the fuel subsidy.
-High inflation due to exchange rate pressures and food prices.
-Adverse market expectations and a high external debt service put great pressure on the value of the Angolan currency.
Due to the imminent dangers, the IMF “invites” the Angolan Executive to accelerate structural reforms of the economy, in which it emphasizes fiscal consolidation (cutting public spending or increasing taxes), the withdrawal of fuel subsidies, rationalizing public investment and improving the efficiency of spending, strengthening the management of public finances, including the public procurement framework and reforms of public companies. It also reaffirms the need for monetary policy to maintain a restrictive bias to ensure lasting disinflation.
The main emphasis, according to the IMF, should be on pro-market policies aimed at simplifying business regulation, strengthening governance, fighting corruption, developing human capital and deepening financial inclusion. Greater statistical capacity is also needed to support sound policymaking.
2-Beyond the IMF. The necessary reforms
The IMF communiqué itself contains contradictions that show its difficulty in obtaining a realistic view of the Angolan economy. For example, it attributes inflation to the liberalization of the exchange rate and the rise in food prices. Let’s remember that it was the IMF that recommended the abrupt adoption of a totally flexible exchange rate, without noticing that a good part of Angolan food was imported…so it’s an IMF policy that according to the IMF itself generates inflation….
However, further down he talks about the need for a restrictive monetary policy, which is obviously Angola’s major problem and the ultimate source of all inflation, the lax attitude of the BNA which lives with negative reference interest rates in real terms (BNA reference interest rate, 19.5% for inflation of 26.48%) and has difficulties controlling the money supply .[3]

Fig. 2-Development of monetary aggregates as a percentage/end of period. Source: IMF, 2025
Also surprising is the obsession with fuel subsidies, since it is clear that withdrawing them will generate even stronger inflationary pressures and possible social upheaval.
Even the warning about budget slippage seems out of context. If you look, the balance for Angola’s General State Budget (GSB) for 2025 is -1.3% of GDP, nothing significant. In fact, Angola doesn’t need less spending or austerity; on the contrary, it needs more effective spending.

Fig. nº 3- Overall Budget Balance, percentage of GDP. Source: IMF, 2025
The problems of the Angolan economy do not lie along these lines, but along others that the IMF also addresses, but does not highlight.
- The first problem facing the Angolan economy is that of rationalizing public spending. Much of the expenditure is uncontrolled, its destination is unknown, it is the result of over-invoicing, corrupt schemes, endogenous bargaining[4] . Much more than in the United States of America, it is in Angola that a programme like that of Elon Musk and his DOGE (Department of Government Efficiency) would be essential in order to reduce bureaucracy and optimize Angola’s public machine by cutting phantom and invented spending and reformulating government agencies.
- In terms of public procurement, it is essential to introduce competition mechanisms. If, perhaps, public tendering is time-consuming and an obstacle to development, allow simplified contracting, but with competition, perhaps through auctions or electronic mechanisms, thoroughly reviewing the current contracting law, which is bureaucratic, slow and unenforceable.
- Another important aspect is the renegotiation of the foreign debt. You can’t keep paying billions in capital every year, with the opportunity cost being Angolan development. Paying off the foreign debt under the terms in which it is being paid is an obstacle to the country’s growth.
- Domestically, the private economy needs to be stimulated, creating the pro-market conditions that the IMF talks about, with a major effort to reduce bureaucracy, freedom to set up companies, boosting bank credit, depoliticizing the business community and some protectionism for Angola’s infant industries. An internal free market with external protection must be the recipe for the initial years.
- We also need to understand the profitability of the large state-owned companies, Sonangol, TAAG, among others, by promoting efficiency in their management and privatizing at least 1/3 of their capital
Even now, Sonangol’s current income statement presents more doubts than certainties: Sonangol ended 2024 with a debt of 4.5 billion dollars, representing an increase of 15.4% on the previous year. At the same time, revenues fell to 10 billion euros last year, a drop of 8.6% in the space of a year. EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization) also fell by 8.8% year-on-year to 3.2 billion euros[5] . Let’s be clear, these results are not good. It’s not the catastrophe of 2015, but it’s not very encouraging.
The efficiency of companies can be optimized through partial privatization, since management with private partners tends to be more agile and focused on results, possibly encouraging innovation in mixed companies. The introduction of competing visions (state and private) can lead to cost savings and the elimination of unnecessary bureaucracy. Similarly, selling off parts of state-owned companies can generate revenue for the government, easing budget constraints and reducing the need for public funding. Partial privatization can lead to improvements in the quality of services, as private entities focus on customer satisfaction. Finally, mixed companies will have greater flexibility to adapt quickly to market demands.
Essentially:
- The state’s financial function will have to be completely restructured, in terms of spending, debt and hiring, possibly by creating an efficiency department like Elon Musk’s in the US.
- Introducing a free market in Angola with perfect independence for entrepreneurs to create and manage their companies without bureaucracy and interference from the state and the creation of mechanisms to bring them capital (banks, stock exchanges, venture capital, funds and autonomous state partnerships).
- Privatize up to 1/3 of the capital of large state-owned companies, including Sonangol.
All these reforms should be speeded up in the two and a half years that remain before President João Lourenço finishes his term in office.
[1] Cfr. https://actionaid.
[2] See https://www.imf.org/en/Ne
[3] https://www.makaangola.org/2024/03/bna-o-culpado-da-inflacao-em-angola/
[4] A recent example of pure waste: https://www.makaangola.org/2025/02/os-consumiveis-do-saque-no-kuando-kubango/
[5] https://www.jornaldenegocios.pt/economia/mundo/africa/detalhe/sonangol-ve-divida-aumentar-para-43-mil-milhoes-em-2024
THE DINOSAUR’S LEAP – New technologies and good governance
/in Research documents /by CEDESA-Editor
Rui Verde
Communication to the National Conference on Good Governance
Organization of the General Inspectorate of State Administration
Luanda
January 15th, 2025
The big question facing Angola’s governance, like that of many countries that feel they have the capacity to do much better, have ample natural resources and a young, active and impatient population, is the question of the leap. How can we leapfrog quickly to become a developed, prosperous and fair country for all?
In the early studies of economics, there was a fundamental author, Alfred Marshall, whose book Principles of Economy was the basis of knowledge of neoclassical economics. At the opening of the book, Marshall had inscribed the old saying Natura non facit saltus (nature does not jump). With this, Marshall, following Leibniz and Darwin, expressed the idea that things and natural properties change gradually, not suddenly. This meant that long leaps were not possible, only gradual evolution.
However, Stephen Jay Gould, an American paleontologist and historian of science, has shown that the evolution of nature is not exactly like that, presenting the so-called punctuated equilibrium theory. The theory proposes that most of evolution is characterized by long periods of evolutionary stability, punctuated by rapid periods of speciation, of abrupt jumps. The theory contrasted with gradualism, the popular idea that evolutionary change is marked by a pattern of smooth, continuous change in the fossil record. In short, Gould proved that dinosaurs also jump.
As far as a country’s development is concerned, a good hypothesis is that the impetus for this leap will be provided by good governance combined with the intelligent exploitation of new technologies.
Good governance is an expression in which the advice uti, non abuti (use, don’t abuse) must prevail, lest it become an empty and inexpressive concept. For example, looking at the Mo Ibrahim Foundation’s Good Governance Index, we see that Good Governance for them includes security and the rule of law, participation, rights and inclusion, economic opportunities and human development. In turn, these categories are subdivided into subcategories. It’s an interesting exercise, but at the end of the day impossible, giving reason to Camões’ verses “the whole world I embrace and nothing I squeeze.”
The generosity of concepts is at the root of their ineffectiveness. It’s not important to include everything in Good Governance, only to end up with nothing but good intentions. It is therefore better to limit Good Governance to two aspects that have always been required of rulers, whether they were emperors, kings, presidents, chancellors or anyone else. Effectiveness in meeting the country’s needs at each moment of the historical process and popular consent. Effectiveness and consent are the foundations of good governance. The ruler must have the ability to produce the desired effect or an expected result. In simpler terms, they must be able to achieve the objectives demanded of them by the historical situation. These objectives are defined widely and spontaneously by the political community, including the manifestos of the winning parties, the speeches or proclamations of the head of state, the consensus opinion emerging from public opinion, the feeling of the population measured by polls. And what is important in one space and time may not be in another.
However, this effectiveness and the objectives to be achieved are subject to the need for governance to have popular consent. Popular consent refers to the general acceptance or support of the population for a decision, policy or ruler. Popular consent does not necessarily imply the democratic model as it is currently followed; it can be that or any other model through which there is the necessary sensitivity and adequate communication channels between the people and the ruler.
It is very important to define good governance in order to avoid a vacuum.
As for new technologies, they can play a major role. But first we must always draw attention to the dangers that Jamie Susskind invokes in his book The Digital Republic: digital systems are based on rules written by people who, by creating certain non-unionizable algorithms, are left with enormous uncontrolled power. What seems neutral and technical is ultimately political and moral. Having emphasized this point, let’s look at some examples of a virtuous link between good governance and new technologies.
In the UN Indexes, Estonia usually appears as the most advanced country in the world in terms of e-government. There have been several reports of trips by the Minister of State and Civil House, Dr. Adão de Almeida, to Estonia. Thus, the country and its practices are already well known in Angola, so I won’t be redundant, just focusing on the points that seem most salient.
The widespread use of new technologies has resulted first and foremost from investments in infrastructure and cutting-edge technologies such as artificial intelligence, cloud computing and broadband. At the same time, Estonia is home to 10 unicorns and produces 10 times more start-ups per capita than the European average. Estonian ICT companies have helped build the world’s most advanced digital society
Therefore, we have a virtuous set-up that allows the use of new technologies for good governance: investment in artificial intelligence, cloud computing and broadband complemented by the freedom and promotion of the creation of cutting-edge technological companies.
There is thus a state-private sector partnership for the digitization and implementation of new technologies. The state doesn’t have the capacity to do everything, nor do the private sector.
Specifically, 99% of all public services are accessible online. A total of 88% of households have Internet capacity, and Wi-Fi connections are also available in more than 1100 public places, including all schools. In Estonia, 88% of the population aged between 16 and 74 use the Internet and these citizens regularly use electronic services. More than 95% of income tax returns were filed via the e-Tax Board in 2022, while almost all (more than 99%) banking transactions are carried out via the Internet.
All residents have an Estonian eID card, which acts as a digital identity card and is a physical identity document and, in the European Union, also a travel document.
An entrepreneur can even set up a company in Estonia directly from their personal device. The e-Business portal registration for setting up and registering a company can take as little as 18 minutes.
Politics is also a digital activity. Since 2005, everyone in Estonia has been able to vote electronically via the Internet, using an ID card or mobile ID, from home or even while traveling abroad.
In addition to the aforementioned investments and the creation of an entrepreneurial ecosystem centered on new technologies, there are two fundamental basic themes without which the use of new technologies for good governance is not possible. The first, which we won’t focus on here, is reforming the public administration, cutting red tape and making it a structure that serves the citizen. Efficient public administrations meet the needs of citizens and businesses. It is essential that public authorities are able to adapt to new circumstances.
In this sense, in Angola I have to mention the websites I use most often and which generally live up to expectations. One is the website of the Ministry of Finance. Especially with regard to the State Budget, it is very complete, accessible, easy to access and understand. The reports, tables and figures are organized and easy to understand.
Two others that have seen substantial improvements are the websites of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. However, in order to make it easier for the researcher, the published judgments should have a short summary, preferably by the reporting judge, accompanied by keywords. The way they are now, it’s almost impossible to do a jurisprudential analysis. Out of curiosity, I see that the latest ruling published in the Constitutional Court (at the time of writing) already has the object mentioned. Perhaps this heralds a good development.
The other fundamental theme, which constitutes a Hegelian synthesis of good governance and new technologies, is education. Without education, it is not possible to use new technologies as has been done in Estonia, and on the other hand, education can be one of the greatest beneficiaries of new technologies and a concrete application of good governance.
Education is the key and the result of the excellent use of new technologies by a well-governed country.
Everyone recognizes that there is a deficit in basic education in Angola. There are said to be 5 million children outside the education system. The seriousness of the issue cannot be overstated, but it is also clear that there are no means of reproducing the current system based on more physical schools and more teachers. The numbers are immense and impossible. That’s why it’s essential to change the paradigm, giving up the abstraction and generalization that laws impose by becoming impractical, and looking for differentiated, diverse and innovative solutions. Schools cannot still be thought of according to the Prussian-industrial model, with a law that regulates everything in the same way and which only allows for the repetition of a school model over and over again. It’s a recipe for failure.
In an ideal world, elementary school teachers in Angola would all be well trained, highly motivated and dreaming of vibrant lessons. In reality, this possibility is not feasible. That’s why radical solutions are needed to reach as many students as possible on a consistent basis.
First of all, we need to distinguish between places with access to networks and internet communications systems and those without. It is for the latter that physical investment should be focused, constructing buildings and training teachers. For places with network access, in addition to the physical structures already in place, the learning model must be radically different. The teacher will above all be a facilitator who will transmit well-prepared lessons written by a central team and sent to them on electronic tablets. The instructions define exactly what to write on the board and even when to walk through the presentation. Equally detailed plans determine the daily checks that directors must carry out to ensure that their team is up to date. What this facilitator has to know is how to use electronic media, read and transmit. In essence, he or she will act as a terminal on an electronic line, disseminating its content to a myriad of students.
A study carried out in Kenya by Michael Kremer, Nobel Prize-winning economist (2019), and colleagues from four American universities – – followed more than 10,000 children who applied for free places at schools that adopted these methods. After two years, it turned out that the children had learned much more than those who went to traditional schools.
The great advantage of the method is its low cost, which allows more children to learn. As has been said, the teachers are facilitators, so they can only have secondary education, which would greatly boost much-needed youth employment.
It’s clear that the standardized digital system can be criticized for many things, including the promotion of mechanical learning, the social devaluation of the teacher’s role, and the lack of elasticity in knowledge. That’s true. But it has a fundamental advantage: it allows a much greater coverage of students at a lower cost and will introduce them to digital media immediately.
It’s much more important to give all children basic knowledge tools, even if they’re not ideal, even if there are different systems, even if some have teachers and schools and others tablets and facilitators, than to leave millions with nothing.
This is the real choice.
It ends as it began. Angola can make the leap from the dinosaur. It just needs to use new technologies intelligently and locally to ensure good governance.
IV INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF ANGOLANISTICS
/in Research documents /by CEDESA-Editor
CALL FOR PAPERS
This year, 2025, marks the half-century of independent Angola. Fifty years of sometimes divergent paths, continuities and ruptures, and almost always difficult choices.
Fifty years doesn’t sound like much, but it was a very rich period in the history of Africa and the world, which saw unpredictable changes in 1975, including the fall of the so-called Eastern Bloc, the transformation of China into a global power, the creation of a European bloc, the strengthening of the African Union and many others.
The Angola Research Network(https://www.angolaresearchnetwork.org/) invites all Angolanists, members and non-members of our Network, to submit proposals for papers and panels for the IV International Congress of Angolanistics, to be held in Lisbon on June 18, 2025 at National Library of Portugal facilities.
The call will be open between January 15 and March 15, 2025.
As usual, the Congress will cover a broad spectrum of interests served by a wide range of perspectives and methodologies from history and the social, political and legal sciences, the humanities, the arts and music, the cultures of the Angolan diaspora and international relations and regional integration (Great Lakes and SADC).
Multidisciplinary proposals, with perspectives that cut across different fields of knowledge, and inter-arts proposals will be particularly welcome.
Those interested should send a reasoned proposal of no more than 250 words, accompanied by a short academic biography (no more than 100 words), email address, if possible, and contact telephone number with WhatsApp.
All correspondence should be sent to the following email address:
angolaresearchnetwork@gmail.com
Co-organizers: Filipe Santos and Rui Verde
The impossible peace in eastern Congo and Rwanda’s economic interests
/in Research documents /by CEDESA-Editor
1-Summary of the situation in eastern Congo. The role of M23 and Rwanda
There is an unknown or ignored war in eastern Congo that could, in the medium term, have very significant impacts on the whole policy of energy transition and the use of new technologies around the world. It is already having a devastating effect in the area. The Guardian, in a very recent report in which the issue is finally addressed, presents accounts of victims of unthinkable violence that paint a macabre picture of the brutality sweeping the central African country [Democratic Republic of Congo – DRC] and asks: “How long is the West prepared to look away?”[1]
Angola and President João Lourenço have been committed to preventing an escalation of violence and guaranteeing peace. Although Angolan mediation has prevented a total and direct confrontation between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda, it has not succeeded in bringing peace.
M23 plays an important role in this whole process. The M23 rebel group gained notoriety about a decade ago when its fighters took over the city of Goma, the largest in eastern Congo. The name “M23” comes from the peace agreement of March 23, 2009, which they accuse the Congolese government of not implementing properly. In recent years, M23 has resurfaced and intensified its activities, capturing strategic territories and causing massive displacement of civilians. The group’s violence has led to a serious humanitarian crisis, with thousands of people being forced from their homes and living in precarious conditions.[2]
The situation is complicated by the support M23 receives from Rwanda, which has generated regional tensions and hampered peace efforts. The Congolese government, led by President Félix Tshisekedi, has refused to negotiate directly with the M23, branding the group a terrorist group and blaming it for immense suffering and the violation of national sovereignty.
The reality is that Rwanda is deeply involved in promoting M23 activities in the DRC. This has already been proven by several UN reports, the latest of which was presented in July 2024[3] . Rwandan troops are operating undisguised in eastern Congolese territory, in full combat gear. Drone images confirm columns of its troops in the DRC. Around 4,000 Rwanda Defense Force (RDF) troops are in Congo supporting M23.
It is assumed that there is a political objective on the part of Rwanda, which is to obtain part of this territory for itself. First, it destabilizes, then it takes factual control and at a later stage detaches that territory from the DRC and makes it a protectorate, buffer state or even an integral part of Rwanda. Admittedly, it uses the Russian techniques that led to the annexation of Crimea.
In addition, many sectors of the US believe that the DRC is too big to be governed efficiently from Kinshasa, and there is some sympathy for a division of the country, as has been done in South Sudan, where the rich part secedes. The author of this report took part in a meeting at Chatham House in which this American position was developed and discussed, without any conclusions, but it remains in the air…. is a working hypothesis.
Incidentally, Rwanda enjoys the support, or at least the benevolence, of many Western powers. The EU is afraid of disrupting the supply chain if it sanctions Rwanda. The EU is currently discussing a controversial strategic minerals agreement with Rwanda. Critics warn that the agreement risks legitimizing the smuggling of conflict minerals from the DRC. In addition, Rwanda “controls” the West by “leveraging” its role as the third largest contributor to UN peace missions. Diplomatic sources claim that Kigali has threatened to withdraw peacekeeping troops if serious sanctions are applied. Rwanda courts Washington with its donor image darling, an image reinforced by the hiring of PR firms and lobbyists in the US and the UK[4] . France, one of the biggest bilateral donors to Rwanda, is another country that some believe is very close to Kagame (President of Rwanda). Sources point to the deployment of Rwandan troops to protect French-owned gas installations in Mozambique, which creates “solid leverage over Paris”. None of these assertions are straightforward, but only show some of the ambiguity that may underlie the West’s actions towards the east of the DRC and the conflict there.
2-The fundamental question of economic interests
Despite Rwanda’s political objectives, linked to projecting the country’s power, prestige and fighting the opposition forces in the DRC, there is one key fact that whets Rwanda’s interest and is probably linked to its survival as a viable and sustainable country with high growth rates.
The latest IMF report[5] sheds light behind the technical language on some of the paradoxes affecting Rwanda in economic and financial terms. From a structural point of view, Rwanda’s economy is fragile and subject to permanent shocks. The Rwandan government itself recognizes that the political space it has to move forward with its development objectives is limited due to recurring and overlapping shocks. From 2015 to 2023, public debt almost doubled to 73.5% of GDP, due to spending to support the development agenda, mitigate the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic and the May 2023 floods. Headwinds from growing geopolitical fragmentation, tightening global financial conditions and consecutive poor agricultural seasons, mainly due to adverse weather conditions, have put pressure on the level of international reserves. The devastating floods of May 2023 have further widened the underlying imbalances, with reconstruction costs projected at around $451 million (3% of GDP) over the 2023-2028 period. The recent outbreak of Marburg virus disease (MVD) puts further pressure on fiscal balances and the health system. Balance of payments pressures remain significant amid prolonged weakness in export performance and high imports of capital and consumer goods.
However, while facing these problems, Rwanda’s economy is growing at a remarkable rate: 8.2% in 2023, 8.3% in 2024 and a forecast of 7% for 2025. These are enviable GDP growth rates. Consequently, the structural weaknesses mentioned above are not reflected in the very high GDP growth rates.
What is beginning to emerge is the role that the area “invaded” by the DRC’s M23 has for Rwanda in sustaining economic growth.
In 2021, official US data showed that Rwanda provided 15% of the global supply of tantalum, a derivative of coltan ore, despite the fact that Rwanda produces only modest amounts of tantalum in its own mines. The US buys tantalum from Rwanda worth 36% of its (US) total imports – the highest among global producers – compared to just 7% from the DRC, which is bizarre given that tantalum exists in abundance in the DRC and not in Rwanda.
In March 2023, the DRC’s finance minister, Nicolas Kazadi, claimed that his country was losing almost $1 billion a year in minerals smuggled illegally into Rwanda. The minister said that Rwanda exported nearly $1 billion worth of gold, tin, tantalum and tungsten in 2022, even though the country (Rwanda) has few mineral deposits of its own.
According to a report by AMSTERDAM & PARTNERS LLP, a Washington DC law firm[6] , used by the DRC government to sue Apple urging it to stop using materials from the conflict zone, Rwanda uses an international network of elite entities to help smuggle, sell and profit from DRC minerals that are transported along militarized trade routes. Kigali allegedly received institutional cover to market these minerals with the help of an industry-led compliance scheme and companies such as AVX Corporation, KEMET Corporation and Global Advanced Metals that manufacture electronic components; these companies would, according to the same report, legitimize the smuggling by knowingly buying minerals “laundered” by Rwanda. The report gives examples of various cases and concrete situations of action within the DRC and later in Rwanda, highlighting the various actors involved.
There may have been a deliberate context of war provoked by Rwanda in order to make economic gains by “laundering” large quantities of tin, tungsten, tantalum and gold from the DRC.
3-The fragility and corruption of the RDC
The fragility of the state and corruption in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are critical issues that profoundly affect the country’s development and stability, and above all its ability to react to problems in the east, and which prevent any solution from being limited to supporting the DRC. Political institutions in the DRC are often perceived as weak and ineffective, which compromises good governance and the implementation of public policies. In the case of the Armed Forces, where budget spending is increasing exponentially, there is a belief that much of this spending does not go towards training and equipping soldiers[7] , but is instead diverted by those in charge and intermediaries, leaving the army ineffective, coupled with a lack of unified command in the combat region and an inability to train[8] . To a certain extent, the war has become a lucrative business for Congolese leaders, both through the purchase of arms and the hiring of mercenaries.
The President of the Republic Tshisekedi himself and his family are accused of being more committed to increasing their fortunes than to running the country rationally.[9]
4. Paradoxes of an impossible peace and the various working hypotheses
Rwanda needs access to minerals from the conflict zone in eastern Congo to sustain its economic growth. The DRC has an inefficient and allegedly corrupt political structure. So, there are no ideal solutions, and one cannot rely too much on the good faith of the contenders. To some extent, they both have an interest in prolonging the conflict, and this will be the essential problem. Any solution will be that of the lesser evil.
As mentioned above, there is always the possibility of the separation/secession of the Eastern zone, creating a new state that would possibly fall under the influence of Rwanda, or at least sign a free trade agreement with Kigali (the capital of Rwanda). Obviously, this solution would not please Kinshasa (capital of the DRC).
There is the possibility of keeping eastern Congo as an integral part of the DRC, but giving it a more autonomous status and allowing the zone to be part of a free trade area or economic integration with Rwanda.
There is yet another hypothesis that would require military intervention by Angola to train and strengthen the DRC army, possibly with the involvement of the United States of America. This hypothesis would have to be accompanied by reform towards good governance in the DRC and some kind of economic agreement with Rwanda, without which no lasting peace can be guaranteed.
[1] https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/dec/21/children-executed-and-women-raped-in-front-of-their-families-as-m23-militia-unleashes-fresh-terror-on-drc
[2] “Tired of this war”: the violence of the M23 group in the Democratic Republic of Congo | World | G1 and Rapid expansion of M23 in DR Congo worries UN mission leader | UN
[3] Final Report of the UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo, https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/118/80/pdf/n2411880.pdf
[4] https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/dec/21/children-executed-and-women-raped-in-front-of-their-families-as-m23-militia-unleashes-fresh-terror-on-drc
[5] IMF Country Report No. 24/341, December 2024, RWANDA December 2024. Fourth review under the policy coordination instrument, second and final review under the stand-by credit facility arrangement, fourth and final review under the arrangement under the resilience and sustainability facility, and request for the modification of end-June 2025 quantitative target for the policy coordination instrument-press release; staff report; and statement by the executive director for Rwanda.
[6] AMSTERDAM & PARTNERS LLP, BLOODMINERALS “everyone sees the massacres in eastern congo.but everyone is silent.” Washington DC| A pril2024 The laundering of drc’s3 t minerals by Rwanda and private entities.
[7] https://www.egmontinstitute.be/corruption-in-the-congolese-army-three-lessons-for-modern-democracies/
[8] https://afridesk.org/rdc-lever-letat-de-siege-au-profit-dune-zone-operationnelle-unique-biprovinciale/
[9]https://thegreatlakeseye.com/post?s=DRC%3A–Unmasking–Tshisekedi%E2%80%99s–failure–to–address–deep-seated–corruption–_1217; https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/jan/02/how-many-more-must-suffer-in-drc-before-the-west-stops-enabling-tshisekedi
CEDESA News
/in Research documents /by CEDESA-Editor
The Dinner-Debate to mark the 50th anniversary of Angola’s independence, organized jointly by ACNAE and CEDESA, took place on 21 November at the Pestana Palace in Lisbon.
It was attended by academics, journalists and businesspeople with links to Angola, a diverse group of personalities who debated the issue in a lively and free way, without factionalism and in a constructive manner.
We had the CEO of Portugal’s largest chemical company moderating the debate, several former MPs, journalists from LUSA, DN, Jornal de Negócios and TPA, professors from Portuguese and foreign universities.
The Book o Livro de Actas do III Congresso de Angolanística (June 2024) was distributed.
There was a strong interest in Angola.
Attendance was richer and more timely.






Trump’s victory and Angola (quick analysis)
/in Research documents /by CEDESA-Editor
Donald Trump’s expectations and unpredictability
For any observer of Angolan politics, there seemed to be a certain domestic alignment in terms of sympathies for the American elections. Or to put it more explicitly, a hope on the part of the sectors antagonistic to João Lourenço that Donald Trump would win, in the expectation that he would repeat the policy of his first term of disinterest in Africa and therefore a cooling off towards Angola.
Now that victory has been won, it’s important to try to understand what may or may not happen, given that Angola’s new strategic alignment with the US is at stake, which has, in a way, balanced the balance of power on the African continent and also, specifically, relaunched the Lobito Corridor, a project that President Joe Biden has embraced intensely.
Obviously, before January 20, 2025, everything will be too speculative, and, above all, when it comes to Trump, unpredictability takes center stage.
Even so, there have been enough signs to suggest that Trump’s attitude towards Angola will not be so different from Joe Biden’s policy after all.
China’s competition and containment
The first reason for the policy’s permanence is China. From a geostrategic point of view, the current situation (2024) is extremely different from that of Trump’s first term (2017-2021), particularly with regard to competition or containment of China, which, it should be remembered, was initiated as a structural trend in US foreign policy, precisely by Donald Trump. Trump’s collection of speeches on China during his term “TRUMP ON CHINA – PUTTING AMERICA FIRST” is expressed in his introduction to the statement:
“For decades, Donald J. Trump was one of the few prominent Americans to recognize the true nature of the Chinese Communist Party and its threat to America’s economic and political way of life. Now, under President Trump’s leadership, the United States is taking action to protect our nation and its partners from an increasingly assertive China. We are no longer turning a blind eye to the People’s Republic of China’s conduct nor are we hiding our criticism of its Communist Party behind closed doors.”[1]
It is in this sense that some of Trump’s most prominent collaborators have spoken out. Tibor Nagy, Trump’s former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs and former Ambassador to Guinea and Ethiopia, insists that Trump was the first to raise awareness about the enormous threat that China poses to US interests in Africa, and expressly states: “You will again see an aggressive fight against Chinese influence in Africa “.[2]
Admittedly, the focus of this transactional approach, typical of Trump, will be to start blocking supply chains for essential minerals in Africa used for green energy batteries used in electric vehicles and phones. Thus states Ambassador J. Peter Pham, former US Special Envoy for the Sahel region of Africa under Trump, “There is no denying that access to the many critical minerals that Africa has in great abundance is necessary for the US economy today, as well as for the technologies that will take us into the future,” and “Moreover, the monopolization of supply chains for these strategic resources by any country, let alone a revisionist power like China, is a threat to US security.”
This geostrategic sense of Africa in which Angola fits is reinforced by the so-called Project 2025, a kind of parallel doctrine of Trumpist ideologues, from which he has departed in some respects, but not in relation to Africa. Kiron K. Skinner writes in that document that Africa’s explosive population growth, large reserves of minerals dependent on industry, proximity to the main maritime transportation routes and its collective diplomatic power guarantee the continent’s global importance .[3]
The truth is that one area of the Biden-Harris approach that has not been criticized by Republicans is the Lobito Corridor, the multi-billion dollar logistics and communications infrastructure project that connects the Port of Lobito in Angola to essential mineral mines in Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. American observers of Africa see the project as a model to be built or replicated, mainly with the aim of taking back some control of essential mineral supply chains from China .[4]
Therefore, what emerges from a first analysis of the pronouncements of Trump’s allies and their own interests and stance towards China, is that Angola and its Lobito Corridor occupy a prominent place, and therefore, if Trump’s attention to China is maintained, Africa and especially Angola will be at a higher level of US strategic options, i.e. US interest in Angola will be maintained.
Business opportunities
A second aspect is Trump’s emphasis on numbers and business opportunities. It is likely that this time, thinking about Africa and Angola, he will see figures reflecting the massive movement of young people to the continent and opportunities for American business. It’s no secret that João Lourenço, albeit with modest success, has been trying to open up Angola to world business, making the country an attractive location for foreign investment. It’s a long road. However, Trump may see a market for US exports here, as Biden has already seen in telecommunications and solar energy .[5]
Conclusions
With all the caution that Trump’s unpredictability advises, as well as his previous contempt for the African continent has shown, it should not be anticipated that there will be a cooling in the rapprochement between Angola and the United States after January 20, 2025.
In fact, what has been at stake on the US side is not any friendship or personal relationship between Joe Biden and João Lourenço, but the strategic American interest in counterbalancing China and guaranteeing access to key minerals, as well as the exploitation of profitable businesses for a mature economy like the US.
In these terms, the US will most likely maintain a clear interest in Africa and Angola, unlike what happened in Trump’s first term. What is at stake is a structural trend in US foreign policy, which will depend less on its actors and more on its interests.
[1] https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Trump-on-China-Putting-America-First.pdf
[2] https://www.semafor.com/article/11/01/2024/trumps-africa-plans-take-pragmatic-turn-for-election
[3] https://static.project2025.org/2025_MandateForLeadership_CHAPTER-06.pdf
[4] https://www.semafor.com/article/11/01/2024/trumps-africa-plans-take-pragmatic-turn-for-election
[5] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/what-africa-can-expect-under-a-second-trump-administration-a-focus-on-the-numbers/
Afiliada na Angola Research Network (ARN)
Parceiros no projecto Life with Corona: Universidade das Nações Unidas ; International Security and Development Center, Berlim.