Artigos

THE DINOSAUR’S LEAP – New technologies and good governance

Communication to the National Conference on Good Governance

Organization of the General Inspectorate of State Administration

Luanda

January 15th, 2025

The big question facing Angola’s governance, like that of many countries that feel they have the capacity to do much better, have ample natural resources and a young, active and impatient population, is the question of the leap. How can we leapfrog quickly to become a developed, prosperous and fair country for all?

In the early studies of economics, there was a fundamental author, Alfred Marshall, whose book Principles of Economy was the basis of knowledge of neoclassical economics. At the opening of the book, Marshall had inscribed the old saying Natura non facit saltus (nature does not jump). With this, Marshall, following Leibniz and Darwin, expressed the idea that things and natural properties change gradually, not suddenly. This meant that long leaps were not possible, only gradual evolution.

However, Stephen Jay Gould, an American paleontologist and historian of science, has shown that the evolution of nature is not exactly like that, presenting the so-called punctuated equilibrium theory. The theory proposes that most of evolution is characterized by long periods of evolutionary stability, punctuated by rapid periods of speciation, of abrupt jumps. The theory contrasted with gradualism, the popular idea that evolutionary change is marked by a pattern of smooth, continuous change in the fossil record. In short, Gould proved that dinosaurs also jump.

As far as a country’s development is concerned, a good hypothesis is that the impetus for this leap will be provided by good governance combined with the intelligent exploitation of new technologies.

Good governance is an expression in which the advice uti, non abuti (use, don’t abuse) must prevail, lest it become an empty and inexpressive concept. For example, looking at the Mo Ibrahim Foundation’s Good Governance Index, we see that Good Governance for them includes security and the rule of law, participation, rights and inclusion, economic opportunities and human development. In turn, these categories are subdivided into subcategories. It’s an interesting exercise, but at the end of the day impossible, giving reason to Camões’ verses “the whole world I embrace and nothing I squeeze.”

The generosity of concepts is at the root of their ineffectiveness. It’s not important to include everything in Good Governance, only to end up with nothing but good intentions. It is therefore better to limit Good Governance to two aspects that have always been required of rulers, whether they were emperors, kings, presidents, chancellors or anyone else. Effectiveness in meeting the country’s needs at each moment of the historical process and popular consent. Effectiveness and consent are the foundations of good governance. The ruler must have the ability to produce the desired effect or an expected result. In simpler terms, they must be able to achieve the objectives demanded of them by the historical situation. These objectives are defined widely and spontaneously by the political community, including the manifestos of the winning parties, the speeches or proclamations of the head of state, the consensus opinion emerging from public opinion, the feeling of the population measured by polls. And what is important in one space and time may not be in another.

However, this effectiveness and the objectives to be achieved are subject to the need for governance to have popular consent. Popular consent refers to the general acceptance or support of the population for a decision, policy or ruler. Popular consent does not necessarily imply the democratic model as it is currently followed; it can be that or any other model through which there is the necessary sensitivity and adequate communication channels between the people and the ruler.

It is very important to define good governance in order to avoid a vacuum.

As for new technologies, they can play a major role. But first we must always draw attention to the dangers that Jamie Susskind invokes in his book The Digital Republic: digital systems are based on rules written by people who, by creating certain non-unionizable algorithms, are left with enormous uncontrolled power. What seems neutral and technical is ultimately political and moral. Having emphasized this point, let’s look at some examples of a virtuous link between good governance and new technologies.

In the UN Indexes, Estonia usually appears as the most advanced country in the world in terms of e-government. There have been several reports of trips by the Minister of State and Civil House, Dr. Adão de Almeida, to Estonia. Thus, the country and its practices are already well known in Angola, so I won’t be redundant, just focusing on the points that seem most salient.

The widespread use of new technologies has resulted first and foremost from investments in infrastructure and cutting-edge technologies such as artificial intelligence, cloud computing and broadband.  At the same time, Estonia is home to 10 unicorns and produces 10 times more start-ups per capita than the European average. Estonian ICT companies have helped build the world’s most advanced digital society

Therefore, we have a virtuous set-up that allows the use of new technologies for good governance: investment in artificial intelligence, cloud computing and broadband complemented by the freedom and promotion of the creation of cutting-edge technological companies.

There is thus a state-private sector partnership for the digitization and implementation of new technologies. The state doesn’t have the capacity to do everything, nor do the private sector.

Specifically, 99% of all public services are accessible online.  A total of 88% of households have Internet capacity, and Wi-Fi connections are also available in more than 1100 public places, including all schools. In Estonia, 88% of the population aged between 16 and 74 use the Internet and these citizens regularly use electronic services. More than 95% of income tax returns were filed via the e-Tax Board in 2022, while almost all (more than 99%) banking transactions are carried out via the Internet.

All residents have an Estonian eID card, which acts as a digital identity card and is a physical identity document and, in the European Union, also a travel document.

An entrepreneur can even set up a company in Estonia directly from their personal device. The e-Business portal registration for setting up and registering a company can take as little as 18 minutes.

Politics is also a digital activity. Since 2005, everyone in Estonia has been able to vote electronically via the Internet, using an ID card or mobile ID, from home or even while traveling abroad.

In addition to the aforementioned investments and the creation of an entrepreneurial ecosystem centered on new technologies, there are two fundamental basic themes without which the use of new technologies for good governance is not possible. The first, which we won’t focus on here, is reforming the public administration, cutting red tape and making it a structure that serves the citizen. Efficient public administrations meet the needs of citizens and businesses. It is essential that public authorities are able to adapt to new circumstances.

In this sense, in Angola I have to mention the websites I use most often and which generally live up to expectations. One is the website of the Ministry of Finance. Especially with regard to the State Budget, it is very complete, accessible, easy to access and understand. The reports, tables and figures are organized and easy to understand.

Two others that have seen substantial improvements are the websites of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. However, in order to make it easier for the researcher, the published judgments should have a short summary, preferably by the reporting judge, accompanied by keywords. The way they are now, it’s almost impossible to do a jurisprudential analysis. Out of curiosity, I see that the latest ruling published in the Constitutional Court (at the time of writing) already has the object mentioned. Perhaps this heralds a good development.

The other fundamental theme, which constitutes a Hegelian synthesis of good governance and new technologies, is education. Without education, it is not possible to use new technologies as has been done in Estonia, and on the other hand, education can be one of the greatest beneficiaries of new technologies and a concrete application of good governance.

Education is the key and the result of the excellent use of new technologies by a well-governed country.

Everyone recognizes that there is a deficit in basic education in Angola. There are said to be 5 million children outside the education system. The seriousness of the issue cannot be overstated, but it is also clear that there are no means of reproducing the current system based on more physical schools and more teachers. The numbers are immense and impossible. That’s why it’s essential to change the paradigm, giving up the abstraction and generalization that laws impose by becoming impractical, and looking for differentiated, diverse and innovative solutions. Schools cannot still be thought of according to the Prussian-industrial model, with a law that regulates everything in the same way and which only allows for the repetition of a school model over and over again. It’s a recipe for failure.

In an ideal world, elementary school teachers in Angola would all be well trained, highly motivated and dreaming of vibrant lessons. In reality, this possibility is not feasible. That’s why radical solutions are needed to reach as many students as possible on a consistent basis.

First of all, we need to distinguish between places with access to networks and internet communications systems and those without. It is for the latter that physical investment should be focused, constructing buildings and training teachers. For places with network access, in addition to the physical structures already in place, the learning model must be radically different. The teacher will above all be a facilitator who will transmit well-prepared lessons written by a central team and sent to them on electronic tablets. The instructions define exactly what to write on the board and even when to walk through the presentation. Equally detailed plans determine the daily checks that directors must carry out to ensure that their team is up to date. What this facilitator has to know is how to use electronic media, read and transmit. In essence, he or she will act as a terminal on an electronic line, disseminating its content to a myriad of students.

A study carried out in Kenya by Michael Kremer, Nobel Prize-winning economist (2019), and colleagues from four American universities – – followed more than 10,000 children who applied for free places at schools that adopted these methods. After two years, it turned out that the children had learned much more than those who went to traditional schools.

The great advantage of the method is its low cost, which allows more children to learn. As has been said, the teachers are facilitators, so they can only have secondary education, which would greatly boost much-needed youth employment.

It’s clear that the standardized digital system can be criticized for many things, including the promotion of mechanical learning, the social devaluation of the teacher’s role, and the lack of elasticity in knowledge. That’s true. But it has a fundamental advantage: it allows a much greater coverage of students at a lower cost and will introduce them to digital media immediately.

It’s much more important to give all children basic knowledge tools, even if they’re not ideal, even if there are different systems, even if some have teachers and schools and others tablets and facilitators, than to leave millions with nothing.

This is the real choice.

It ends as it began. Angola can make the leap from the dinosaur. It just needs to use new technologies intelligently and locally to ensure good governance.

The impossible peace in eastern Congo and Rwanda’s economic interests

1-Summary of the situation in eastern Congo. The role of M23 and Rwanda

There is an unknown or ignored war in eastern Congo that could, in the medium term, have very significant impacts on the whole policy of energy transition and the use of new technologies around the world. It is already having a devastating effect in the area. The Guardian, in a very recent report in which the issue is finally addressed, presents accounts of victims of unthinkable violence that paint a macabre picture of the brutality sweeping the central African country [Democratic Republic of Congo – DRC] and asks: “How long is the West prepared to look away?”[1]

Angola and President João Lourenço have been committed to preventing an escalation of violence and guaranteeing peace. Although Angolan mediation has prevented a total and direct confrontation between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda, it has not succeeded in bringing peace.

M23 plays an important role in this whole process. The M23 rebel group gained notoriety about a decade ago when its fighters took over the city of Goma, the largest in eastern Congo. The name “M23” comes from the peace agreement of March 23, 2009, which they accuse the Congolese government of not implementing properly. In recent years, M23 has resurfaced and intensified its activities, capturing strategic territories and causing massive displacement of civilians. The group’s violence has led to a serious humanitarian crisis, with thousands of people being forced from their homes and living in precarious conditions.[2]

The situation is complicated by the support M23 receives from Rwanda, which has generated regional tensions and hampered peace efforts. The Congolese government, led by President Félix Tshisekedi, has refused to negotiate directly with the M23, branding the group a terrorist group and blaming it for immense suffering and the violation of national sovereignty.

The reality is that Rwanda is deeply involved in promoting M23 activities in the DRC. This has already been proven by several UN reports, the latest of which was presented in July 2024[3] . Rwandan troops are operating undisguised in eastern Congolese territory, in full combat gear. Drone images confirm columns of its troops in the DRC. Around 4,000 Rwanda Defense Force (RDF) troops are in Congo supporting M23.

It is assumed that there is a political objective on the part of Rwanda, which is to obtain part of this territory for itself. First, it destabilizes, then it takes factual control and at a later stage detaches that territory from the DRC and makes it a protectorate, buffer state or even an integral part of Rwanda. Admittedly, it uses the Russian techniques that led to the annexation of Crimea.

In addition, many sectors of the US believe that the DRC is too big to be governed efficiently from Kinshasa, and there is some sympathy for a division of the country, as has been done in South Sudan, where the rich part secedes. The author of this report took part in a meeting at Chatham House in which this American position was developed and discussed, without any conclusions, but it remains in the air…. is a working hypothesis.

Incidentally, Rwanda enjoys the support, or at least the benevolence, of many Western powers. The EU is afraid of disrupting the supply chain if it sanctions Rwanda. The EU is currently discussing a controversial strategic minerals agreement with Rwanda. Critics warn that the agreement risks legitimizing the smuggling of conflict minerals from the DRC. In addition, Rwanda “controls” the West by “leveraging” its role as the third largest contributor to UN peace missions. Diplomatic sources claim that Kigali has threatened to withdraw peacekeeping troops if serious sanctions are applied. Rwanda courts Washington with its donor image darling, an image reinforced by the hiring of PR firms and lobbyists in the US and the UK[4] . France, one of the biggest bilateral donors to Rwanda, is another country that some believe is very close to Kagame (President of Rwanda). Sources point to the deployment of Rwandan troops to protect French-owned gas installations in Mozambique, which creates “solid leverage over Paris”. None of these assertions are straightforward, but only show some of the ambiguity that may underlie the West’s actions towards the east of the DRC and the conflict there.

2-The fundamental question of economic interests

Despite Rwanda’s political objectives, linked to projecting the country’s power, prestige and fighting the opposition forces in the DRC, there is one key fact that whets Rwanda’s interest and is probably linked to its survival as a viable and sustainable country with high growth rates.

The latest IMF report[5] sheds light behind the technical language on some of the paradoxes affecting Rwanda in economic and financial terms. From a structural point of view, Rwanda’s economy is fragile and subject to permanent shocks. The Rwandan government itself recognizes that the political space it has to move forward with its development objectives is limited due to recurring and overlapping shocks. From 2015 to 2023, public debt almost doubled to 73.5% of GDP, due to spending to support the development agenda, mitigate the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic and the May 2023 floods. Headwinds from growing geopolitical fragmentation, tightening global financial conditions and consecutive poor agricultural seasons, mainly due to adverse weather conditions, have put pressure on the level of international reserves. The devastating floods of May 2023 have further widened the underlying imbalances, with reconstruction costs projected at around $451 million (3% of GDP) over the 2023-2028 period. The recent outbreak of Marburg virus disease (MVD) puts further pressure on fiscal balances and the health system. Balance of payments pressures remain significant amid prolonged weakness in export performance and high imports of capital and consumer goods.

However, while facing these problems, Rwanda’s economy is growing at a remarkable rate: 8.2% in 2023, 8.3% in 2024 and a forecast of 7% for 2025. These are enviable GDP growth rates. Consequently, the structural weaknesses mentioned above are not reflected in the very high GDP growth rates.

What is beginning to emerge is the role that the area “invaded” by the DRC’s M23 has for Rwanda in sustaining economic growth.

In 2021, official US data showed that Rwanda provided 15% of the global supply of tantalum, a derivative of coltan ore, despite the fact that Rwanda produces only modest amounts of tantalum in its own mines. The US buys tantalum from Rwanda worth 36% of its (US) total imports – the highest among global producers – compared to just 7% from the DRC, which is bizarre given that tantalum exists in abundance in the DRC and not in Rwanda.

In March 2023, the DRC’s finance minister, Nicolas Kazadi, claimed that his country was losing almost $1 billion a year in minerals smuggled illegally into Rwanda. The minister said that Rwanda exported nearly $1 billion worth of gold, tin, tantalum and tungsten in 2022, even though the country (Rwanda) has few mineral deposits of its own.

According to a report by AMSTERDAM & PARTNERS LLP, a Washington DC law firm[6] , used by the DRC government to sue Apple urging it to stop using materials from the conflict zone, Rwanda uses an international network of elite entities to help smuggle, sell and profit from DRC minerals that are transported along militarized trade routes. Kigali allegedly received institutional cover to market these minerals with the help of an industry-led compliance scheme and companies such as AVX Corporation, KEMET Corporation and Global Advanced Metals that manufacture electronic components; these companies would, according to the same report, legitimize the smuggling by knowingly buying minerals “laundered” by Rwanda. The report gives examples of various cases and concrete situations of action within the DRC and later in Rwanda, highlighting the various actors involved.

There may have been a deliberate context of war provoked by Rwanda in order to make economic gains by “laundering” large quantities of tin, tungsten, tantalum and gold from the DRC.

3-The fragility and corruption of the RDC

The fragility of the state and corruption in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are critical issues that profoundly affect the country’s development and stability, and above all its ability to react to problems in the east, and which prevent any solution from being limited to supporting the DRC. Political institutions in the DRC are often perceived as weak and ineffective, which compromises good governance and the implementation of public policies. In the case of the Armed Forces, where budget spending is increasing exponentially, there is a belief that much of this spending does not go towards training and equipping soldiers[7] , but is instead diverted by those in charge and intermediaries, leaving the army ineffective, coupled with a lack of unified command in the combat region and an inability to train[8] . To a certain extent, the war has become a lucrative business for Congolese leaders, both through the purchase of arms and the hiring of mercenaries.

The President of the Republic Tshisekedi himself and his family are accused of being more committed to increasing their fortunes than to running the country rationally.[9]

4. Paradoxes of an impossible peace and the various working hypotheses

Rwanda needs access to minerals from the conflict zone in eastern Congo to sustain its economic growth. The DRC has an inefficient and allegedly corrupt political structure. So, there are no ideal solutions, and one cannot rely too much on the good faith of the contenders. To some extent, they both have an interest in prolonging the conflict, and this will be the essential problem. Any solution will be that of the lesser evil.

As mentioned above, there is always the possibility of the separation/secession of the Eastern zone, creating a new state that would possibly fall under the influence of Rwanda, or at least sign a free trade agreement with Kigali (the capital of Rwanda). Obviously, this solution would not please Kinshasa (capital of the DRC).

There is the possibility of keeping eastern Congo as an integral part of the DRC, but giving it a more autonomous status and allowing the zone to be part of a free trade area or economic integration with Rwanda.

There is yet another hypothesis that would require military intervention by Angola to train and strengthen the DRC army, possibly with the involvement of the United States of America. This hypothesis would have to be accompanied by reform towards good governance in the DRC and some kind of economic agreement with Rwanda, without which no lasting peace can be guaranteed.


[1] https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/dec/21/children-executed-and-women-raped-in-front-of-their-families-as-m23-militia-unleashes-fresh-terror-on-drc

[2] “Tired of this war”: the violence of the M23 group in the Democratic Republic of Congo | World | G1 and Rapid expansion of M23 in DR Congo worries UN mission leader | UN

[3] Final Report of the UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo, https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/118/80/pdf/n2411880.pdf

[4] https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/dec/21/children-executed-and-women-raped-in-front-of-their-families-as-m23-militia-unleashes-fresh-terror-on-drc

[5] IMF Country Report No. 24/341, December 2024, RWANDA December 2024. Fourth review under the policy coordination instrument, second and final review under the stand-by credit facility arrangement, fourth and final review under the arrangement under the resilience and sustainability facility, and request for the modification of end-June 2025 quantitative target for the policy coordination instrument-press release; staff report; and statement by the executive director for Rwanda.

[6] AMSTERDAM & PARTNERS LLP, BLOODMINERALS “everyone sees the massacres in eastern congo.but everyone is silent.” Washington DC| A pril2024 The laundering of drc’s3 t minerals by Rwanda and private entities.

[7] https://www.egmontinstitute.be/corruption-in-the-congolese-army-three-lessons-for-modern-democracies/

[8] https://afridesk.org/rdc-lever-letat-de-siege-au-profit-dune-zone-operationnelle-unique-biprovinciale/

[9]https://thegreatlakeseye.com/post?s=DRC%3A–Unmasking–Tshisekedi%E2%80%99s–failure–to–address–deep-seated–corruption–_1217; https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/jan/02/how-many-more-must-suffer-in-drc-before-the-west-stops-enabling-tshisekedi

The need for a joint African Union mechanism for Africa’s debt to China

The framework and problems of debt to China in Africa

Africa is a continent that is mentioned many times because of its vast natural wealth. Unfortunately, this is not reflected in the wealth of the African populations, who consequently suffer a variety of deprivations.

In this context, the issue of the debt owed by African countries to China is taking on somewhat worrying contours. The loans taken out by sub-Saharan African countries from China have seen a major boost, especially since the Road and Belt Initiative (RBI) was established in 2013. This ambitious Chinese initiative, whose main driving force was President Xi Jinping, aimed to increase the country’s economic and geopolitical influence. And while loans grew dramatically in 2013 with 17.5 billion dollars, and even peaked in 2016 with 28.4 billion dollars, in the following years the drop in loan amounts was incessant, reaching 1.2 billion in 2021, and the following year totalling just 994 million dollars (a total of 9 loans), making it the lowest level of Chinese loans since 2004.[1]

Fig.1 – Annual evolution of Chinese loans to Africa (billions of dollars)

Source: Chinese Loans to Africa Database, Boston University

The channelling of this Chinese money into development in Africa, specifically in the financing of various infrastructure projects and other ventures, has stimulated some African economic growth. However, there have been several “grey clouds”, many of which are clearly visible in the Angolan economy, but which also stand out in other countries. This translates into an often undisguised unease in Sino-African relations. Some countries have even become hostages to the so-called “debt trap diplomacy”. China, by unleashing the RBI, provoked the idea of facilitating loans to other developing economy states, and indeed, this ended up making the Asian country the largest international creditor. However, these loans have often lacked transparency: cases of corruption have multiplied, often because the financing did not go through public tender processes. The problem of the so-called ‘hidden debt’ arose when “China stopped lending to central governments and state-owned or state-supported companies. These debts do not appear on government balance sheets, although governments are often responsible for them if the official debtor is unable to pay.”[2]

You might think that this situation could eventually benefit the Chinese, since they have several countries “stuck” with monstrous debts. However, this is not the case, because at the same time, China is facing very serious domestic economic problems, which, until they are solved, will make it difficult to promote a reduction in foreign debt at the same time. [3]

Indeed, the slow recovery from the pandemic, the problem of youth unemployment, and the collapse of the property sector have shaken what seemed to be China’s unshakeable growth. This is how Christoph Nedopil, founder and director of the Chinese think tank Green Finance and Development Centre (GFDC), argues: “it will be a domestic challenge for China to simultaneously promote debt reduction abroad as long as domestic economic problems are not fully resolved.”[4]

In December 2022, Chatham House published a report analysing the development of the model of Chinese loans to African states (2000-2020), which were initially based on providing resources, and then evolved into more strategic or business-oriented choices.

Fig 2: Top 10 recipients of Chinese loans in Africa, 2000-20

Source: Chatham House: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/12/response-debt-distress-africa-and-role-china/02-case-studies-chinese-lending-africa

It should be noted, however, that from 2021 onwards the Asian country’s orientation changed, for reasons already mentioned, and also because several states were not meeting their payments. The Chinese leadership changed course and stopped investing in large projects, such as railways and motorways, to focus on smaller loans with a more beneficial social and environmental impact. The climate agenda was another factor to enter the equation.[5]

In addition, the money began to change direction; previously most of the loans went to countries in East and Southern Africa. From 2021-22 there was a shift towards West Africa, with countries like Senegal, Benin and Côte d’Ivoire receiving most of the money.[6]

Many African states and others have defaulted on their debts, so it was imperative that ways were found to resolve China’s so-called ‘odious debt’.

According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the world’s most indebted poor countries have all borrowed heavily from China. This situation, as we have already mentioned, may constitute “debt trap diplomacy”, in which China deliberately grants loans to countries it knows it cannot repay, in the hope of gaining political influence.[7]

What we saw last year was a growth in Chinese exports to Africa, which reached 173 billion dollars, an increase of 7.5 per cent compared to 2022, while its imports from the continent fell by 6.7 per cent to 109 billion dollars (data provided by the Chinese General Administration of Customs).

Although the annual increase of 100 million dollars made bilateral trade in 2023 a record, Africa’s trade deficit with China continued to rise, from 46.9 billion dollars in 2022 to 64 billion dollars last year.[8]

In 2022, 60 per cent of China’s debtor nations were in financial difficulties, compared to 5 per cent in 2010.[9]

How have some of these African nations dealt with this debt problem, and how has China changed its behaviour over time?

Let’s analyse a few cases:

Zambia:

The Middle Kingdom has been tough in the debt restructuring negotiations, and the situation, despite all the constraints, is not worse because other actors are gaining prominence, not just states, such as economic institutions like the IMF or the World Bank, or organisations that promote international negotiation and dialogue, such as the G20.

In the case of Zambia, which is the continent’s largest copper producer, it was the first sovereign nation in Africa during the pandemic to default when it failed to make a bond payment of 42.5 million dollars. The debt ended up preventing the country from developing economically and taking on new projects. So, in June 2023, Zambia and its creditors, including China, finally reached an agreement within the G20 Common Framework to restructure 6.3 billion dollars in loans.[10] This relief was limited to deadline extensions and a grace period on interest payments, but in order to reach a consensus there were no debt cuts,

However, in November there were already disagreements, as the Zambian government announced that a revised agreement to rework 3 billion dollars in eurobonds could not be implemented due to objections from official creditors, including China.

These problems in restructuring Zambia’s debt, which had been negotiated within the G20 Common Framework, ended up greatly undermining the negotiations and further delaying debt restructuring, putting the lives of ordinary Zambians in ever greater agony.[11]

Ghana:

At the beginning of last year, Ghana owed China 1.7 billion dollars, according to the International Institute of Finance, a financial services trade association focused on emerging markets.[12] Like Zambia, Ghana went into sovereign default on 60 billion dollars in domestic and external debt at the end of 2022 and sought a resolution to this problem soon afterwards under the Common Framework for official external debt of 5.4 billion dollars.[13]

An agreement was reached with the official creditors to restructure the debt, along the same lines as Zambia. However, although this agreement has unlocked an IMF loan, progress has been slow.

Currently, according to some sources, “Ghana intends to carry out a simple debt restructuring, exchanging old bonds for new notes, at a time when the country is seeking to relieve a debt of around 13 billion dollars owed to international private creditors”.[14] However, the information provided has been contradictory, which is why the Ghanaian government has been cautious about a debt overhaul that would include a gradual reduction, in which bondholders would receive less if macroeconomic results were not as good as expected.[15]

Nevertheless, the government has told investors that it would like to reach a solution following the agreement on public debt reached with creditors such as the Paris Club and China.

Ethiopia:

Ethiopia is the second most populous country in Africa and the tenth largest in terms of area, but it is also one of the African states experiencing the greatest geopolitical, military and economic turbulence. The proximity to the Chinese state goes back a long way. Ethiopia recently signed several bilateral agreements with several of its official creditors, including China itself. With low foreign currency reserves, which have been a constant problem in the country, and high inflation, it has reached bilateral agreements to suspend debt servicing. With China, it obtained a two-year debt suspension, which is quickly being cancelled. Ethiopia has 28.2 billion dollars in foreign debt, half of which is Chinese. According to the African Development Bank, Ethiopia’s GDP is expected to grow by 5.8 per cent in 2023 and 6.2 per cent in 2024, mainly on the basis of industry, consumption and investment. On the other hand, inflation reached 34 per cent in 2022. Due to high defence spending and declining revenue collection, the budget deficit was 4.2% of GDP in 2022.[16] Against this backdrop, Ethiopia needs development support, debt relief and Foreign Direct Investment.[17]

The Angolan situation

Angola’s debt to China is older than the Belt and Road initiative of 2013. It began to develop after the end of the Civil War in 2002, with China becoming the main financier of the reconstruction that followed. At the moment, according to official data from the National Bank of Angola (BNA), Angola’s public debt stock in relation to China is 18.4 billion dollars (billions in Anglo-American terms), corresponding to 37 per cent of the total debt. What’s more, the figures show that between 2019 and 2023 this amount fell from 22.4 billion to 18.4 billion. This means that, in four years, Angola has paid – in capital alone, not counting interest – 4 billion dollars to China[18] . Everyone has noticed the weight that public debt payments have on the state budget, and there were serious problems with Angola’s public finances in 2023, and it is expected that the same will happen in 2024, especially from March onwards, given the need for payments to China.

Although we don’t believe that the payment of the debt to China jeopardises the solvency of the Angolan state, we do believe that it has a very significant crowding out effect, since it removes resources from the General State Budget that could be earmarked for development and the social sector to pay off debt, debt that is controversial to some extent, since the loans were used in a very questionable way: Part of that debt was earmarked for disposable infrastructure, such as stadiums and roads that today are in a precarious condition. In addition, a significant portion of these loans ended up being privately appropriated by Angolan leaders, damaging the country’s economy.

There is a clear Angolan problem with Chinese debt, which, as we have just briefly described, also exists in relation to other African countries.

Fig. 3 – Chinese loans to Africa and Angola (in USD$ billion)

Source: China Africa Research Initiative – Johns Hopkins University (https://www.sais-cari.org/) 

The creation of a common mechanism within the African Union (AU) to negotiate Chinese debt

Since the Chinese debt is an African issue, it should no longer be dealt with bilaterally, as it is clear that each state on its own may be too weak to negotiate with China, one of the world powers of today, or to appear alone in the organisations promoted by the creditors. The creditors unite, while the African countries face them individually without support.

It would be important for the Conference of the African Union, the AU’s supreme body made up of heads of state and government (Article 6 of the AU’s Constitutive Act), to set up a Joint Chinese Debt Negotiation Committee (Article 6(d)), mandated to negotiate with the Chinese authorities a global framework for readjusting Africa’s debt to China, which would then be applied to all those seeking debt relief.

It is clear that negotiating Africa’s debt with China is a complex process that involves interaction between different parties with different interests and objectives. In order to achieve success, it is essential to consider African unity in demanding Chinese co-operation. This unity means, from the outset, gathering information and obtaining as many elements as possible for the negotiation, which a joint body can facilitate. In complex negotiations, time and the ability to understand the other person are fundamental aspects, and in this sense, a unified African solution will allow for a much greater exchange of experiences and, at the same time, a more technical, less emotional and more ‘negotiatingly’ weighty follow-up to the negotiation.

It is essential that Africa draws up a joint policy to deal with Chinese debt on an equal footing and not from a position of weakness.

A clear solution is to pass all the negotiations through a united African body within the African Union, becoming an enlarged African Union-China negotiation. This would also make it possible to strengthen the unity of the cradle continent.


[1] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/chinese-loans-africa-plummet-near-two-decade-low-study-2023-09-19/

[2] Africa Defence Forum Magazine: https://adf-magazine.com/pt-pt/2022/02/dividas-com-a-china-colocam-20-paises-africanos-em-dificuldades-financeiras/

[3] https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/articles/cmj544lg205o

[4] idem

[5] https://www.voanews.com/a/china-s-lending-to-africa-hits-a-low-study-shows/7280214.html

[6] idem

[7]  Visual Capitalist: https://www.visualcapitalist.com/countries-loans-from-china/

[8] South China Morning Post: https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3250552/china-africa-trade-hit-282-billion-2023-africas-trade-deficit-widens-commodity-prices-key-factor

[9] Visual Capitalist: https://www.visualcapitalist.com/countries-loans-from-china/

[10] Associated Press: https://apnews.com/article/zambia-debt-restructuring-deal-china-a0d14e7af986e2f873555685cedb86b3

[11] Afronomics Law: https://www.afronomicslaw.org/category/african-sovereign-debt-justice-network-afsdjn/one-hundred-and-fourth-sovereign-debt-news

[12] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/china-says-its-official-bilateral-loans-are-less-than-5-ghana-debt-2023-03-02/

[13] Economist Intelligence: https://www.eiu.com/n/china-and-africas-long-road-to-debt-recovery/

[14] https://www.reuters.com/markets/rates-bonds/ghana-pushes-simple-debt-rework-proposal-bondholders-sources-2024-01-30/

[15] idem

[16] Observer Research Foundation: https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-changing-face-of-ethiopia

[17] idem

[18] Rui Verde, https://www.makaangola.org/2024/01/angola-eua-trump-e-divida-a-china/

The current economic situation in China and Angola

China’s economic crisis: facts and causes

There is a problem in the Chinese economy that appears to be structural and could affect relations with debtor countries such as Angola. Various factors are contributing to a decline in economic growth in China and an increase in unemployment, especially among young people, which could also imply some political instability within China itself.

Let’s start with some recent figures[1] :

-The July credit data released on 11 August showed a drop in demand for loans from companies.

-Retail sales rose by just 2.5 per cent in July compared to the previous year, below expectations of a 4.5 per cent increase.

-Industrial production only rose by 3.7 per cent in July compared to the previous year, below the 4.4 per cent increase that analysts were expecting.

The truth is that recent statistics published by China have caused severe concern.  In addition to the aforementioned statistics, consumer prices in July were lower than a year ago, suggesting that we may be on the verge of deflation, which reflects a chronic shortage of demand in the economy. China’s foreign trade in the same month of July showed a sharp drop in exports due to weak global demand, accompanied by a sharper decline in imports, signifying the aforementioned weakness in domestic demand. Chinese companies and families are “shrinking”[2] . The seriousness of the situation led China’s leaders at a Politburo meeting last month to refer to this year’s economic recovery as “torture[3] .”

This poor performance raises several thoughts. The first is that we shouldn’t exaggerate. Just as there was an exaggeration in previous announcements about China as an economic superpower, when its GDP per capita will not exceed 13,000 USD in 2021,[4] while the GDP per capita in the United States is more than 70,000 USD, or even 25,000 USD in Portugal, the opposite exaggeration should not be made either, that China has entered an insurmountable abyss. What is clear is that the Chinese economy is in a moment of correction, as is the case with all economies, possibly requiring profound reforms and political adjustments.

Therefore, the context we have adopted in this work is to consider a crisis in the Chinese economy, but to believe that the right policy choices can overcome this crisis.

At this very moment, hopes of a Chinese recovery from the pandemic have faded, as consumption has generally been very subdued, especially for expensive items such as cars and houses, and private investment, the backbone of China’s economy, fell in the first half of this year for the first time since such data was published. Private companies and entrepreneurs aren’t spending much on investment or hiring staff. Youth unemployment has reached 21 per cent. The annual graduation of 11 to 12 million students this summer will exacerbate an already difficult situation because of the problems of finding suitable work and also because the Chinese labour market has become one in which most jobs are low-paid, low-skilled or in the informal economy.

It seems wrong to attribute all this to the pandemic. Most of the threats to China’s economy were growing a few years ago. The fundamental problem is that China has generated, over the last decade or more, a mountain of bad debts, unprofitable and uncommercial infrastructure and real estate, empty flat blocks, underused transport facilities and overcapacity, for example in coal, steel, solar panels and electric vehicles. Productivity growth has stagnated and China can boast one of the highest levels of inequality in the world[5] .

Furthermore, under Xi Jinping, it developed a more intense, state-centred and controlling system of governance, both for political reasons and to deal with the effects of its ailing development model.

We wonder to what extent the political interventions to limit billionaires like Jack Ma[6] have been positive for the economic environment. Whilst it’s true that they have averted the Russian danger of oligarchic state domination and signalled to the general population that power is concerned about excesses, it’s also true that they have sent a chill down the entrepreneurial spirit necessary for a competitive economy. Everyone will be afraid of growing too much, of being too conspicuous and, ultimately, of innovating. Because innovation and excessive attention can have negative repercussions.

In a way, the “animal spirit” that Keynes spoke of as the engine of any healthy economy has been “tamed” in China and this may be the main problem of its economy, which is neither measurable nor solvable with technical measures.

Chinese reaction and other possible directions

For the time being, China has announced the suspension of the release of the official unemployment rate among China’s urban youth aged between 16 and 24, which reached a new all-time high of 21.3 per cent in June. The State Council published new guidelines for stepping up efforts to attract foreign investment. And the central bank lowered interest rates[7] .
 None of these measures seem to have the strength to reverse the cycle of decline in the Chinese economy.

Many authors argue that a huge fiscal stimulus would be needed to energise the economy, which should not be translated into more debt, but into pure “printing” of money, which makes sense in a situation of deflation. A kind of “helicopters with money” flying over the cities and dropping it off.[8]

It is also possible that this crisis will force the Chinese president to revise his policy towards the large economic groups and the business community in general, opting, like Lenin a century ago, for a new liberalisation and flexibilisation, while also seeking to ease the tension that has been building up between China and the United States.

In fact, we believe that a good part of the solution to China’s current economic problems lies in politics rather than economics, and in both domestic and foreign policy. Probably the best way out of the crisis would be to reintroduce the more ambiguous and flexible system of Jiang Zemin’s time. Jiang Zemin, president of China from 1993 to 2003, is considered “the man who changed China”. Many Chinese who grew up in the 1990s remember Jiang Zemin for overseeing China’s entry into the World Trade Organisation, and also for allowing the film Titanic to be broadcast. During the Asian financial crisis, Jiang emphasised the importance of finance and financial security for China’s national security and the building of a modern economy. At the same time, this did not imply a lessening of the power of the Chinese Communist Party and its political control. Some authors point to his tarnished record in relation to human rights and freedom of expression. Zemin oversaw the repression of national dissidents, the banning of religious groups such as Falun Gong and the suppression of the press and the Internet, and also maintained an uncompromising stance on Taiwan[9] .

The advantage for Jiang Zemin’s China is that he was able to maintain a balance between liberating market forces and innovation, and the Communist Party’s control of China.

And our opinion is that a large part of the Chinese crisis is not the result of economic factors alone or above all, but of the loss of that balance point that needs to be recovered.

Obviously, this doesn’t just depend on the Chinese leadership, but also on a change in the external situation of quasi-confrontation between the United States and China.

It’s well known that since the time of Donald Trump there has been a shift in US foreign policy towards China. What seemed like “Trumpism” became a central US policy under Joe Biden and today the United States sees and treats China as a potential future enemy that must be contained. Naturally, this coincided with Xi Jinping’s nationalist assertion, which abandoned the previous external caution, and began to want a strong China in the world context and without complexes, wanting the country to be a post-hegemonic alternative to the United States. So on both sides we had a voluntary confrontational initiative.

The question that arises is whether it is possible to retract and create a new space for US-China collaboration, which will certainly increase China’s prosperity, or whether the course is definitely strategic confrontation? In this confrontation, China will tend to compartmentalise and close itself off, losing the capacity for innovation linked to entrepreneurship, which increases the chances of conflict (more or less direct war) and hinders any Chinese economic recovery.

Impacts in Angola

This is the real situation of the Chinese economy at the moment. As mentioned, the fundamental “brakes” on growth seem to be twofold: from an economic point of view, excessive debt, and from a political point of view, which seems more important to us for the medium and long term, the accentuation of the force of political power in the economy and society, and the political condemnation of entrepreneurship and innovation.

Faced with this scenario, Angola is confronted with advantages and disadvantages that act dynamically.

One advantage is Luanda’s rapprochement with the United States and its relations with China. Angola could be a bridge country for a reunion between the two powers, a kind of proving ground where both can co-operate, compete and survive for mutual benefit. However, it could also become a disadvantage for the same reason, with Angola becoming one of the areas of dispute between the two powers, both wanting to pull it into their sphere of influence. This would be another difficult balance for João Lourenço to maintain.

In economic terms, there will be a possible tendency for the Chinese authorities to become more inflexible in relation to foreign debts, and this may already be happening with Angola, or could happen in the future. This is the normal reaction of countries in a “squeeze.” There is therefore the danger of greater Chinese pressure in economic terms on Angola, which could jeopardise Angola’s once again perilous public finances.

The “tree of patacas” spirit that prevailed in China-Angola financial relations from 2002 onwards is definitely over and will not be recovered. China will behave towards Angola, in greater or lesser detail, like any other international creditor, and its pressure will increase as the Chinese domestic economic situation deteriorates. Another challenge for João Lourenço.

One advantage that Angola could offer China is the creation of a large labour market for its young graduates. Cooperation agreements could be made to put Chinese people in Angola to train Angolan staff and help implement policies in areas such as public administration, in which China has millennia of experience, or telecommunications and information technology.

The Chinese civil service system has provided stability for the Chinese empire for more than 2,000 years and has provided one of the main outlets for social mobility in Chinese society. Today, in the 1980s, it has made a successful transition from a centralised Marxist economy to a mixed economy with strong growth.

China has also become one of the largest telecoms markets in the world, with more than one billion Internet users and monthly revenues of more than 130 billion yuan from the telecoms sector. The country has undergone several waves of reforms over the last three decades to liberalise and privatise its telecommunications industry. It is the experience gained in this immensity that can be put at the service of Angolans.

In these terms, the current phase of China-Angola relations could partly leave physical capital behind and centre on human capital, showing that relations between countries can mature. Angola could provide an outlet for Chinese companies and their young people.

What we have to realise is that the relationship is entering a “mature” phase in which each country has its own interests to defend.  China will no longer bring “rains of money”, but rational investments, and this is what Angola must count on and counter. In fact, in terms of future markets, investment opportunities and an escape from China’s problems, Angola has a lot to offer and can be the “bargaining chip” in various negotiations.


[1] https://www.cnbc.com/2023/08/14/china-economy-new-loans-fall-property-fears-low-consumer-sentiment-.html

[2] https://www.cnbc.com/2023/08/17/david-roche-chinas-economic-model-is-washed-up-on-the-beach.html

[3] https://www.theguardian.com/business/2023/aug/11/china-economic-problems-show-things-are-seriously-amiss

[4] https://www.ceicdata.com/pt/indicator/china/gdp-per-capita

[5] On the structural and long-term problems of the Chinese economy see Frank Dikotter, China after Mao – The rise of a superpower, 2023.

[6] https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgecalhoun/2021/06/07/the-sad-end-of-jack-ma-inc/

[7] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/15/business/china-economy-downturn-unemployment.html, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2023-08-20/xi-jinping-is-running-china-s-economy-cold-on-purpose?in_source=embedded-checkout-banner,

[8] Rui Verde, Helicópteros com dinheiro, 2013

[9] https://www.cfr.org/blog/jiang-zemin-put-chinas-economic-opening-practice

An Investment Bank for Portuguese Speaking Countries Community

Introduction: The Investment Bank for Portuguese Speaking Countries Community

João Lourenço, President of the Republic of Angola, presented in the inauguration speech of his mandate as acting president of the Speaking Countries Community (CPLP), at the XIII Conference of Heads of State and Government, held in Luanda in July 2021, the “challenge of start thinking about the pertinence and feasibility, even if remote, of creating a CPLP Investment Bank[1]”.

The President of the Portuguese Republic, Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, in turn, admitted that the Angolan head of State’s proposal for the creation of an investment bank in the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) could advance, if there were significant investments of several parties. And he added that this could become a reality if “significant investments from Brazil, from African economies emerging from the CPLP, from Portugal, but also with the contribution of European funds are combined[2]”.

Although the details of this idea are not known, only knowing that it corresponds to the implementation of an Economic Pillar of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), it is interesting to see how such a proposal could become a reality, which is more important, since doubts have arisen from reputable Angolan experts about its feasibility[3].

***

Our conclusion is that it is possible to envisage the creation of an investment bank and development of CPLP with mixed capital and a reasonably independent and efficient structure, with diverse and plural sources of financing.

Vision, goals and strategic axes of the investment bank of lusophony

What we will call the Banco de Investimento de Fomento da Lusofonia (BIFEL) would be an investment and development bank that would materialize the CPLP Economic Pillar. The CPLP Economic Pillar, as understood from the several statements of the Angolan government, corresponds to a need to transform the collaboration potential of member countries into real wealth and would translate into the creation of common financing mechanisms and large free market areas and freedom of movement.

BIFEL would, therefore, be an instrument for financing the development of the PALOPS and the integration of the corresponding markets.

It would have three basic goals:

i) the financing of large works and infrastructures that bring the PALOPs closer together and make them more competitive in economic terms;

ii) the development of the corresponding economies and common access markets;

iii) the survey of the quality of life of the neediest populations (levelling up).

Thus, there would be a triple concern with economic integration, development and what is currently called levelling up regions and populations[4]. Economic and social aspects would have to be combined.

These goals would have to be operationalized in the creation of three major strategic axes that would, in practice, be transformed into three consigned credit lines.

• The first axis would be dedicated to infrastructure for common benefit: digital structures and networks, ports, airports, means of communication, roads, energies, especially renewable energies, etc.

• The second axis would be aimed at economic growth projects, the formerly called economic development. Here we would have factories, companies, and growth-promoting economic activities.

• Finally, a third axis dedicated to the aforementioned levelling up, with characteristics of economic and social development, would include support for building hospitals, schools, training human resources in education and health, environmental and climate protection.

BIFEL Share Capital

BIFEL would be a mixed financial institution, with share capital from several sources. One could point to an initial share capital of one billion, seven hundred and fifty thousand euros [1, 750 billion euros] (the reference point is that the development bank recreated in Portugal has 255 million euros as social capital and is fully public). In this case, the share capital would be much larger (1.75 billion euros) and the ownership not fully public.

A mixed ownership system for BIFEL is envisioned.

• First, 1000 million euros would be earmarked for the subscription of CPLP Member States: Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Mozambique, Portugal, São Tomé and Príncipe and East Timor. Each State would participate in capital according to an equitable formula that considered its absolute GDP and GDP per capita, which allowed considering the real wealth of each one, its competitiveness and productivity, and the well-being of its populations.

• Afterwards, 500 million euros would be allocated to observer countries associated with the CPLP: Mauritius, Senegal, Georgia, Japan, Namibia, Turkey, Slovakia, Hungary, Czech Republic, Uruguay, Andorra, Argentina, Chile, France, Italy, Luxembourg, United Kingdom , Serbia as well as the European Union. Each of these countries and the European Union would make the proposals for capital subscription up to the amount it considered within the threshold of 500 million euros.

• A third group of share capital worth 250 million euros would be open to private investors from any country in the world.

Naturally, BIFEL would produce dividends from its borrowing activities in order to compensate its shareholders and would only finance projects in countries subscribing to share capital.

Organic structure of BIFEL

The bank’s structure would be based on three type bodies.

The direction would be ensured by a Board of Directors with a five-year term composed of 7 members, 4 appointed by the Member States, 2 by the Associate Observers and 1 by the Private Investors, the Chairman of the Board being appointed under the prerogative of the Member States, while acting as Vice -Presidents, there would be an element designated by the associated observers and another by the private investors.

The supervision would be incumbent upon a Supervisory Board composed of 5 members, 3 of which were chosen by the Courts of Auditors of the Member States on a rotating basis for three-year terms. Another member would be appointed by the Courts of Auditors of the associated observer countries in the same rotating scheme and finally the fifth member would belong to an international auditor of global reputation, resulting from the co-option of the remaining four members. Finally, there would be a General Assembly where each representative would act according to their share capital.

This structure would allow, on the one hand, the representation of States and shareholders, but would also BIFEL effectively independent corporate body with fiduciary duties and economic efficiency in relation to its shareholders and taxpayers of each State, given the diversity of its organic structure.

The head office would be established in CPLP’s most important financial market, according to the volume of business, with two operational sub-headquarters in the subsequent relevant financial centers.

Conclusion

This could be the outline of a financial  institution dedicated to the PALOPs, combining the advantages of public and private ownership at the same time, deriving from various sources of financing, allowing for a better integration of Portuguese-speaking markets, making each country grow and improve the living conditions of Portuguese-speaking populations, in the end, the ultimate goal of this initiative.


[1] https://www.jornaldeangola.ao/ao/noticias/angola-propoe-criacao-de-banco-de-investimento/

[2] https://www.jornaldenegocios.pt/economia/detalhe/banco-de-investimentos-da-cplp-pode-ter-virtualidades-diz-marcelo

[3] https://visao.sapo.pt/atualidade/mundo/2021-07-20-cplp-economista-angolano-diz-que-banco-de-investimentos-nao-tem-pernas-para-andar/

[4] About the concept as it is being developed in the UK, see: https://www.centreforcities.org/levelling-up/

Proposal for a pilot job guarantee design in Angola

Introduction: the magnitude of the unemployment problem and the need for a systematic government response

In Angola, in the third quarter of 2020, the unemployment rate stood at 34%[1]. This number corresponds to a chain increase (i.e., compared to the previous quarter) of 9.9% and homologous (referring to the same period in 2019) in the order of 22%[2]. In view of these data, whatever the perspective adopted, it is easy to see that unemployment is a fundamental and serious problem facing the Angolan economy and societies.

Fig. Nº 1- Recent evolution of the unemployment rate in Angola (2017-2020). Source: INE-Angola

So far, the government recognizes this problem, but is betting on the recovery of the economy at the private sector level, to resolve the issue, believing that the State can do little to face the situation. The solution lies in economic growth and business dynamism, says the executive. The President of the Republic, João Lourenço, was clear in the last speech of the State of the Nation when he stated: “priority of our agenda [is): to work for the resuscitation and diversification of the economy, to increase the national production of goods and basic services, to increase the range of exportable products and increase the supply of jobs. ” João Lourenço makes an indelible link between the diversification of the economy and the increase in national production and the decrease in unemployment.

Basically, the government relies on the traditional postulate stated by the American economist Arthur Okun, according to which there would be a linear relationship between changes in the unemployment rate and the growth of the gross national product: with each real GDP growth in two percent would correspond to a one percent decrease in unemployment[3]. The truth is that several empirical studies do not confirm this empirical relationship at all, and in recent years in several countries around the world, an increase in GDP has not led to a sharp decrease in unemployment, while in other cases it has, therefore, it is difficult establish a permanent relationship between unemployment and GDP. In addition, the magnitude of unemployment in Angola would imply that in order to decrease the rate for the still frightening 24%, GDP would have to grow 15% …

The fundamental issue is that the problem of unemployment in Angola is not cyclical, but structural, this means that it is closely connected to the permanent deficiencies of the Angolan economy and does not have a mere dependence on the economic cycle.

The fact that the problem of unemployment is structural and of an economic recovery for the years 2021 and onwards is only between 2% and 4% of GDP[4], according to the current IMF projections, imply that such economic animation will have little impact on employment.

In this sense, it is essential to understand that the solution to the problem of unemployment does not depend only on the market and the economic recovery, it requires, at least in the short term, the muscular intervention of the State. It is in this context that this proposal for a pilot experience arises.

Fig. No. 2- GDP growth projections Angola (2021-2024). Source: IMF

A pilot job guarantee experiment in Angola

Starting from the first experience of universal employment guarantee in the world, designed by researchers at the University of Oxford and administered by the Austrian Public Employment Service, which takes place in the Austrian city of Marienthal[5], the same methodology would apply to a specific location in Angola, possibly, to a specific municipality in Luanda.

According to this regime to be implemented on an experimental basis in a municipality in Luanda, a universal guarantee of a properly paid job would be offered to all residents who have been unemployed for more than 12 months.

In addition to receiving training and assistance to find work, the participants would have guaranteed paid work, with the State subsidizing 100% of the salary in a private company or employing participants in the public sector or even supporting the creation of a microenterprise. All participants would receive at least one minimum wage set in accordance with the Presidential Decree that regulates the matter appropriate to a life with dignity.

The pilot Design would work as follows:

i) All residents of the chosen Luanda municipality, who have been unemployed for a year or more, will be unconditionally invited to participate in the pilot design.

ii) Participants begin with a two-month preparatory course, which includes individual training and counseling.

iii) Subsequently, participants will be helped to find suitable and subsidized employment in the private sector or supported to create a job based on their skills and knowledge of the needs of their community or will still be employed by the State.

iv) The job guarantee ensures three years of work for all long-term unemployed, although participants may choose to work part-time.

Fig. No. 3- Brief description of the pilot employment design

In addition to eliminating long-term unemployment in the region, the program aims to offer all participants useful work, be it in paving streets, in small community repairs, in a day care center, in the creation of a community cafe, in access to water and energy , basic sanitation, in the reconstruction of a house, or in some other field.

The pilot project is designed to test the policy’s results and effectiveness and then be extended to more areas of the country.

Financing

“As part of the asset recovery process, the State has already recovered real estate and money in the amount of USD 4,904,007,841.82, of which USD 2,709,007,842.82 in cash and USD 2,194,999,999.00 in real estate, factories, port terminals, office buildings, residential buildings, radio and television stations, graphic units, commercial establishments and others. ”

Thus, the President of the Republic spoke in the most recent speech by the State of the Nation mentioned above.

Now, nothing better than to allocate part of these recovered funds to the promotion of employment. Consequently, an amount withdrawn from there would be used to create an Employment Development Fund which we would simply call, because of the origin of the amounts, “Marimbondos Fund”. This Fund would receive part of the recovered assets and would use them to finance initiatives to promote employment such as the one presented here. Money withdrawn in the past from the economy would return to this one to foster work for the new generations.

With this self-financing model, any constraints imposed by the International Monetary Fund or the need for budgetary restraint would be removed. The promotion of employment would have its own funds resulting from the fight against corruption. There doesn’t seem to be a better destination for money than that.

Fig. No. 4- Financing the pilot Design


[1] https://www.ine.gov.ao/

[2] https://www.ine.gov.ao/images/Idndicador_IEA_III_Trimestre_2020.PNG

[3] Arthur M. Okun, The Political Economy of Prosperity (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1970)

[4] https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/AGO#countrydata

[5] https://www.ox.ac.uk/news/2020-11-02-world-s-first-universal-jobs-guarantee-experiment-starts-austria

The devaluation of Kwanza and inflation

Some studies by prestigious economic consultants have lately issued some reports on the Angolan economy that only report negative numbers and projections, without taking into account either the theoretical models on which some of the main economic policy decisions in Angola are based, or the actual reality of its economy.

One of the most intriguing cases is the permanent link between the rise in inflation and the devaluation of the Kwanza, presenting the two phenomena as cause and effect or effect and cause, as well as always giving a negative connotation to the term “devaluation”.

This article, which does not aim to make forecasts, which at this time of Covid-19 would be rash, offers alternative explanations behind the Kwanza`s devaluation, looking instead at the opportunity it offers foreign investors.

It is evident that the semi-rigid or controlled exchange rate regime that existed before the adoption of the flexible exchange rate last year, was partly responsible for the crash in the Angolan economy.
In fact, pegging the Angolan currency at a high value in view of market conditions, caused unrestrained consumerism while domestic production was allowed to decline, since international prices were artificially made more competitive.

It was the time when Luanda became the most expensive city in the world with the Angolan elite making flagrant shows of wealth. This situation did not correspond to domestic production or development, but rather excessive spending of foreign currency earned from high oil prices which bolstered the inadequate value of the Kwanza. This was unsustainable.

The prolonged recession since 2014 demanded an end to the artificial appreciation of the Kwanza and the introduction of a flexible exchange rate.

The model underlying the adoption of flexible exchange rates has clear goals. Since Milton Friedman’s seminal text in 1953[1] on flexible exchange rates, two arguments support this policy: first, free movements in exchange rates are an efficient way of adjusting international relative prices in response to macroeconomic shocks; second, with flexible exchange rates, policymakers are free to choose and follow their own inflation target, rather than depending on the inflation rate from abroad. This last factor should be emphasised. Milton Friedman stressed that exchange rates would help to insulate the domestic economy from external shocks and would give national political authorities the ability to meet domestic goals. Flexible exchange rates provide enough insulation to the domestic economy if the sources of the recessionary shock are abroad.

This means that with a flexible exchange rate, it is possible for the government / central bank to pursue an autonomous anti-inflationary policy on the external value of the currency.
In fact, the devaluation of the Kwanza could mean that the prices of international goods become excessively expensive for Angola, and spark that, contrary to what happened previously, being cheaper to produce goods in Angola. That would be the opportunity to invest in Angola`s agriculture and industry, at they will have a market and low production costs due to the devaluation.

With national goods becoming more competitive than corresponding foreign goods, this will boost national production and encourage exports.

And provided that the central bank does not pint excess money, national production should increase and inflation should decrease if internal policies are adequately followed.

This does not mean that the transition from an economy artificially anchored by a high-value Kwanza supported by rising oil prices to a competitive and productive economy is easy. Angola is currently in deep crisis, made worse by the Covid-19 pandemic, and luck, either bad or good, has to be considered.

However, the exchange rate easing policy is right and there is no need to be afraid of devaluation. This is making the economy more competitive overseas and encouraging the manufacture and production of goods to sell both internally and abroad. Success depends more on government policies; policies that are coherent and consistent.

That is why the figures being released on devaluation and inflation are, on the surface, frightening, but they will only have a negative impact if the government implements the wrong policies.

Otherwise, they are not, by themselves, of any relevance. It is known that the Kwanza was overvalued and that this has greatly affected the Angolan economy. It is known that combating inflation, with flexible rates, does not depend on the outside world, but on the right decisions by the government.

There is awareness that Angola is in deep economic crisis, but some real encouraging indicators are beginning to emerge. One of them is that “Angola disbursed, in the first quarter of the year, 495 million dollars (436.5 million euros) on importing food products, a decrease of 31% compared to the 717 million dollars (632.3 million euros) ) for the last quarter of 2019.[2]

The Angolan government attributed this evolution to a better organisation of its foreign exchange market and to an increase in the demand for national products. Official sources state: “We are verifying these two factors, we can say that we are on the right path, there is a demand for national production, there is a decrease in imports.” These facts seem to confirm the analysis we do. Obviously, in the end everything will depend on the right internal public policies.


[1] Friedman, M. (1953) “The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates.” In Essays in Positive Economics, 157–203. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

[2] https://www.sapo.pt/noticias/economia/angola-importou-menos-31-de-alimentos-no_5f0f32adb34d505496f5eddd

The opportunity for privatizations in Angola. 2020 analysis

Introduction

The privatization program currently underway in Angola has a scope never before outlined in the country and deserves extra attention by the international business community.

Legislation

The legal basis for the Angolan privatization program is found in the Privatization Act (Law No. 10/19, 14th of May) and ProPriv (Presidential Decree No. 250/19 5th of August). The Private Investment Act (Law 10/18, 26th of June) is also relevant.

Table 1- Basic legal regulations for privatizations

Privatization Act Law No. 10/19, May 14th
ProPriv Presidential Decree No. 250/19, August 5th
Private Investment Act Law No. 10/18, June 26th

Terms of reference

Under ProPriv, 195 public entities will be privatized during a 4-year program (2019-2022). These entities were grouped into four sectors: National Reference Companies, Sonangol’s Participating and Active Companies, Industrial Units in the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) and Other Companies and Assets to be Privatized. The sectors of activity that refer to privatizations are diverse: mineral and oil resources, telecommunications and information technologies, finance, transport, economics and planning, hotels and tourism, industries, agriculture, fisheries.

In the list of to be privatized companies, we have the country’s most important such as Sonangol (oil), Endiama (diamonds), Unitel (telecommunications), TAAG (aviation), Banco Económico (ex-Besa, bank), ENSA (insurance company)), CUCA (brewer) and also another type of more modest entities such as Centro Infantil 1 de Junho, Pungo-Andongo Farm or INDUPLAS (plastic bags industry). It is, therefore, a comprehensive and an extensive program.

Table 2 – Core elements of privatization

195 entities to privatize
4 years (2019-2022)
Key companies such as Sonangol and Endiama

Achievements

To date, the privatization program has been focused on small industries and entities. In 2019, Angola earned US $ 16 million due to the privatization of five factories, which costed the State approximately US $ 30 million. For 2020, the 2nd  phase of privatization embraces 13 plants located in the Economic Zone Luanda / Bengo. The factories operate in sectors such as ​​metal packaging, concrete, carpentry, plastic bags, paints and varnishes, metal towers, PVC tubes, metal tiles, PVC fittings manufactoring, absorbents and cement bags.

Also in progress is the privatization of several agricultural projects, as well as some assets belonging to Sonangol.

Advantages and opportunities

This vast privatization program is extremely attractive to foreign investors due to several reasons, namely:

  • IFC / World Bank Quality Assurance. The privatization program is being carried out within the framework of the IFC-International Finance Corporation, which belongs to the World Bank, that provides investment, advisory and asset management services to encourage the performance of the private sector in less developed countries. IFC guarantees a global projection of the project and the World Bank warranty seal in the procedures followed, in addition to being an experienced partner and knowledgeable of the global rules. In this way, the Angolan privatization process comes with an appreciable quality certification that can reassure foreign investors.
  • Institutional strengthening and property protection in progress. The present government is committed with the consolidation of institutions, the transparency of due process and the adequate protection of property rights through the promotion of the rule of law. This is not immediate obtained allowing to quickly remove the risks associated with losing investments in Angola.  However, it is a trend already in motion.  In this context, it is important to highlight the new Private Investment Act (Law no. 10/18, 26th of June) that expressly provides legal guarantees to investors, regarding their rights, property and also legal guarantees (articles 14 , 15 and 16 of the Law metioned). In addition, the same Act drops the local investment partner exigence for any foreign investment, which was a source of the greatest abuses and fraud in the relationship with the non-national investor. And the investment is no longer preceded by permission, preventing or delaying registration.
  • Economic reform towards free markets.The executive led by João Lourenço, with the support of technicians from the International Monetary Fund, is developing an economic liberalization program for the economy that increases competition between companies and reduces barriers to entry into the markets. This becomes accentuated connecting to the fight against corruption, which has the immediate consequence, in economic terms, of the breaking of the existing monopolies and oligopolies in the country and which limited competition, besides imposing higher prices and abusing practices regarding taxation. Consequently, in addition to the legal reinforcement, the economic component seems more prepared for a functioning market economy.
  • Atractive companies to be privatized. To privatize are companies with great worldwide attraction such as Sonangol, Endiama or Unitel. They are what can be called the Blue Chips of Angola, that will offer a very high growth potential to the investor once they are submitted to a strict management discipline, rationalized investment and optimization of their values. At a time when the African economy due to demographics and the complementarities with Asia that act as determinants, has an increased growth potential, it becomes a good bet to invest in large companies linked to natural resources and communications in Angola .
  • Small and medium-sized companies with lucrative niche markets. The interesting thing about the program is that the universe of companies to be privatized is vast and diverse. In this context, several small and medium-sized companies can be the basis for small investors who want to explore niche markets in Angola or Southern Africa from a platform that tends to be business friendly and eager in infrastructure development. In Africa, the potential of small and medium-sized enterprises is very large. Some surveys carried out in specific South African provinces, encouragingly, conclude that 94% of small businesses surveyed are profitable, while 75% of small business owners believe they earn more money running their own businesses than in any other alternative. The areas covered by these companies are very diverse: travel, tourism and hospitality; agribusiness; brewers; etc.
  • Business problems are not structural. The companies to be privatized suffer essentially two types of problems: incompetent management and lack of capital. Any new investor who provides professional management and fresh money to the company will be able to successfully exploit its potential. The markets are yet to develop and far from being mature, consequently, there is a very broad and stimulating path for companies with capital and professional management.
  • High rate of return on investment. Given the needs that are still emerging in the Angolan market and the possibilities that integration with SADC (Southern African Development Community) bring, the prospects for obtaining high profit rates are high. In fact, there is a low-cost labor force and with a very large market extension. These two factors predict growth and a good return on capital.

Table 3 – Reasons for attracting privatizations in Angola

• IFC / World Bank Quality Assurance
• Ongoing institutional strengthening and property protection
• Liberalizing economic reform
• Desirable companies
• Small and medium-sized companies with attractive niche markets
• Business problems are not structural
• High rate of return on investment

Problems to solve

The problems envisaged are of three types: bureaucratic-administrative and assessment of the real situation of companies. There is also a lack of clarity of purpose in relation to large companies and banks.

On the bureaucratic-administrative issue, it is important to highlight the multitude of coordinating entities. The President of the Republic appears as the leader and strategic coordinator, but then we have the Minister of State for Economic Coordination as the general coordinator of the program, the Secretary of State for Finance and Treasury under the Ministry of Finance as the operational coordinator, each Sectorial Ministry will have duties of sharing information and data of companies operating in the sector. The State Assets and Participations Management Institute (SAPMI) as manager and executor of the program, in addition to other institutions with specific roles. Perhaps because of this, all schedules have been exceeded. By mid-February 2020, around 50 companies were expected to be privatized. The number as seen earlier is much smaller. In fact, the privatization program has not reached an exciting dynamic phase, the so-called momentum.

“The Privatization Czar”

It is essential to give privatizations an accelerated dynamic. For this, the best solution is to nominate what can be called a “Czar of Privatizations”. Someone the President trusts  who, under his command alone, directs the privatizations with legal powers to instruct any minister or body and to override them by deciding to concentrate the competencies and powers for the privatizations.

Technical problems

The remaining types of problems are of a more technical nature. For many companies, there is no clear idea of ​​their values ​​or of any hidden losses that may exist. For example, in relation to banking, the previous due dilligence has encountered several situations in which unknown impairments are detected that require recapitalization or levels of non-compliance with some indicators of financial balance, namely excessive concentration of investments in low-profit properties.

No internal audit work has been done on the companies to be privatized. This obviously implies that investors are taking risks. The answer that cannot be given is that a thorough internal audit will have to be carried out for each of the 195 companies. This will be impossible and would require an endless delay in privatization.

Thus, it will be necessary to provide for possible state compensation mechanisms if impairments are found after a certain level, imputing liability below that level to buyers. At the same time, in doubtful cases, the State will have to sell at a sharp discount. And trust that appropriate private management will make it possible to solve most cases.

In fact, the essential point of the privatization program, more than obtaining revenues for the State, is to create professional management based on investment that contributes to the structuring of flourishing markets, so it is justified to sell at a discount or to support any previously undetected impairments. It is a risk that the State must accept in order to achieve the eagerly-awaited objective of creating a competitive free market economy.

Finally, in relation to large companies, the total privatization program must be defined and publicly disclosed with reference to the percentage amounts to be offered to the market, the dates and other qualifying conditions. There is still a lot of ignorance in the national and international markets about the privatization of these companies.

INVESTOR RECOMMENDATIONS:
◈ For large investors, the Angolan Blue Chips that are going to be subjected to privatization have vast potential for growth and rationalization of costs and organization, so they can provide very high rates of return on investment;
◈ For small and medium entrepreneurs there is a range of companies that can serve as a platform for launching moderate sized businesses;
◈ In general, given the positive Schumpeterian social climate that is being created, there is a strong recommendation to participate and buy in the privatization process in Angola.
 
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ANGOLAN STATE:
◈ To avoid delays and some administrative and decision confusion, a “Czar of Privatizations” should be instituted, managed directly by the President of the Republic and with delegated legal powers that will allow him/her to carry out the privatizations;
◈There must be mechanisms to compensate for the lack of internal audit by companies;
◈ Capital repatriation mechanisms for investors must be clarified;
◈ Clarification is required with dates, percentages and specific conditions for privatizations to take place in major reference companies (Blue Chips).