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Conditions and solutions for the removal of fuel subsidy in Angola

Summary of the proposed policy

In this document there are necessary conditions and possible solutions for the removal of the subsidy to fuel in Angola.

1-The necessary conditions are:

a) Creation of transparency mechanism of budgetary financial flows. The fate of savings made with the withdrawal of subsidies, emphasizing social aspects;

b) Modification of the oligopolistic market structure. Promotion of competition in the fuel distribution market. One hypothesis is the split of Sonangol distribuição in three entities and privatization of two of them.

2-The possible solutions are:

a) Focus on the subject

AA) direct subsidy to the most disadvantaged and social pass

AB) direct allowance to companies

AC) Tax Benefit /Negative Tax to AA) and AB)

b) Focus on the object

BA) Subsidized fuel prices continues for lower displacement vehicles

BB) subsidized fuel prices continue for transportation companies and similar

c) Composite systems

***

Elimination Fuel Subsidies: IMF and Vera Daves

It is an integral part of any intervention of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to have fuel subsidies withdrawn, where they exist. Of course, the same booklet was followed in Angola creating this burden on the Angolan government.

In terms of fiscal policy, in the recent Staff Report according to article IV the fund makes this the main measure to take at the level of fiscal policy, prescribing that: “Authorities need to take political action to increase non-oil tax revenues and gradually eliminate fuel subsidies while increasing support for vulnerable. These measures should help reduce vulnerabilities debt, create tax space and achieve their fiscal and medium-term debt goals. ”[1] (emphasis added).

Minister Vera Daves tunes for the same tuning fork, and in a recent interview said that the removal of fuel subsidies is “the elephant in the middle of the room, and with ballerina shoes”, stating that the political decision was made and was not implemented only because it is lacking to find the mechanism that reduces the impact on the most disadvantaged. And she explained that: “It is a blind subsidy, which everyone accesses, and with this revenue we could have a more directed policy instead of subsidizing those who do not need.” Adding arguments for the elimination of this measure as “fuel leakage to neighboring countries, lack of market share and the consequent loss of tax revenue, beyond the issue of inequality of treatment. There are several distortions to the market, but we are aware that the impact, especially through transport, is considerable. “It also recognized the negative impact on municipalities, industries and farms and the price of freight to transport food. And concluded by saying:” We have everything mapped, now the challenge is to take the dancer’s shoe thinking of measures that can mitigate the removal “from this allowance that costs between $ 3 and 4 billion, about $ 2.8 to 3.7 billion euros, per year. “It is a considerable value, given that the Integration and Intervention Program in the municipalities (PIIM) has 2 billion, so it would be two PIIM. ”[2]

It seems, therefore, that the IMF and Vera Daves are determined to eliminate fuel subsidies, apparently they do not know yet is how.

The political issue and the mechanism of transparency

It is evident that these eliminations, even making sense economically, and we will already address doubts in this context, have a large political impact and cannot be viewed as a “lightweight”. From Egypt to Iran to Sudan, France, changes in fuel prices have impacts on political stability, so the first assessment to do is political.

The great argument advanced by Vera Daves is the one that technically is called Crowding Out. By spending 2.8 to 3.7 billion euros, a year on fuel subsidies, the government does not spend them in the social sector, in education and health, for example. In fact, she argues, what is put in the lowering of the price of gasoline is taken from the well-being of the people. Accepting the argument, it must be sustained and convince the population. Accordingly, the first task would be to create a transparency mechanism (perhaps in the form of a digital site) that explained to the population how the background of subsidies would be channeled to other sectors, clarifying government plans. 1000 million for schools, 500 million for teachers, etc. Making a simple scheme and spreading it, everyone would realize the fate of money, and then over the early years there should be a public presentation of this flow. It would be explained by a scheme where the savings had gone with the removal of fuel subsidies. Consequently, the population would see that it had not been invented by the Minister of Finance, but that it was effectively happening.

A first preparatory measure of political nature is the creation of a transparency mechanism for all consultable to explain the path of money, how much it comes out of fuel subsidies and where it will end up in the various sectors of the budget. Thus, the population sees the benefits.

Fig. No. 1- Example of the transparency mechanism of the flow of funds taken from the subsidy to fuels, to be presented annually to the population

The problem of market structure

Entering the economic area there is a question that is raised and should be confronted. It is evident that the termination of fuel allowance will increase their prices.

In 2021, there were 951 gas stations in Angola, of which 432, would be controlled by small operators without brand. Sonangol Distribuidora is the largest in the distribution segment with a market share (sales) of 64%, Pumangol is the second largest player with 24% and the remaining 16% are distributed by Sonangalp and Tomsa (Total Marketing and Services Angola)[3].

The question is the definition of the structure of this market. A first analysis could appear to be facing a competitive market, but the weight of Sonangol and Pumangol, representing a total of 78% of sales market quota indicates that we are facing an oligopolistic type market, where few companies dominate the sector. It is known to price theory that oligopolistic markets have higher prices than perfect competition markets, where no one dominates the market. The oligopoly price is fixed by companies above the price level that would prevail in competition and below the monopoly profit maximizing price level. It is a market structure that constitutes a intermediate case, where there are few companies that compete with each other.[4] Consequently, removing the subsidy of fuel prices in an oligopoly situation would be equivalent at a higher price than the market equilibrium price and to put the population to finance higher profits from fuel distribution companies.

It is fundamental while the gradual withdrawal of prices begins to increase the number of relevant operators in the market and put them to compete with each other, without anyone mastering the market.

The most advisable was to split Sonangol Distribuidora in three different companies and immediately privatize two of them. Thus, we would have at least 5 relevant operators in competition.

Fig. No. 2- Sonangol Distribuição Scheme to ensure competition in the market

Forms of compensation/mitigation of the removal of subsidies

Described was the need to create a fund flow transparency mechanism for political consensus purposes, as well as the need to reform the market structure of the Downstream segment as a way to prevent oligopoly price formation, that is, higher than normal, it is time to make suggestions for compensation for the removal of subsidies.

The starting point is that there will be no savings of all values pointed out as a cost, 2.8 to 3.7 billion euros per year, and that there are sectors and populations that must be protected. We speak, of course, the populations with less income and the areas of transport and food and agricultural distribution.

Measures can start from various focuses:

a) Focus on the subject

AA) direct subsidy to the most disadvantaged and social pass

AB) direct allowance to companies

AC) Tax Benefit /Negative Tax to AA) and AB)

b) Focus on the object

BA) Subsidized fuel prices continues for lower displacement vehicles

BB) subsidized fuel prices continue for transportation companies and similar

c) Composite systems

Explaining each of the items and possibilities. We would have the following:

a) Focus on the subject

AA) direct subsidy to the most disadvantaged and social pass

A first hypothesis would be the granting of a fuel subsidy to all those who had a vehicle and/or used fuel in a given activity and showed an income below a given level. This wanted to say that the citizen who used fuel and had low income would receive a direct subsidy of the state in order to alleviating the negative effects of the price of fuel climbing.

In addition, a reduced social pass could be created, allowing any citizen to use transport without repercussion of the amount of fuel climb.

AB) direct allowance to companies

Another hypothesis would be that of direct allowance to transport and distribution companies. So that they did not reverberate the price of fuel in prices charged to the public, there would be compensation paid by the state that would cover the differential. Companies would receive funds so as not to increase prices.

AC) Tax Benefit /Negative Tax to AA) and AB)

In this situation, the instrument used for compensation would be the fiscal system, not the direct transfers of subsidies. It would be allowed to natural persons to a certain level of income and the companies of the affected sectors presented as tax deduction the value of the differential paid with the rise of prices. For example, if they previously paid 5 and then they would pay 10, they would have the opportunity to present an amount of 5 as a fiscal deduction, paying a lower tax.

In a superficial situation, such a deductive possibility would only apply to entities who paid tax, leaving out those who do not pay or are exempt. In these cases, a negative tax should be made, that is, a system through which low-income people would receive supplementary government payments rather than pay taxes. These supplementary payments would be equal to the additional amounts spent on fuel by these people.

b) Focus on the object

BA) Prices of subsidized fuel continues for lower displacement vehicles

In this hypothesis, what would happen would be the establishment of different levels of price for fuel according to the displacement of vehicles. Low-displacement vehicles would pay a lower price and vice versa. It would be a kind of progressive price.

BB) subsidized fuel prices continue for transportation companies and similar

In this case, the system would be the same as indicated above, with the difference that the beneficial price would be applied to the vehicles of transport companies and similar.

c) composite system

It is evident that the above systems can be mixed or complemented by each other, and it is up to the political decision-making to find the best technical combination.

Fig. No. 3- Possible compensatory solutions for the removal of subsidies to fuels

Need for financial calculations

There are no financial calculations in this work because the numbers are not known. The Minister of Finance presents an order of magnitude of current spending quantity with fuel subsidy, which is between 2.8 and 3.7 billion euros per year. Easily it is found that the differential is too large (900 million euros) to do a finer arithmetic of the situation.


[1] IMF, STAFF REPORT FOR THE 2022 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION, February 7, 2023, p. 7.

[2] https://angola24horas.com/component/k2/item/26418-governo-angolano-prepara-fundo-de-investimento-imobiliario-para-gerir-ativos-recuperados

[3] Data from Expansão: https://expansao.co.ao/expansao-mercados/interior/sao-951-postos-de-combustivel-e-454-de-bandeira-branca-101135.html

[4] See for example, George J. Stigler, https://cooperative-individualism.org/stigler-george_a-theory-of-oligopoly-1964-feb.pdf

Sonangol. Oil or energy company?

1- Introduction. Sonangol’s privatization and the oil market

On June 15, 2021, at 16.00, the sale price of Brent oil (which serves as a reference for Angola) was USD 73, 45[1] . A month and a half ago, the price was around USD 66.00, and in recent times there has been a sustained rise in the price, as we had predicted in a previous report[2]. If we notice, when we made this forecast (June 2020), the price of oil was situated at USD 36.6. In practice, in one year the price doubled.

However, the government has put forward more details on Sonangol’s partial privatization. The Minister of Mineral Resources, Oil and Gas, Diamantino Azevedo, repeated[3] his promise to approve the schedule for the sale of 30% of Sonangol’s capital on the stock exchange during the current presidential term, explaining that it will be a staggered process, and that there will be several available tranches: “stocks for Sonangol workers, stocks for Angolans who are interested and for strategic partners who later want to become partners”, a model that we defend in due course[4].

A third element to consider when analyzing Sonangol’s is the energy transition. In the United States and Western Europe, at least, this has become something of a recurring mantra forcing oil companies to modify their strategies so that they are less dependent on oil and contribute to a “green” economy. Sonangol finds itself at this crossroads between the need to recover its old aura, to be privatized, but not just relying on oil.

This report will analyze the possible solutions that the Angolan oil company has and point out some strategic paths.

2-The two determining forces in Sonangol’s strategy

There are two somewhat opposing forces regarding the strategy Sonangol may adopt in the future.

The first force “glues” the company to the oil price and aims to keep it as an oil company. In this view, what Sonangol must do is focus on its “core business” – oil – and then become efficient. Therefore, in this context, Sonangol’s restructuring is focused on achieving profits in the oil business, making profitable investments in the area and increasing as much as possible, at the lowest cost, in oil production. The essential measures taken by the current government with a view to reorganizing the company are in this direction. As Minister Azevedo said: “The first measure we took was to free (Sonangol) from the concessionary function, which could create conflicts of interest. We could not take a company with a concessionary, regulatory and business function to the stock exchange”, and another measure was create an “attractive” company that “encourages investment”, which involved reducing the number of subsidiaries and selling non-nuclear oil companies[5].

The other, somewhat opposite force is the energy transition (the green economy). Here it is argued that Sonangol should not be overly dependent on oil, and that Sonangol should become, as happens with other companies, for example, BP, Aramco or Galp, a global energy company and not an oil company. To this is added the potential of non-oil natural energy resources that the country has, such as sun, water, etc.

3-China, India and the OPEC gap

Contrary to what one might think in a Eurocentric analysis, the answer to Sonangol’s future characterization is not obvious. Much depends on the markets to which Sonangol wanted to allocate its production and on the country’s development needs. If you look at it, the recent rise in the price of oil was essentially “pulled” by China’s renewed oil appetite. According to the Bloomberg[6] financial agency, it was the strong demand for gasoline in China that boosted the need for crude oil. The truth is that China is among the biggest drivers of fluctuations in oil prices and China has been buying oil like there is no tomorrow, as a result, prices have gone up. The question is whether China will continue to drive this rise in the medium term in a way that allows for a sustainable oil strategy in relation to Sonangol.

There are two broad lines to consider in trying to anticipate China’s future behavior. The first is its economic level, while the second is its commitment to the energy transition.

China is not yet at an economic level that corresponds to a rich and developed country. According to data from the World Bank, in 2019, the Chinese GDP per capita is in the order of USD 10,000. For comparison, Portugal, one of the poorest of the rich countries, has a GDP per capita on the same date of USD 23,000 and the United States is at USD 65,000[7]. Countries with GDP per capita identical to the Chinese are Argentina, Lebanon, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, Turkey or Equatorial Guinea. It is easy to see that China still has a long way to go and will need a lot of energy, especially oil.

China’s oil demand has nearly tripled over the past two decades, accounting on average for a third of global oil demand growth each year. From what we have just exposed, China will continue to lead the demand for oil in the coming decades. However, the pace of the country’s oil consumption will not grow as fast, although it will continue to grow. Over the past two decades, China’s oil consumption has grown by more than 9 million barrels per day (mb / d) from 4.7 mb / d in 2000 to 14.1 mb / d in 2019. China’s oil use should continue to grow, albeit at a slower pace, as China is also investing heavily in renewable energy.

China is the world leader in electricity production from renewable energy sources, with more than twice the generation of the second country, the United States. At the end of 2019, the country had a total capacity of 790 GW of renewable energy, mainly hydroelectric, solar and wind power. China’s renewable energy sector is growing faster than that of fossil fuels, as is its nuclear power capacity. China has pledged to achieve carbon neutrality before 2060 and peak emissions before 2030. By 2030, China aims to reduce carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by more than 65% from the level of 2005, increase the share of non-fossil energy in primary energy use to about 25 percent, and bring the total installed capacity of wind and solar electricity to over 1200 GW. Furthermore, China sees renewable energies as a source of energy security and not just a means of reducing carbon emissions[8][9].

In India, another of the world’s great countries in a process of growth, the situation is as follows: trade relations between Angola and India amount to US$4 billion, of which US$3.7 million correspond to exports from Angola to the Asian country, being 90% related to oil. Angola is currently the third most important African exporter to India, when in 2005 it was not relevant. In 2017, the Ambassador of India issued a statement in which he highlighted: “Trade between Angola and India increased by 100% in 2017.” The thing to remember is that India is becoming a significant partner of Angola through its oil needs.

In terms of GDP per capita, India in 2019 was around USD 2000.00. It is easy to see that the growth that India expects is enormous, even if it does not have China’s ambitions of world leadership, just to reach its current level, it has to multiply its GDP by five. Obviously, this implies a growing need for oil. India was the world’s third largest crude oil importer in 2018, and has an estimated oil import dependency of 82%. India’s economic growth is closely related to its demand for energy, so the need for oil and gas is expected to grow even further, making the sector very investment-friendly. At the same time, India is one of the countries with a large production of energy from renewable sources. As of November 27, 2020, 38% of India’s installed electricity generation capacity came from renewable sources. In the Paris Agreement, India committed to a target of achieving 40% of its total electricity generation from non-fossil fuel sources by 2030. The country is aiming for an even more ambitious target of 57% of total electricity capacity from renewable sources by 2027.

Official data indicate that Angola’s oil production reached, in May 2021, only 34 million 887 thousand 890 barrels, less about one million compared to April. In that month, a daily average of one million 125 thousand 416 barrels of oil was obtained, when the forecast was one million 184 thousand 813. This means that Angola is below the target set by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). ), which was 1 million 283 thousand barrels per day, in May, with subsequent increases.

4- Conclusion: Sonangol’s challenges

Considering all of the above, it is evident, first of all, that there is a large margin for Sonangol to continue to focus on oil, either because not even the quotas defined by OPEC for Angola are met, ie, Angola is producing less than it should in a tight market situation, either because the large potential oil futures markets such as China and India will need plentiful oil shipments.

To that extent, Sonangol should not make the mistake – as some oil companies are doing – of underestimating the potential for growth in the oil market. In the Western world with mature economies, the demand for oil may not feel as strong as in the past, but in fast-growing economies, more oil will be needed, albeit often not as exponentially as before.

There is space and market for Sonangol, as an oil company, to grow. Therefore, Sonangol’s ongoing strategic structuring should focus on producing more oil more efficiently, both in terms of costs and in terms of the environment.

However, this model focused on oil efficiency has to be matched with the enormous potential that is opening up in renewable energies and the company has to take advantage of energy synergies, as many of its counterparts are doing and also China and India.

At the present time, when the intention is to privatize Sonangol from a global perspective, it seems sensible to commit Sonangol to tasks in the area of ​​renewable energies. In fact, to be an attractive company for the international stock market, Sonangol must present itself as adopting the latest trends in oil companies, i.e., also following the needs of the energy transition.

Not abandoning or belittling oil, Sonangol must boldly explore the combined possibilities brought by renewable energies.

This exploration of renewable energies by Sonangol should not start from scratch, but rather seek some sustainability and economies of scale. One hypothesis, which we have already touched upon in a previous report[10], would be a strategic partnership with Galp for this purpose. As is known, Galp accelerated its energy transition process.

As this hypothesis was not adopted, Sonangol should review the rationality of its permanence at Galp. In fact, at this moment, the Angolan position in Galp is “sandwiched” between Isabel dos Santos and the Amorim family, corresponding to a mere financial investment. This doesn’t make much sense anymore. Either Galp becomes a strategic partner for Sonangol’s energy transition, or a position review becomes required.

The alternative would be for Sonangol to acquire a company that is minimally established in the field and develop its activities based on this new platform. At this time, partnerships have already been announced with ENI and TOTAL to develop projects in renewable energy that will be operational in 2022. Perhaps a strategic focus in this area is more interesting, which would translate into an internal commitment by Sonangol and, as mentioned above, it would go through the purchase or merger with a company operating in the renewable energy sector, to provide initial support for Sonangol.

In short, Sonangol must become a bi-focused company: on oil and renewable energies.


[1] https://www.ifcmarkets.com/pt/market-data/commodities-prices/brent

[2] https://www.cedesa.pt/2020/06/03/angola-petroleo-e-divida-oportunidades-renovadas-2/

[3] https://www.dw.com/pt-002/governo-angolano-admite-privatiza%C3%A7%C3%A3o-gradual-de-30-da-sonangol/a-57879593

[4] https://www.cedesa.pt/2020/01/29/um-modelo-de-privatizacao-da-sonangol/

[5] Idem note 3

[6] https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Chinese-Gasoline-Demand-Is-Driving-Oil-Prices-Higher.html

[7] https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=US

8 Cfr. https://www.oxfordenergy.org/publications/chinas-oil-demand-in-the-wake-of-covid-19/ and

[9] Deng, Haifeng and Farah, Paolo Davide and Wang, Anna, China’s Role and Contribution in the Global Governance of Climate Change: Institutional Adjustments for Carbon Tax Introduction, Collection and Management in China (24 November 2015). Journal of World Energy Law and Business, Oxford University Press, Volume 8, Issue 6, December 2015.

[10] https://www.cedesa.pt/2021/02/10/sonangol-galp-que-futuro-conjunto/