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Angola: the American challenge and the Chinese reaction

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Angola’s new foreign policy under João Lourenço (2017)

After the end of the Civil War (2002), José Eduardo dos Santos (JES) opted for a “low profile” foreign policy for Angola. Apart from the intensification of relations with China, which essentially had economic objectives, and muscular interventions in African border countries, generally when Angola’s internal security could be at stake, the former President of the Republic did not develop an active policy in the world, preferring it to forget about Angola’s existence.

JES’s non-foreign policy had two fundamental consequences. It took Angola out of the concerns of the major powers, preventing the country from being looked at greedily on the world stage, and in doing so, it allowed the “capture of the state” by private interests to take on unthinkable contours[1] . Angola has become a kind of private property for a few, in the face of the generalised indifference of the world and the glee of sophisticated profiteers.

João Lourenço effectively changed the compass of Angolan foreign policy, promoting what we will call a sovereigntist policy of variable geometry from 2017 onwards.  In other words, Lourenço wanted to put Angola on the world’s radar and the country assumed itself as a regional power, with a role to play in the peaceful stabilisation of Central and Southern Africa; also open to investment and committed to global affairs[2] .

This Laurentian perspective has meant a strong rapprochement with the United States, the Arab countries of the Gulf, but also maintaining relations with China and Russia, and economic realities now impose a stronger bond with India.

While Angola’s new active presidential diplomacy is clear and perceptible, the big question mark is the reaction of the other countries, particularly the major powers, such as the United States, which has an ambiguous history in relation to Angola, as well as China, which is used to playing a decisive role in Angola.

The United States and the Lobito Corridor

It seems that, initially, the United States didn’t understand João Lourenço’s moves. It was at the end of the Trump administration, which had no interest in Africa, there was still, albeit in degradation, an idea of cooperation between America and China, and Russia had not invaded Ukraine. Africa and Angola, in particular, were of no interest to the Americans, except for the traditional oil companies.

However, everything changed at the beginning of the 1920s. The world’s geostrategic situation once again placed Africa as a field of conflicting interests, both in terms of obtaining raw materials (an area in which China was far ahead and in which the US became interested in order to guarantee its strategic autonomy) and in counting support for the Ukrainian War and its aftermath. In this sense, with a new US ambassador in Angola, Tulinabo S. Mushingi, and Luanda’s persistent rapprochement with Washington, the Americans realised that they had a possible new and powerful ally in Angola.

As a result, Angola appeared to become one of the United States’ strongest allies in Africa. Symbols of this were João Lourenço’s trip to Washington for a meeting at the White House with President Joe Biden (December 2023)[3] , and the constant visits by US officials to Luanda (Antony Blinken, five US senators, Samantha Power, Lloyd Austin, among others).

Many projects were announced, most notably the famous Lobito Corridor, which has become the flagship of this intense Angola-US co-operation.

Without going into an in-depth description of this project, the main thing to remember is that it is a railway linking the African interior, including the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia and Angola itself, to the port of Lobito. Just recently, the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) was announced, mobilising 4.9 billion dollars to date, presented as a significant step by the United States of America, the European Union and private partners to strengthen the commitment to sustainable development and regional integration, benefiting Angola, Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo[4] . And at the recent G7 summit in Puglia, Italy, the leaders of the West’s most advanced economies reaffirmed their support for multi-billion dollar infrastructure projects across Africa in order to realise the continent’s economic potential and transformation, specifying the Lobito Corridor as a top priority[5] .

Many observers have claimed that this is a response to Chinese mining domination of Africa[6] . This is unlikely to be the case, since a large part of the minerals to be transported through the Corridor are in mines under Chinese control. Although, according to the Wilson Center, China currently controls only around 8 per cent of Africa’s mining sector, less than half of its Western competitors, this is still an increase from 6.7 per cent in 2018. And as far as the potential beneficiaries of the Lobito Corridor are concerned, what worries the US is China’s monopoly on mining in Africa’s copper belt (Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia) and its recent substantial investments in lithium production in Zimbabwe, which holds Africa’s largest lithium reserves. These investments allow China to dictate the global supply chain for renewable batteries and electric vehicles (EVs). In the DRC, the country with the world’s largest reserves of high-quality cobalt and copper, China currently owns 72 per cent of the cobalt and copper mines, including the Tenge Fungurume mine, which alone produces around 12 per cent of the world’s cobalt output. China’s mining operations in these three countries give Beijing a significant lead in the production of semiconductors and batteries, and therefore in the field of climate security technologies. This leaves the rest of the world increasingly dependent on Chinese innovation and industry to drive global energy transitions and tackle climate change. Furthermore, in the DRC, China owns at least 7 cobalt processing entities, but mainly sends raw minerals back to China for processing and manufacturing in order to meet global demand for critical minerals and finished products[7] .

Naturally, this data on China’s mining influence in the DRC and Zambia makes it clear that the Lobito Corridor will never be an American alternative to Chinese domination of Central African minerals. In fact, to be commercially successful, American transport will need the support of Chinese miners.

Well-placed sources tell us that the objective is less the transport of minerals and more the creation of an agro-industrial development area parallel to the corridor, whose products will be transported through it. It is in this objective that the American option for the Cart Group comes into play. At the aforementioned recent G7 summit, significant funding was announced for the Carrinho Group, which is considered to be a leading Angolan company in the agro-industrial sector, to develop the Lobito Corridor. Apparently, the Carrinho Group, a sort of “darling” company of the Americans, has the task of transforming Angola into a regional food hub, with investments aimed at building and acquiring infrastructure for storing food products[8] . The Carrinho Group has thus become a key part of the American strategy for Africa.

Even so, however, it should be noted that even in the current structure of the Corridor, there is a relevant Chinese company, Mota-Engil, which, although it has a Portuguese name, has the Chinese state as its reference shareholder. The truth is that China Communications Construction Co., Ltd. holds 32.41 per cent of the share capital, and the CEO of Mota-Engil himself, Carlos Mota Santos, has already admitted that CCCC is owned by the State of the People’s Republic of China[9] .

So, at the end of the day, the Lobito Corridor will never be a US project to counter China, but it will certainly have to be a Sino-American co-operative project if it is to succeed. Whether or not this is possible, we’ll see in the future.

The Chinese attitude

For years, while ensuring its exponential economic growth, China adopted a soft and discreet international diplomacy, not confronting but modelling, following the precepts of Deng Xiao Ping, who favoured an international approach known as “taoguang yanghui”, which emphasized the need to avoid polemics and the use of cooperative rhetoric. It is clear that with Xi Jiping, China has entered a new, more assertive phase on the international stage, known as the “warrior wolf”, which does not avoid confrontation, allowing China to occupy the place it recognizes as its own on the world stage.

In this context of assertiveness, contrary to what might have been expected in the past, China has reacted to the American rapprochement with Angola swiftly, above all by expeditiously reoccupying spaces that the Americans or their Western allies have not been able to occupy or where they have been sloppy.

From a political point of view, the Chinese reaction was visible during João Lourenço’s most recent trip to Beijing (March 2024). Although the official statements were of great friendship and success, the Chinese authorities made their disenchantment with João Lourenço known in certain reasonably public circles, contradicting the official narrative of the trip. It was a discreet game, unnoticeable to many, but it existed, demonstrating the Chinese will not “throw in the towel” in Angola.

And the reality is that China’s political will has subsequently asserted itself in China’s field of choice: the economy.

Three recent announcements affirm the renewed Chinese vigour in Angola.

Firstly, a Chinese group is going to build Angola’s first motorway, some 1,400 kilometers long, linking the south to the north of the country. The Chinese state-owned company China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) will build a 1,400 kilometer motorway linking the southern part of Angola with neighbouring Namibia to the northern part of Angola with the Democratic Republic of Congo. Construction is expected to begin at the end of 2025 or in 2026[10] .

This project shows China returning to large-scale infrastructure projects in Angola, something that was thought to be over. However, this is not the case.

Secondly, there is the Angolan government’s intention to terminate the contract with the company that won the tender to build the Soyo refinery, which has had difficulties obtaining funding. This is a consortium led by Quanten, which won an international public tender in 2021 for the construction of the Soyo refinery, made up of four companies, three of which are American (the consortium leader Quanten LLC, TGT INC and Aurum & Sharp LLC) and one Angolan (ATIS Nebest)[11] .

In this case, we have an American failure to secure financing, which leads to the cancellation of a contract, opening the door to China’s entry, because, remember, China had already been involved in the construction of the Soyo refinery during the time of José Eduardo dos Santos, and a Chinese company had come second in the international tender that awarded the contract to Quanten[12] . Now the door is open for the second-placed Chinese, the CMEC consortium made up of China Machinery Engineering Corp,[13] or other Chinese-led interested parties to move into Soyo.

It’s clear that here we are confronted with a typical American problem of our time, the excessive belief in the power of marketing and in financial engineering that is impractical in Africa. To quote the CEO of Mota-Engil, Carlos Mota Santos, the American problem is that “all North American or European investment, with one or two exceptions, is more opportunistic. They are property funds and vulture funds, I don’t see them investing in any industry.”[14]

Finally, we have a third sign of Western withdrawal, now from Siemens, and the opening of more doors to China in an area in which it also has expertise, that of surface metros (let’s remember that the recent fleet of the Porto metro in Portugal has already been equipped with Chinese trains).

Now it’s the case of the surface metro in Luanda. The Germans from Siemens Mobility have pulled out of the project based on a public-private partnership and the Angolan government intends to take on the construction costs itself with funding from China[15] .

It’s a big turnaround, and once again demonstrates the inability or unwillingness of Western companies to invest in Angola. First Quanten failed in Soyo, now Siemens in the Luanda metro. Angola is once again fully open and in need of China to ensure its development.

Slow United States and energetic China

What appears to be the case at the moment is that American and Western goodwill is not enough. The reality is simple. Angola needs money, as it did in 2002 for reconstruction, and once again China seems committed to taking the lead.

The United States seems to want to be with Angola, but when it comes to decisive moments it has no practical or operational solutions, getting lost in plans, projects, trips, financial engineering and announcements of intent. On the other hand, China seems to have realized that a new opportunity is opening up in Angola, and is apparently in a position to take advantage of this new opportunity.

The future will tell.

[1] Rui Verde, 2021, Angola at the Crossroads: Between Kleptocracy and Development, London

[2] See our previous report at https://www.cedesa.pt/2021/05/18/os-realinhamentos-da-politica-externa-de-angola/

[3] https://observador.pt/2023/12/06/embaixador-dos-eua-destaca-ano-verdadeiramente-historico-apos-encontro-entre-biden-e-joao-lourenco/

[4] João de Almeida, https://www.facebook.com/dealmeida31

[5] https://www.afdb.org/pt/noticias-e-eventos/comunicados-de-imprensa/lideres-do-g-7-reafirmam-empenho-em-infraestruturas-de-milhares-de-milhoes-de-dolares-para-africa-prometem-mais-apoio-iniciativas-do-banco-africano-de-desenvolvimento-71926

[6] https://www.club-k.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=52349:o-corredor-do-lobito-a-resposta-de-washington-a-iniciativa-belt-and-road-em-africa&catid=5&lang=pt&Itemid=1070#google_vignette

[7] https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/addressing-chinas-monopoly-over-africas-renewable-energy-minerals

[8] https://www.club-k.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=54293:grupo-angolano-carrinho-recebe-financiamento-do-g7-para-impulsionar-infraestrutura-no-corredor-do-lobito&catid=41026:nacional&lang=pt&Itemid=1083

[9] https://eco.sapo.pt/2023/04/20/mota-engil-insiste-numa-decisao-e-diz-que-e-incontornavel-no-projeto-do-novo-aeroporto/

[10] https://www.angonoticias.com/Artigos/item/77289/grupo-chines-vai-construir-primeira-autoestrada-de-angola

[11] https://www.rtp.pt/noticias/economia/angola-admite-rescindir-contrato-com-empresa-que-vai-construir-refinaria-do-soyo_n1578622

[12] https://expansao.co.ao/expansao-mercados/interior/consorcio-euaangola-tem-tres-anos-para-construir-refinaria-101446.html

[13] https://www.noticiasaominuto.com/economia/1710487/consorcio-quantem-vence-concurso-para-a-construcao-da-refinaria-do-soyo

[14] https://eco.sapo.pt/2023/04/20/mota-engil-insiste-numa-decisao-e-diz-que-e-incontornavel-no-projeto-do-novo-aeroporto/

[15] https://www.angonoticias.com/Artigos/item/77319/angola-avanca-com-metro-de-luanda-e-desiste-de-ppp-negociada-com-os-alemaes-da-siemens-mobility

2022 Angolan elections and the United States

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Recently, rumors have circulated in Luanda and received echo in generally well-informed portals[1] about a possible increased interest of the United States in the Angolan elections, which would lead the Western power to demand that the elections have impartial international observers to guarantee the electoral truth, as well as the threat of possible sanctions against the João Lourenço government if it did not comply with these American recommendations. Specifically, it is announced that the Biden Administration has been threatening the application of financial sanctions, visa restrictions and travel bans against government officials who undermine elections in their countries[2]. From there it is extrapolated that it will be doing the same in relation to Angola.

This apparent position represents a break with the relative passivity with which the United States of America in the past has faced the general elections in Angola, at least since 2008, it is necessary to try to understand if this change in US policy verifiably exists and in what terms.

Firstly, the sources we consulted state that they are not aware of any reversal of US foreign policy towards Angola, noting that the rumors essentially originate from documents sent by Angolan Non-Governmental Organizations to the State Department, which has always happened and will happen and also in the usual inquiries that the American Embassy in Luanda carried out, but which it has always carried out in the past and will carry out in the future. Therefore, nothing new.

Secondly, and this is the object of our study, it is interesting to investigate whether the structural conditions of US foreign policy imply a more accentuated intervention/concern with the elections and the situation in Angola, which could lead to serious misunderstandings between the Biden Administration. and the executive of João Lourenço.

The Biden Administration’s foreign policy, curiously, in its broad lines follows the policy adopted by Donald Trump, breaking only in specific aspects, such as the weather emergency or some multilateralism. Thus, Biden’s foreign policy is based on a commitment to dealing with the relationship with China, a pragmatism in most relations and a lack of interest in Africa.

The withdrawal, as it took place, from Afghanistan is a typical example of this approach, in which Americans do not want to get involved in “nation building” projects or actively promoting values ​​in other countries. They now prefer a strategy that benefits them commercially, guarantees stability and helps control China.

The idealism of the neoconservatives who embraced George Bush Jr., in his attempt to build democracies and the rule of law in Iraq and Afghanistan, is no longer part of the American foreign policy guide. So don’t expect this idealism to come to Africa. There will be no interventions in Africa to promote any kind of American values, not even muscular interventions of any kind.

What exists on the North American side is a desire for the African continent to be as stable as possible and the supply of essential raw materials ensured in the most adequate way possible.

This October, in the prestigious Foreign Affairs magazine, they wrote “President Joe Biden’s administration has been similarly slow out of the blocks on Africa. Aside from its focused diplomatic response to the horrific civil war in Ethiopia and a few hints about other areas of emphasis, such as trade and investment, Biden has not articulated a strategy for the continent.[3]”

Consequently, in terms of the structural lines of American foreign policy, it appears that with the withdrawal from Afghanistan, any wish for “Nation building” or intervention in a third country that does not directly threaten the national interest has been abandoned.

Additionally, the focus was placed on China and its control and more generally on Asia.

The US State Department’s statement from May this year is very clear on the importance of China and the role it plays in the American approach: “Strategic competition is the frame through which the United States views its relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The United States will address its relationship with the PRC from a position of strength in which we work closely with our allies and partners to defend our interests and values.  We will advance our economic interests, counter Beijing’s aggressive and coercive actions, sustain key military advantages and vital security partnerships, re-engage robustly in the UN system, and stand up to Beijing when PRC authorities are violating human rights and fundamental freedoms. When it is in our interest, the United States will conduct results-oriented diplomacy with China on shared challenges such as climate change and global public health crises[4]”.

If the structuring lines of American foreign policy are those mentioned above, and Africa does not occupy a relevant place, it is worth pointing out, however, what the United States wants or expects from Africa. Essentially, it can be summed up in a colloquial phrase: The US wants Africa not to bother them and provide some economic profits.

Following this strategy, the US has handed over a good part of the anti-terrorist fight to France and counts on African countries to guarantee local stability, pursuing strong alliances with some of them. Only if US national interests and security are affected by Islamic terrorism will the United States intervene strongly. It should be noted that the US also has its trauma here, which occurred in Somalia, and so well portrayed in the beautiful film Black Hawk Down[5], masterfully directed by Ridley Scott. There is no US willingness to get inside any imbroglio in Africa. This idea is reinforced by the donwsizing proposals regarding its Africom (United States Command for Africa).

To this extent, the US has a very practical view of the balance of power and needs for Africa. And in reality its history with Angola demonstrates this. In fact, even when in the 1980s they reportedly supported Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA against José Eduardo dos Santos’ MPLA, they were careful that such support did not disrupt the activities of their oil companies operating in territory dominated by the MPLA government. At the time, Cuba sent an additional 2,000 soldiers to protect Chevron’s oil rigs (in Cabinda). In 1986 Savimbi called Chevron’s presence in Angola, already protected by Cuban troops, as a UNITA “target”. So, we had Savimbi backed by the Americans to invective an American company protected by the Cubans[6]. Later, it was rumored that a company linked to the conservative Dick Cheney, future vice president of George Bush Jr., had a role in the location and death of Jonas Savimbi[7].

This means that the US attitude towards Angola has always been ambivalent, and it will not be now that it will embark on a path of confrontation, when Angola became an important ally for two very realistic reasons.

Firstly, Angola, specially under the leadership of João Lourenço, has played a role of pacification in its area of ​​influence. Remember that Angola helped a peaceful and electoral broadcast in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), tries to establish some peacefulness between the triangle DRC, Uganda and Rwanda, besides having contributed decisively to the recent peace in the Central African Republic (CAR). In fact, in the latter country, President Touadéra highlighted the crucial role played by the Angolan state in achieving peace. Angola is an ally of US peace in Africa and obviously the Americans will not neglect Angola’s diplomatic and military support and collaboration for African tranquility.

It is also a strong bulwark against any penetration of Islamic terrorism.

Secondly, it is clear that Angola is currently pursuing a new foreign policy, intending to “detach itself” from the excessive dependence on China. Now, given its experience with China, which pioneered intervention in Africa and the current attempt to a more Western foreign policy, Angola constitutes an experimental platform par excellence for US policy towards China, where the true implications of this policy will be tested and how far the US effort to counterbalance China will go.

To that extent, an American failure with Angola will be a global failure of its strategic approach to China. Here, as in the Cold War in relation to the Soviet Union, the reality of American action in relation to China will be measured.

Thus, it does not seem that the Biden Administration embarks on any hostility or change in relation to the João Lourenço government, as this does not correspond to American interests in relation to Africa and even in relation to China. All rumors in another sense should be seen as part of the Angolan infighting and not any muscular American positioning.

[1] CLUB-K, 2021,  https://club-k.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=46062:eua-ameacam-sancoes-contra-regimes-africanos-que-recorrem-a-fraude-eleitoral&catid=11:foco-do-dia&lang=pt&Itemid=1072

[2] idem

[3] Foreign Affairs, 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2021-10-08/africa-changing-and-usstrategynotkeeping?utm_medium=promo_email&utm_source=lo_flows&utm_campaign=registered_user_welcome&utm_term=email_1&utm_content=20211026

[4] USA State Department, 2021, https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-china/

[5] Black Hawk Down, 2001, https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0265086/

[6] Franklyn, J. (1997), Cuba and the United States: a chronological history

[7] Madsen, W. (2013). National Security Agency surveillance: Reflections and revelations 2001-2013

Eleições angolanas de 2022 e os Estados Unidos da América

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Recentemente, têm circulado por Luanda e obtido o devido eco em portais geralmente bem-informados[1]rumores acerca dum possível interesse acrescido dos Estados Unidos nas eleições angolanas, que levariam a potência ocidental a exigir que as eleições tivessem observadores internacionais imparciais que garantissem a verdade eleitoral, bem como a ameaça de possíveis sanções ao governo de João Lourenço se não acatasse essas recomendações americanas. Em concreto, anuncia-se que a Administração Biden tem estado a ameaçar com a aplicação de sanções financeiras, restrições de vistos e proibições de viagens contra governantes que prejudiquem as eleições nos seus países.[2] Daí extrapola-se que estará a fazer o mesmo em relação a Angola.

Representando esta aparente postura uma rutura com a relativa passividade com que os Estados Unidos da América no passado têm encarado as eleições gerais em Angola, pelo menos desde 2008, é mister tentar perceber se existe verificavelmente essa mudança de política dos EUA e em que termos.

Em primeiro lugar, as fontes que consultamos afirmam desconhecer qualquer inversão da política externa norte-americana relativa a Angola, anotando que os rumores têm origem, essencialmente, em documentos enviados por Organizações Não Governamentais angolanas ao Departamento de Estado, o que sempre aconteceu e acontecerá e também nas auscultações habituais que a Embaixada americana em Luanda efetuou, mas que sempre realizou no passado e realizará no futuro. Nada de novo, portanto.

Em segundo lugar, e isto constitui o objeto do nosso estudo, interessa averiguar se as condicionantes estruturais da política externa norte-americana implicam uma intervenção/preocupação mais acentuada com as eleições e a situação em Angola, podendo levar a desentendimentos graves ente a Administração Biden e o executivo de João Lourenço.

A política externa da Administração Biden, curiosamente, nas suas grandes linhas segue a política adotada por Donald Trump, quebrando apenas em aspetos específicos, como a emergência climatérica ou algum multilateralismo. Deste modo, a política externa Biden assenta num empenho no tratamento da relação com a China, um pragmatismo na generalidade das relações e um desinteresse em África.

A retirada, nos termos em que ocorreu, do Afeganistão é um exemplo típico desta abordagem, em que os americanos não se querem envolver em projetos “nation building” ou de promoção ativa de valores noutros países. Preferem agora uma estratégia que os beneficie comercialmente, garanta a estabilidade e ajude a controlar a China.  

O idealismo dos neoconservadores que acolitaram George Bush filho na sua tentativa de construção de democracias e estados de direito no Iraque e Afeganistão, deixou de fazer parte do guião da política externa americana. Portanto, não se espere que esse idealismo venha existir para África. Não vão existir intervenções em África para promover qualquer tipo de valores americanos, nem sequer intervenções musculadas de qualquer tipo.

O que existe da parte norte-americana é um desejo que o continente africano seja o mais estável possível e o fornecimento de matérias-primas essenciais seja assegurado do modo mais adequado possível.

Ainda este mês de outubro, na prestigiada revista Foreign Affairs, escrevia-se “President Joe Biden’s administration has been similarly slow out of the blocks on Africa. Aside from its focused diplomatic response to the horrific civil war in Ethiopia and a few hints about other areas of emphasis, such as trade and investment, Biden has not articulated a strategy for the continent.” (A administração do presidente Joe Biden tem sido igualmente lenta nos bloqueios de África. Além de sua resposta diplomática focada na horrível guerra civil na Etiópia e algumas dicas sobre outras áreas de ênfase, como comércio e investimento, Biden não articulou uma estratégia para o continente.)[3].

Consequentemente, em termos das linhas estruturais da política estrangeira americana verifica-se que com a retirada do Afeganistão foi abandonada qualquer veleidade de “Nation building” ou intervenção em país terceiro que não ameace diretamente o interesse nacional.

Adicionalmente, o foco foi colocado na China e no seu controlo e mais geralmente na Ásia.

A declaração do Departamento de Estado norte-americano de maio deste ano é bem clara sobre a importância da China e o papel que desempenha na abordagem americana: “Strategic competition is the frame through which the United States views its relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).  The United States will address its relationship with the PRC from a position of strength in which we work closely with our allies and partners to defend our interests and values.  We will advance our economic interests, counter Beijing’s aggressive and coercive actions, sustain key military advantages and vital security partnerships, re-engage robustly in the UN system, and stand up to Beijing when PRC authorities are violating human rights and fundamental freedoms.  When it is in our interest, the United States will conduct results-oriented diplomacy with China on shared challenges such as climate change and global public health crises[4].” (“A competição estratégica é a estrutura pela qual os Estados Unidos veem seu relacionamento com a República Popular da China (RPC). Os Estados Unidos abordarão o seu relacionamento com a RPC a partir de uma posição de força na qual trabalhamos em estreita colaboração com nossos aliados e parceiros para defender nossos interesses e valores. Avançaremos os nossos interesses económicos, combateremos as ações agressivas e coercitivas de Pequim, manteremos vantagens militares importantes e parcerias de segurança vitais, voltaremos a colaborar fortemente no sistema da ONU e enfrentaremos Pequim quando as autoridades da RPC estiverem a violar os direitos humanos e as liberdades fundamentais. Quando for de nosso interesse, os Estados Unidos conduzirão uma diplomacia voltada para resultados com a China em desafios compartilhados, como mudanças climáticas e crises globais de saúde pública.”

Se as linhas estruturantes da política externa americana são as referidas, e África não ocupa um lugar relevante, convém assinalar, no entanto, o que os Estados Unidos desejam ou esperam de África. Essencialmente, pode-se resumir numa frase coloquial: Os EUA desejam que África não lhe dê chatices e propicie alguns lucros económicos.

No seguimento dessa estratégia, os EUA têm entregado uma boa parte da luta anti- terrorista a França e contam que os países africanos garantam a estabilidade local, prosseguindo fortes alianças com alguns deles. Só se o interesse e a segurança nacionais norte-americanas forem afetadas pelo terrorismo islâmico, os Estados Unidos intervirão fortemente. De notar, que também aqui os EUA têm o seu trauma, ocorrido na Somália, e tão bem retratado no belo filme Black Hawk Down[5] magistralmente dirigido por Ridley Scott. Não existe qualquer apetência dos EUA em se colocarem por dentro de qualquer imbróglio em África. Esta ideia é reforçada pelas propostas de donwsizing relativamente ao seu Africom (Comando dos Estados Unidos para a África).

Nesta medida, os EUA têm uma perspetiva muito prática dos equilíbrios de forças e necessidades para África. E na realidade a sua história com Angola isso o demonstra. Na verdade, mesmo quando nos anos 1980s apoiavam declaradamente a UNITA de Jonas Savimbi contra o MPLA de José Eduardo dos Santos tinham o cuidado que tal apoio não perturbasse as atividades das suas companhias petrolíferas a operar em território dominado pelo governo do MPLA. Na altura, Cuba enviou 2 mil soldados adicionais para proteger as plataformas de petróleo da Chevron (em Cabinda). Em 1986 Savimbi chamou a presença da Chevron em Angola, já protegida pelas tropas cubanas, como um “alvo” da UNITA. Portanto, tínhamos Savimbi apoiado pelos norte-americanos a invetivar uma companhia norte-americana protegida pelos cubanos.[6] Mais tarde, correram rumores que uma empresa ligada ao conservador Dick Cheney, futuro vice-presidente de George Bush filho, teria tido um papel na localização e morte de Jonas Savimbi[7].

Isto quer dizer, que a atitude dos EUA face a Angola sempre foi ambivalente, e não será agora que irá enveredar por um caminho de confronto, quando Angola se tornou um aliado importante por dois motivos muito reais.

Em primeiro lugar, Angola, sobretudo com a liderança de João Lourenço tem desempenhado um papel de pacificação na sua zona de influência. Relembre-se que Angola ajudou a uma transmissão pacífica e eleitoral na República Democrática do Congo (RDC), tenta estabelecer alguma tranquilidade entre o triângulo RDC, Uganda e Ruanda, além de ter contribuído decisivamente para a recente paz na República Centro-Africana (RCA). Na verdade, neste último país o Presidente Touadéra destacou o papel fulcral desempenhado pelo Estado angolano na obtenção da paz. Angola é um aliado da paz dos EUA em África e obviamente os americanos não vão desleixar o apoio e colaboração diplomática e militar de Angola para a tranquilidade africana.

Também é um forte baluarte contra qualquer penetração do terrorismo islâmico.

Em segundo lugar, é nítido que Angola segue atualmente uma nova política externa, pretendendo “descolar-se” da excessiva dependência da China. Ora, atendendo à sua experiência com a China de quem foi pioneira da intervenção em África e da tentativa atual duma política estrangeira mais ocidental, Angola constitui uma plataforma experimental por excelência para a política dos EUA face à China, onde se testarão as verdadeiras implicações dessa política e até onde irá o empenho americano para contrabalançar a China.

Nessa medida, um falhanço americano com Angola será um falhanço global da sua aproximação estratégica à China. Aqui, tal como na Guerra Fria em relação à União Soviética, se vai medir a realidade da ação americana relativamente à China.

Assim, tudo ponderado não parece que a Administração Biden embarque em qualquer hostilização ou mudança em relação ao governo de João Lourenço, pois isso não corresponde aos interesses americanos face a África e mesmo em relação à China. Todos rumores noutro sentido, devem ser vistos como parte da luta interna angolana e não qualquer posicionamento musculado americano.

[1]CLUB-K, 2021,  https://club-k.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=46062:eua-ameacam-sancoes-contra-regimes-africanos-que-recorrem-a-fraude-eleitoral&catid=11:foco-do-dia&lang=pt&Itemid=1072

[2] Idem

[3] Foreign Affairs, 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2021-10-08/africa-changing-and-us-strategy-not-keeping?utm_medium=promo_email&utm_source=lo_flows&utm_campaign=registered_user_welcome&utm_term=email_1&utm_content=20211026

[4] USA State Department, 2021, https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-china/

[5] Black Hawk Down, 2001, https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0265086/

[6] Franklyn, J. (1997), Cuba and the United States: a chronological history

[7] Madsen, W. (2013). National Security Agency surveillance: Reflections and revelations 2001-2013