Angola and the New Post-International Order (of Trump and others)

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1-For decades, there have been calls for a New World Order. Generally, these calls came from the so-called Third World countries at the time, and from left-wing intellectuals and ideologues who wanted a fairer, more united world, without so many financial rules and not based on the dictates of US capitalism.[1] In fact, an international order had been established at the Bretton Woods Conference and the San Francisco Conference (both in the United States) to create, respectively, the international financial structure and organizations and the United Nations from 1944/1945, with a view to creating a world in which international law was a reality and international relations were based on rules, the economy on free trade and peace was the ultimate goal of coexistence between peoples.

Despite many bumps in the road, this order based on rules, free trade and a trend towards globalization has endured, if not as a practice, at least as a paradigm or benchmark.

Everything began to change in the 2010s. In a number of countries, leaders with authoritarian tendencies emerged who understood that in order to develop their countries and give them the projection to which their size and history entitled them, they had to break with the internationalist paradigm of 1944/1945 and impose a revision of the world order.

This vision was not the solidarity-based and fair alternative of the past, but a reinvention of the power of the affirmative sovereign state with imperial tendencies that prevailed in the 19th century. A new paradigm of great powers in which the reference is their strength has once again taken shape. It was Putin in Russia, Xi Jinping in China, Modi in India, among others. All of them once again have as their main objective the emergence of their countries as great powers, and are willing to do this through the use of force, not necessarily military force, although in some cases it is also[2]

The United States and the European Union have not reacted to these attempts to change the international paradigm. They have remained complacent in advancing their agendas, which over time have become confused and irrational, mixing millenarian desires with destructive social engineering, betting on societies of leisure and consumption, with no benchmarks. Western electorates are beginning to react to the dysfunction of policies with their needs, and the extreme right is emerging in force in Europe and Trump in the United States. Trump’s first term could have been a blip. It wasn’t. His election in 2024 was the catalyst moment for the death of the international paradigm.

International relations can no longer be thought of as based on law, rules, respecting agreements or established facts. Alliances will change, countries’ interests and identities will be strengthened. Force will play a key role in re-establishing an international paradigm. Trump is leading the American reaction to this “death” of the 1944/1945 international system. And he is taking on board the new signs, already enunciated by Putin and Xi Jinping: international treaties are no longer relevant, alliances are changing, borders are not sacred, countries are not equal, democracy and free trade are not the only possible systems and certainly do not represent the end of history. Trump doesn’t hesitate to claim Greenland, Panama and even Canada. Just as Putin has already taken Crimea and is trying to take back Ukraine. When it will be Taiwan’s and China’s turn is unknown, but it all depends on calculations of strength and probability. This is the post-international system.

The European Union, also an essentially American creation in the post-war period, within the system devised for peace and prosperity by Acheson and Marshall, among others, did not understand the historical movements and above all did not understand from President Obama’s mandate onwards that it was no longer an American priority. Now, its creator (the USA) has withdrawn its support. It has to live for itself. It’s a dysfunctional structure with no unambiguous decision-making power in which countries with different interests live. The old European powers, Germany, France, the United Kingdom and perhaps Spain and Italy, will probably have to take over the running of affairs in an articulated way, but in which the national interest takes precedence, in order to reorient Europe.

2-Of course, this radical change in the international paradigm has very important implications for Africa, which are already being felt, and for Angola, which are not yet particularly visible, but will soon become so.

Recently, Africa seems to have returned to the 19th century and the time of the “race to Africa”. Its natural resources, its strategic position in the Global South, its demography, which is a sign of vitality for the future but also a threat of migration to Europe, and the persistent fragility of its institutions, have once again made the continent the target of interest and intervention by various external countries. Russia has set its sights on creating a belt of countries aligned in the Sahel, signing several military agreements, pushing ahead with the so-called Africa Corps (formerly Wagner) and planning to set up nuclear power plants with several African countries. It is possibly the most active power in Africa at the moment.[3] China is always more discreet, but its economic influence is growing and it is an essential partner for many African governments. Little is decided in Africa without China. As someone quoted a Vietnamese saying, China is “an oil slick that spreads without anyone noticing, but sticks to your feet[4] “. Other countries such as Turkey and the Persian Gulf countries are also making rapid strides in Africa, as is India, albeit more slowly.

The European Union has strong relations with Africa, it has several programs and realizes the importance of Africa, but it hesitates, between the problems that migration brings and the regulations it imposes on its companies, it drags its feet, without a defined strategy for Africa, it realizes that it is important, but it prevaricates. France used to dominate African affairs. It is now clearly losing its influence. The European decolonization complex also contributes to its ambiguous attitude[5] . Europe has the know-how and the funding, but it doesn’t leverage it enough

The United States seemed to realize what was happening with the Biden administration. They created a consistent strategy, returned to Africa, were developing projects and pairing up with the European Union, taking it out of its hesitations. Everything went downhill with Trump’s new mandate. The US has become absent, there is an American absenteeism in Africa.[6] Trump hadn’t even managed to get the African team set up by the end of March.

3-There have already been consequences of this new post-international paradigm in Africa, with an impact on Angola. The major advance by the combined forces of M23 and Rwanda to conquer Goma and Kivu in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), creating a clearly relevant intervention zone, took place after Trump took office, cementing the idea that the international order has changed and borders can be changed. The same effect may have been at the origin of the fact that Tshisekedi and Kagame left Angolan mediation to resolve their dispute and went to Qatar. Angola had the US as a support in this negotiation, which gave it negotiating strength. With Trump’s absenteeism, that Angolan advantage no longer exists – at least for now – and there is a strange appetite for holding talks in the Gulf countries. The war in eastern Congo is in danger of becoming even bigger. The American attitude is having effects that could be dramatic .[7]

In this sense, it must be emphasized that all of this has consequences for Angola. In the Second Congo War, Kagame was defeated with the Angolan contribution, and therefore has a “score to settle” with Angola. M23 won’t stop there and the Islamic Republic of East Africa is putting pressure on Cabo Delgado and possibly, according to some analysts, is already in Angola.[8]

In fact, the disruption of the international order and Trump’s absenteeism, which as we have seen is already having consequences in the DRC and the possible spread of Islam, have consequences for Angola, some at a political level and others at a security level.

On a political level, it is clear that the choices and adoption of democratic governance processes are strictly an Angolan matter. It is not and will not be the international community that imposes any political model. Clearly, the time of the end of history described by Francis Kukuyama[9] as democracy and a free economy is no more. Each country is left to its own devices. In fact, the very extinction of the Voice of America, which propagated these goals throughout the world, is the greatest example of this end. Don’t expect outside intervention in any way in the Angolan general elections in 2027. Those appeals to the international community no longer make any sense.

However, it is at the level of sovereignty, border definition and security that the greatest challenges for Angola arise in this new post-international order. A revisionist process of borders in Africa is underway. As we know, the borders in Africa after independence were largely inherited from the colonial period. During the Berlin Conference (1884-1885), the European powers divided the African continent among themselves, often ignoring local cultural, ethnic and geographical realities.

After independence, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) adopted the principle of uti possidetis juris, which stated that colonial borders should be maintained to avoid territorial conflicts. Over the years, there have only been two successful attempts to redefine borders, the creation of Eritrea in 1993 and South Sudan in 2011.

However, this principle of border stability is now being called into question. The M23 incursion with the support of Rwanda may want to establish new borders in the area. This will no longer depend on international law, but on force.

As a result, Angola’s borders are under threat, the call for secession of territories (Cabinda; Lundas?) will become stronger and the validity of the OAU declaration will be called into question. At the same time, migration caused by changes in other countries (DRC, for example) will put pressure on Angola’s borders. It is clear that this is also a time of threat to any country, by another that feels stronger, or that wants to sow instability as may be the case with Rwanda in relation to Angola or any Islamic republic proclaiming .[10]

In this sense, it would be useful for Angolan security to think about creating external perimeters as buffers to stabilize and maintain territory, especially in the event of serious upheaval in DRC territory, from the most sensitive areas, such as Cabinda and the Lundas, huge border lines with potential sources of danger.

The ongoing redefinition of the international system will inevitably lead Angola to a need to strengthen its internal unity and possibly to increase (and revise) its national security doctrine in order to combat threats to the stability of the state and its borders. 

[1] For example, Antônio Carlos Wolkmer, 1989, The third world and the new international order

[2] Michael Kimmage, (2025) The World Trump Wants, Foreign Affairs. March/April 2025, Vol.104. N.2.

[3] Eugénio Costa Almeida, speech at the CEDESA dinner-debate on March 25, 2025.

[4] Maria José de Melo, IDEM above.

[5] IDEM.

[6] Rui Verde, speech at the CEDESA dinner-debate on March 25, 2025.

[7] IDEM

[8] Eugénio Costa Almeida, cit.

[9] Francis Fukuyama, 1992, The End of History and the Last Man,

[10] Eugénio Costa Almeida, IDEM.

CEDESA dinner on March 25, 2025

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Trump and Africa: Victory for China and Russia?

The Dinner-Debate included in CEDESA’s celebrations of the 50th anniversary of Angola’s Independence took place on March 25 at the Pestana Palace in Lisbon, with the theme Trump and Africa: Victory for China and Russia?

In attendance were academics, journalists and businesspeople with links to Angola, a diverse group of personalities who debated the topic in a lively and free manner, without factionalism and in a constructive way.

We had a former PSD deputy-coordinator of the Assembly of the Republic’s Foreign Affairs Committee who moderated the debate, journalists from LUSA, Jornal de Negócios, Correio da Manhã, DW and RTP Africa, and professors from Portuguese and foreign universities.

There was a great deal of interest in the topic, highlighting the intensification of Russia’s efforts to establish itself in Africa through military agreements, the constant and pragmatic presence of China, new players such as India and Turkey, the possibilities opening up for the European Union, and the absenteeism of the US, which has already led to an increase in conflicts in Africa. The African situation is unstable, borders can change and wars can spread. These were the main conclusions.

Attendance was richer and more relevant.

Angolan economy: time for accelerated reforms

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1-The International Monetary Fund’s report on Angola (Feb.2025)

None of the IMF’s various interventions in Angola have succeeded in changing the country’s economic structure and helping to launch it on a path of development, demonstrating the fragility of the IMF’s models of action in Africa.[1]

When the IMF comes up with equivocal results, it uses ambiguous communiqués that allow for different interpretations and, of course, disempower the institution. This is the case with the organization’s most recent statement on Angola, which is a real exercise in ambivalence.

However, despite this, or above all because of it, this communiqué[2] is a valuable tool from which to draw some conclusions and clues for the future of the Angolan economy, essentially the need for effective and real acceleration of economic reform in the direction of competition, productivity and radical modification of the financial functioning of the state.

On February 24, 2025, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded its Article IV consultation on Angola. It then issued a communiqué, which has now been made public.

 On a positive note, the IMF points out that Angola’s economy recovered in 2024, mainly due to the oil sector. GDP growth is estimated to have reached 3.8 percent, exceeding previous projections, although this growth has been extended to the non-oil sector. The public debt/GDP ratio fell in 2024, benefiting from higher nominal GDP growth and sustained primary fiscal surpluses. This is the good news: the economy is growing due to the oil sector, while at the same time having a spill over effect on the other sectors.

Fig. 1- Evolution of Angola’s real economy as a percentage. Source: IMF 2025

At the same time, the IMF is cautious and somewhat frightened by a number of problems:

-General State Budget (public accounts) slippage due to higher capital expenditure and delay in removing the fuel subsidy.

-High inflation due to exchange rate pressures and food prices.

-Adverse market expectations and a high external debt service put great pressure on the value of the Angolan currency.

Due to the imminent dangers, the IMF “invites” the Angolan Executive to accelerate structural reforms of the economy, in which it emphasizes fiscal consolidation (cutting public spending or increasing taxes), the withdrawal of fuel subsidies, rationalizing public investment and improving the efficiency of spending, strengthening the management of public finances, including the public procurement framework and reforms of public companies. It also reaffirms the need for monetary policy to maintain a restrictive bias to ensure lasting disinflation.

The main emphasis, according to the IMF, should be on pro-market policies aimed at simplifying business regulation, strengthening governance, fighting corruption, developing human capital and deepening financial inclusion. Greater statistical capacity is also needed to support sound policymaking.

2-Beyond the IMF. The necessary reforms

The IMF communiqué itself contains contradictions that show its difficulty in obtaining a realistic view of the Angolan economy. For example, it attributes inflation to the liberalization of the exchange rate and the rise in food prices. Let’s remember that it was the IMF that recommended the abrupt adoption of a totally flexible exchange rate, without noticing that a good part of Angolan food was imported…so it’s an IMF policy that according to the IMF itself generates inflation….

However, further down he talks about the need for a restrictive monetary policy, which is obviously Angola’s major problem and the ultimate source of all inflation, the lax attitude of the BNA which lives with negative reference interest rates in real terms (BNA reference interest rate, 19.5% for inflation of 26.48%) and has difficulties controlling the money supply .[3]

Fig. 2-Development of monetary aggregates as a percentage/end of period. Source: IMF, 2025

Also surprising is the obsession with fuel subsidies, since it is clear that withdrawing them will generate even stronger inflationary pressures and possible social upheaval.

Even the warning about budget slippage seems out of context. If you look, the balance for Angola’s General State Budget (GSB) for 2025 is -1.3% of GDP, nothing significant. In fact, Angola doesn’t need less spending or austerity; on the contrary, it needs more effective spending.

Fig. nº 3- Overall Budget Balance, percentage of GDP. Source: IMF, 2025

The problems of the Angolan economy do not lie along these lines, but along others that the IMF also addresses, but does not highlight.

  • The first problem facing the Angolan economy is that of rationalizing public spending. Much of the expenditure is uncontrolled, its destination is unknown, it is the result of over-invoicing, corrupt schemes, endogenous bargaining[4] . Much more than in the United States of America, it is in Angola that a programme like that of Elon Musk and his DOGE (Department of Government Efficiency) would be essential in order to reduce bureaucracy and optimize Angola’s public machine by cutting phantom and invented spending and reformulating government agencies.
  • In terms of public procurement, it is essential to introduce competition mechanisms. If, perhaps, public tendering is time-consuming and an obstacle to development, allow simplified contracting, but with competition, perhaps through auctions or electronic mechanisms, thoroughly reviewing the current contracting law, which is bureaucratic, slow and unenforceable.
  • Another important aspect is the renegotiation of the foreign debt. You can’t keep paying billions in capital every year, with the opportunity cost being Angolan development. Paying off the foreign debt under the terms in which it is being paid is an obstacle to the country’s growth.
  • Domestically, the private economy needs to be stimulated, creating the pro-market conditions that the IMF talks about, with a major effort to reduce bureaucracy, freedom to set up companies, boosting bank credit, depoliticizing the business community and some protectionism for Angola’s infant industries. An internal free market with external protection must be the recipe for the initial years.
  • We also need to understand the profitability of the large state-owned companies, Sonangol, TAAG, among others, by promoting efficiency in their management and privatizing at least 1/3 of their capital

Even now, Sonangol’s current income statement presents more doubts than certainties: Sonangol ended 2024 with a debt of 4.5 billion dollars, representing an increase of 15.4% on the previous year. At the same time, revenues fell to 10 billion euros last year, a drop of 8.6% in the space of a year. EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization) also fell by 8.8% year-on-year to 3.2 billion euros[5] . Let’s be clear, these results are not good. It’s not the catastrophe of 2015, but it’s not very encouraging.

 The efficiency of companies can be optimized through partial privatization, since management with private partners tends to be more agile and focused on results, possibly encouraging innovation in mixed companies. The introduction of competing visions (state and private) can lead to cost savings and the elimination of unnecessary bureaucracy. Similarly, selling off parts of state-owned companies can generate revenue for the government, easing budget constraints and reducing the need for public funding. Partial privatization can lead to improvements in the quality of services, as private entities focus on customer satisfaction. Finally, mixed companies will have greater flexibility to adapt quickly to market demands.

Essentially:

  1. The state’s financial function will have to be completely restructured, in terms of spending, debt and hiring, possibly by creating an efficiency department like Elon Musk’s in the US.
  2. Introducing a free market in Angola with perfect independence for entrepreneurs to create and manage their companies without bureaucracy and interference from the state and the creation of mechanisms to bring them capital (banks, stock exchanges, venture capital, funds and autonomous state partnerships).
  3. Privatize up to 1/3 of the capital of large state-owned companies, including Sonangol.

All these reforms should be speeded up in the two and a half years that remain before President João Lourenço finishes his term in office.

[1] Cfr. https://actionaid.

[2] See https://www.imf.org/en/Ne

[3] https://www.makaangola.org/2024/03/bna-o-culpado-da-inflacao-em-angola/

[4] A recent example of pure waste: https://www.makaangola.org/2025/02/os-consumiveis-do-saque-no-kuando-kubango/

[5] https://www.jornaldenegocios.pt/economia/mundo/africa/detalhe/sonangol-ve-divida-aumentar-para-43-mil-milhoes-em-2024

THE DINOSAUR’S LEAP – New technologies and good governance

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Rui Verde

Communication to the National Conference on Good Governance

Organization of the General Inspectorate of State Administration

Luanda

January 15th, 2025

The big question facing Angola’s governance, like that of many countries that feel they have the capacity to do much better, have ample natural resources and a young, active and impatient population, is the question of the leap. How can we leapfrog quickly to become a developed, prosperous and fair country for all?

In the early studies of economics, there was a fundamental author, Alfred Marshall, whose book Principles of Economy was the basis of knowledge of neoclassical economics. At the opening of the book, Marshall had inscribed the old saying Natura non facit saltus (nature does not jump). With this, Marshall, following Leibniz and Darwin, expressed the idea that things and natural properties change gradually, not suddenly. This meant that long leaps were not possible, only gradual evolution.

However, Stephen Jay Gould, an American paleontologist and historian of science, has shown that the evolution of nature is not exactly like that, presenting the so-called punctuated equilibrium theory. The theory proposes that most of evolution is characterized by long periods of evolutionary stability, punctuated by rapid periods of speciation, of abrupt jumps. The theory contrasted with gradualism, the popular idea that evolutionary change is marked by a pattern of smooth, continuous change in the fossil record. In short, Gould proved that dinosaurs also jump.

As far as a country’s development is concerned, a good hypothesis is that the impetus for this leap will be provided by good governance combined with the intelligent exploitation of new technologies.

Good governance is an expression in which the advice uti, non abuti (use, don’t abuse) must prevail, lest it become an empty and inexpressive concept. For example, looking at the Mo Ibrahim Foundation’s Good Governance Index, we see that Good Governance for them includes security and the rule of law, participation, rights and inclusion, economic opportunities and human development. In turn, these categories are subdivided into subcategories. It’s an interesting exercise, but at the end of the day impossible, giving reason to Camões’ verses “the whole world I embrace and nothing I squeeze.”

The generosity of concepts is at the root of their ineffectiveness. It’s not important to include everything in Good Governance, only to end up with nothing but good intentions. It is therefore better to limit Good Governance to two aspects that have always been required of rulers, whether they were emperors, kings, presidents, chancellors or anyone else. Effectiveness in meeting the country’s needs at each moment of the historical process and popular consent. Effectiveness and consent are the foundations of good governance. The ruler must have the ability to produce the desired effect or an expected result. In simpler terms, they must be able to achieve the objectives demanded of them by the historical situation. These objectives are defined widely and spontaneously by the political community, including the manifestos of the winning parties, the speeches or proclamations of the head of state, the consensus opinion emerging from public opinion, the feeling of the population measured by polls. And what is important in one space and time may not be in another.

However, this effectiveness and the objectives to be achieved are subject to the need for governance to have popular consent. Popular consent refers to the general acceptance or support of the population for a decision, policy or ruler. Popular consent does not necessarily imply the democratic model as it is currently followed; it can be that or any other model through which there is the necessary sensitivity and adequate communication channels between the people and the ruler.

It is very important to define good governance in order to avoid a vacuum.

As for new technologies, they can play a major role. But first we must always draw attention to the dangers that Jamie Susskind invokes in his book The Digital Republic: digital systems are based on rules written by people who, by creating certain non-unionizable algorithms, are left with enormous uncontrolled power. What seems neutral and technical is ultimately political and moral. Having emphasized this point, let’s look at some examples of a virtuous link between good governance and new technologies.

In the UN Indexes, Estonia usually appears as the most advanced country in the world in terms of e-government. There have been several reports of trips by the Minister of State and Civil House, Dr. Adão de Almeida, to Estonia. Thus, the country and its practices are already well known in Angola, so I won’t be redundant, just focusing on the points that seem most salient.

The widespread use of new technologies has resulted first and foremost from investments in infrastructure and cutting-edge technologies such as artificial intelligence, cloud computing and broadband.  At the same time, Estonia is home to 10 unicorns and produces 10 times more start-ups per capita than the European average. Estonian ICT companies have helped build the world’s most advanced digital society

Therefore, we have a virtuous set-up that allows the use of new technologies for good governance: investment in artificial intelligence, cloud computing and broadband complemented by the freedom and promotion of the creation of cutting-edge technological companies.

There is thus a state-private sector partnership for the digitization and implementation of new technologies. The state doesn’t have the capacity to do everything, nor do the private sector.

Specifically, 99% of all public services are accessible online.  A total of 88% of households have Internet capacity, and Wi-Fi connections are also available in more than 1100 public places, including all schools. In Estonia, 88% of the population aged between 16 and 74 use the Internet and these citizens regularly use electronic services. More than 95% of income tax returns were filed via the e-Tax Board in 2022, while almost all (more than 99%) banking transactions are carried out via the Internet.

All residents have an Estonian eID card, which acts as a digital identity card and is a physical identity document and, in the European Union, also a travel document.

An entrepreneur can even set up a company in Estonia directly from their personal device. The e-Business portal registration for setting up and registering a company can take as little as 18 minutes.

Politics is also a digital activity. Since 2005, everyone in Estonia has been able to vote electronically via the Internet, using an ID card or mobile ID, from home or even while traveling abroad.

In addition to the aforementioned investments and the creation of an entrepreneurial ecosystem centered on new technologies, there are two fundamental basic themes without which the use of new technologies for good governance is not possible. The first, which we won’t focus on here, is reforming the public administration, cutting red tape and making it a structure that serves the citizen. Efficient public administrations meet the needs of citizens and businesses. It is essential that public authorities are able to adapt to new circumstances.

In this sense, in Angola I have to mention the websites I use most often and which generally live up to expectations. One is the website of the Ministry of Finance. Especially with regard to the State Budget, it is very complete, accessible, easy to access and understand. The reports, tables and figures are organized and easy to understand.

Two others that have seen substantial improvements are the websites of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. However, in order to make it easier for the researcher, the published judgments should have a short summary, preferably by the reporting judge, accompanied by keywords. The way they are now, it’s almost impossible to do a jurisprudential analysis. Out of curiosity, I see that the latest ruling published in the Constitutional Court (at the time of writing) already has the object mentioned. Perhaps this heralds a good development.

The other fundamental theme, which constitutes a Hegelian synthesis of good governance and new technologies, is education. Without education, it is not possible to use new technologies as has been done in Estonia, and on the other hand, education can be one of the greatest beneficiaries of new technologies and a concrete application of good governance.

Education is the key and the result of the excellent use of new technologies by a well-governed country.

Everyone recognizes that there is a deficit in basic education in Angola. There are said to be 5 million children outside the education system. The seriousness of the issue cannot be overstated, but it is also clear that there are no means of reproducing the current system based on more physical schools and more teachers. The numbers are immense and impossible. That’s why it’s essential to change the paradigm, giving up the abstraction and generalization that laws impose by becoming impractical, and looking for differentiated, diverse and innovative solutions. Schools cannot still be thought of according to the Prussian-industrial model, with a law that regulates everything in the same way and which only allows for the repetition of a school model over and over again. It’s a recipe for failure.

In an ideal world, elementary school teachers in Angola would all be well trained, highly motivated and dreaming of vibrant lessons. In reality, this possibility is not feasible. That’s why radical solutions are needed to reach as many students as possible on a consistent basis.

First of all, we need to distinguish between places with access to networks and internet communications systems and those without. It is for the latter that physical investment should be focused, constructing buildings and training teachers. For places with network access, in addition to the physical structures already in place, the learning model must be radically different. The teacher will above all be a facilitator who will transmit well-prepared lessons written by a central team and sent to them on electronic tablets. The instructions define exactly what to write on the board and even when to walk through the presentation. Equally detailed plans determine the daily checks that directors must carry out to ensure that their team is up to date. What this facilitator has to know is how to use electronic media, read and transmit. In essence, he or she will act as a terminal on an electronic line, disseminating its content to a myriad of students.

A study carried out in Kenya by Michael Kremer, Nobel Prize-winning economist (2019), and colleagues from four American universities – – followed more than 10,000 children who applied for free places at schools that adopted these methods. After two years, it turned out that the children had learned much more than those who went to traditional schools.

The great advantage of the method is its low cost, which allows more children to learn. As has been said, the teachers are facilitators, so they can only have secondary education, which would greatly boost much-needed youth employment.

It’s clear that the standardized digital system can be criticized for many things, including the promotion of mechanical learning, the social devaluation of the teacher’s role, and the lack of elasticity in knowledge. That’s true. But it has a fundamental advantage: it allows a much greater coverage of students at a lower cost and will introduce them to digital media immediately.

It’s much more important to give all children basic knowledge tools, even if they’re not ideal, even if there are different systems, even if some have teachers and schools and others tablets and facilitators, than to leave millions with nothing.

This is the real choice.

It ends as it began. Angola can make the leap from the dinosaur. It just needs to use new technologies intelligently and locally to ensure good governance.

IV INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF ANGOLANISTICS

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CALL FOR PAPERS

This year, 2025, marks the half-century of independent Angola. Fifty years of sometimes divergent paths, continuities and ruptures, and almost always difficult choices.

Fifty years doesn’t sound like much, but it was a very rich period in the history of Africa and the world, which saw unpredictable changes in 1975, including the fall of the so-called Eastern Bloc, the transformation of China into a global power, the creation of a European bloc, the strengthening of the African Union and many others.

The Angola Research Network(https://www.angolaresearchnetwork.org/) invites all Angolanists, members and non-members of our Network, to submit proposals for papers and panels for the IV International Congress of Angolanistics, to be held in Lisbon on June 18, 2025 at National Library of Portugal facilities.

The call will be open between January 15 and March 15, 2025.

As usual, the Congress will cover a broad spectrum of interests served by a wide range of perspectives and methodologies from history and the social, political and legal sciences, the humanities, the arts and music, the cultures of the Angolan diaspora and international relations and regional integration (Great Lakes and SADC).

Multidisciplinary proposals, with perspectives that cut across different fields of knowledge, and inter-arts proposals will be particularly welcome.

Those interested should send a reasoned proposal of no more than 250 words, accompanied by a short academic biography (no more than 100 words), email address, if possible, and contact telephone number with WhatsApp.

All correspondence should be sent to the following email address:

angolaresearchnetwork@gmail.com

Co-organizers: Filipe Santos and Rui Verde

The impossible peace in eastern Congo and Rwanda’s economic interests

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1-Summary of the situation in eastern Congo. The role of M23 and Rwanda

There is an unknown or ignored war in eastern Congo that could, in the medium term, have very significant impacts on the whole policy of energy transition and the use of new technologies around the world. It is already having a devastating effect in the area. The Guardian, in a very recent report in which the issue is finally addressed, presents accounts of victims of unthinkable violence that paint a macabre picture of the brutality sweeping the central African country [Democratic Republic of Congo – DRC] and asks: “How long is the West prepared to look away?”[1]

Angola and President João Lourenço have been committed to preventing an escalation of violence and guaranteeing peace. Although Angolan mediation has prevented a total and direct confrontation between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda, it has not succeeded in bringing peace.

M23 plays an important role in this whole process. The M23 rebel group gained notoriety about a decade ago when its fighters took over the city of Goma, the largest in eastern Congo. The name “M23” comes from the peace agreement of March 23, 2009, which they accuse the Congolese government of not implementing properly. In recent years, M23 has resurfaced and intensified its activities, capturing strategic territories and causing massive displacement of civilians. The group’s violence has led to a serious humanitarian crisis, with thousands of people being forced from their homes and living in precarious conditions.[2]

The situation is complicated by the support M23 receives from Rwanda, which has generated regional tensions and hampered peace efforts. The Congolese government, led by President Félix Tshisekedi, has refused to negotiate directly with the M23, branding the group a terrorist group and blaming it for immense suffering and the violation of national sovereignty.

The reality is that Rwanda is deeply involved in promoting M23 activities in the DRC. This has already been proven by several UN reports, the latest of which was presented in July 2024[3] . Rwandan troops are operating undisguised in eastern Congolese territory, in full combat gear. Drone images confirm columns of its troops in the DRC. Around 4,000 Rwanda Defense Force (RDF) troops are in Congo supporting M23.

It is assumed that there is a political objective on the part of Rwanda, which is to obtain part of this territory for itself. First, it destabilizes, then it takes factual control and at a later stage detaches that territory from the DRC and makes it a protectorate, buffer state or even an integral part of Rwanda. Admittedly, it uses the Russian techniques that led to the annexation of Crimea.

In addition, many sectors of the US believe that the DRC is too big to be governed efficiently from Kinshasa, and there is some sympathy for a division of the country, as has been done in South Sudan, where the rich part secedes. The author of this report took part in a meeting at Chatham House in which this American position was developed and discussed, without any conclusions, but it remains in the air…. is a working hypothesis.

Incidentally, Rwanda enjoys the support, or at least the benevolence, of many Western powers. The EU is afraid of disrupting the supply chain if it sanctions Rwanda. The EU is currently discussing a controversial strategic minerals agreement with Rwanda. Critics warn that the agreement risks legitimizing the smuggling of conflict minerals from the DRC. In addition, Rwanda “controls” the West by “leveraging” its role as the third largest contributor to UN peace missions. Diplomatic sources claim that Kigali has threatened to withdraw peacekeeping troops if serious sanctions are applied. Rwanda courts Washington with its donor image darling, an image reinforced by the hiring of PR firms and lobbyists in the US and the UK[4] . France, one of the biggest bilateral donors to Rwanda, is another country that some believe is very close to Kagame (President of Rwanda). Sources point to the deployment of Rwandan troops to protect French-owned gas installations in Mozambique, which creates “solid leverage over Paris”. None of these assertions are straightforward, but only show some of the ambiguity that may underlie the West’s actions towards the east of the DRC and the conflict there.

2-The fundamental question of economic interests

Despite Rwanda’s political objectives, linked to projecting the country’s power, prestige and fighting the opposition forces in the DRC, there is one key fact that whets Rwanda’s interest and is probably linked to its survival as a viable and sustainable country with high growth rates.

The latest IMF report[5] sheds light behind the technical language on some of the paradoxes affecting Rwanda in economic and financial terms. From a structural point of view, Rwanda’s economy is fragile and subject to permanent shocks. The Rwandan government itself recognizes that the political space it has to move forward with its development objectives is limited due to recurring and overlapping shocks. From 2015 to 2023, public debt almost doubled to 73.5% of GDP, due to spending to support the development agenda, mitigate the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic and the May 2023 floods. Headwinds from growing geopolitical fragmentation, tightening global financial conditions and consecutive poor agricultural seasons, mainly due to adverse weather conditions, have put pressure on the level of international reserves. The devastating floods of May 2023 have further widened the underlying imbalances, with reconstruction costs projected at around $451 million (3% of GDP) over the 2023-2028 period. The recent outbreak of Marburg virus disease (MVD) puts further pressure on fiscal balances and the health system. Balance of payments pressures remain significant amid prolonged weakness in export performance and high imports of capital and consumer goods.

However, while facing these problems, Rwanda’s economy is growing at a remarkable rate: 8.2% in 2023, 8.3% in 2024 and a forecast of 7% for 2025. These are enviable GDP growth rates. Consequently, the structural weaknesses mentioned above are not reflected in the very high GDP growth rates.

What is beginning to emerge is the role that the area “invaded” by the DRC’s M23 has for Rwanda in sustaining economic growth.

In 2021, official US data showed that Rwanda provided 15% of the global supply of tantalum, a derivative of coltan ore, despite the fact that Rwanda produces only modest amounts of tantalum in its own mines. The US buys tantalum from Rwanda worth 36% of its (US) total imports – the highest among global producers – compared to just 7% from the DRC, which is bizarre given that tantalum exists in abundance in the DRC and not in Rwanda.

In March 2023, the DRC’s finance minister, Nicolas Kazadi, claimed that his country was losing almost $1 billion a year in minerals smuggled illegally into Rwanda. The minister said that Rwanda exported nearly $1 billion worth of gold, tin, tantalum and tungsten in 2022, even though the country (Rwanda) has few mineral deposits of its own.

According to a report by AMSTERDAM & PARTNERS LLP, a Washington DC law firm[6] , used by the DRC government to sue Apple urging it to stop using materials from the conflict zone, Rwanda uses an international network of elite entities to help smuggle, sell and profit from DRC minerals that are transported along militarized trade routes. Kigali allegedly received institutional cover to market these minerals with the help of an industry-led compliance scheme and companies such as AVX Corporation, KEMET Corporation and Global Advanced Metals that manufacture electronic components; these companies would, according to the same report, legitimize the smuggling by knowingly buying minerals “laundered” by Rwanda. The report gives examples of various cases and concrete situations of action within the DRC and later in Rwanda, highlighting the various actors involved.

There may have been a deliberate context of war provoked by Rwanda in order to make economic gains by “laundering” large quantities of tin, tungsten, tantalum and gold from the DRC.

3-The fragility and corruption of the RDC

The fragility of the state and corruption in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are critical issues that profoundly affect the country’s development and stability, and above all its ability to react to problems in the east, and which prevent any solution from being limited to supporting the DRC. Political institutions in the DRC are often perceived as weak and ineffective, which compromises good governance and the implementation of public policies. In the case of the Armed Forces, where budget spending is increasing exponentially, there is a belief that much of this spending does not go towards training and equipping soldiers[7] , but is instead diverted by those in charge and intermediaries, leaving the army ineffective, coupled with a lack of unified command in the combat region and an inability to train[8] . To a certain extent, the war has become a lucrative business for Congolese leaders, both through the purchase of arms and the hiring of mercenaries.

The President of the Republic Tshisekedi himself and his family are accused of being more committed to increasing their fortunes than to running the country rationally.[9]

4. Paradoxes of an impossible peace and the various working hypotheses

Rwanda needs access to minerals from the conflict zone in eastern Congo to sustain its economic growth. The DRC has an inefficient and allegedly corrupt political structure. So, there are no ideal solutions, and one cannot rely too much on the good faith of the contenders. To some extent, they both have an interest in prolonging the conflict, and this will be the essential problem. Any solution will be that of the lesser evil.

As mentioned above, there is always the possibility of the separation/secession of the Eastern zone, creating a new state that would possibly fall under the influence of Rwanda, or at least sign a free trade agreement with Kigali (the capital of Rwanda). Obviously, this solution would not please Kinshasa (capital of the DRC).

There is the possibility of keeping eastern Congo as an integral part of the DRC, but giving it a more autonomous status and allowing the zone to be part of a free trade area or economic integration with Rwanda.

There is yet another hypothesis that would require military intervention by Angola to train and strengthen the DRC army, possibly with the involvement of the United States of America. This hypothesis would have to be accompanied by reform towards good governance in the DRC and some kind of economic agreement with Rwanda, without which no lasting peace can be guaranteed.

[1] https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/dec/21/children-executed-and-women-raped-in-front-of-their-families-as-m23-militia-unleashes-fresh-terror-on-drc

[2] “Tired of this war”: the violence of the M23 group in the Democratic Republic of Congo | World | G1 and Rapid expansion of M23 in DR Congo worries UN mission leader | UN

[3] Final Report of the UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo, https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/118/80/pdf/n2411880.pdf

[4] https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/dec/21/children-executed-and-women-raped-in-front-of-their-families-as-m23-militia-unleashes-fresh-terror-on-drc

[5] IMF Country Report No. 24/341, December 2024, RWANDA December 2024. Fourth review under the policy coordination instrument, second and final review under the stand-by credit facility arrangement, fourth and final review under the arrangement under the resilience and sustainability facility, and request for the modification of end-June 2025 quantitative target for the policy coordination instrument-press release; staff report; and statement by the executive director for Rwanda.

[6] AMSTERDAM & PARTNERS LLP, BLOODMINERALS “everyone sees the massacres in eastern congo.but everyone is silent.” Washington DC| A pril2024 The laundering of drc’s3 t minerals by Rwanda and private entities.

[7] https://www.egmontinstitute.be/corruption-in-the-congolese-army-three-lessons-for-modern-democracies/

[8] https://afridesk.org/rdc-lever-letat-de-siege-au-profit-dune-zone-operationnelle-unique-biprovinciale/

[9]https://thegreatlakeseye.com/post?s=DRC%3A–Unmasking–Tshisekedi%E2%80%99s–failure–to–address–deep-seated–corruption–_1217; https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/jan/02/how-many-more-must-suffer-in-drc-before-the-west-stops-enabling-tshisekedi

CEDESA News

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The Dinner-Debate to mark the 50th anniversary of Angola’s independence, organized jointly by ACNAE and CEDESA, took place on 21 November at the Pestana Palace in Lisbon.

It was attended by academics, journalists and businesspeople with links to Angola, a diverse group of personalities who debated the issue in a lively and free way, without factionalism and in a constructive manner.

We had the CEO of Portugal’s largest chemical company moderating the debate, several former MPs, journalists from LUSA, DN, Jornal de Negócios and TPA, professors from Portuguese and foreign universities.

The Book o Livro de Actas do III Congresso de Angolanística (June 2024) was distributed.

There was a strong interest in Angola.

Attendance was richer and more timely.

Trump’s victory and Angola (quick analysis)

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Donald Trump’s expectations and unpredictability

For any observer of Angolan politics, there seemed to be a certain domestic alignment in terms of sympathies for the American elections. Or to put it more explicitly, a hope on the part of the sectors antagonistic to João Lourenço that Donald Trump would win, in the expectation that he would repeat the policy of his first term of disinterest in Africa and therefore a cooling off towards Angola.

Now that victory has been won, it’s important to try to understand what may or may not happen, given that Angola’s new strategic alignment with the US is at stake, which has, in a way, balanced the balance of power on the African continent and also, specifically, relaunched the Lobito Corridor, a project that President Joe Biden has embraced intensely.

Obviously, before January 20, 2025, everything will be too speculative, and, above all, when it comes to Trump, unpredictability takes center stage.

Even so, there have been enough signs to suggest that Trump’s attitude towards Angola will not be so different from Joe Biden’s policy after all.

China’s competition and containment

The first reason for the policy’s permanence is China. From a geostrategic point of view, the current situation (2024) is extremely different from that of Trump’s first term (2017-2021), particularly with regard to competition or containment of China, which, it should be remembered, was initiated as a structural trend in US foreign policy, precisely by Donald Trump. Trump’s collection of speeches on China during his term “TRUMP ON CHINA – PUTTING AMERICA FIRST” is expressed in his introduction to the statement:

“For decades, Donald J. Trump was one of the few prominent Americans to recognize the true nature of the Chinese Communist Party and its threat to America’s economic and political way of life. Now, under President Trump’s leadership, the United States is taking action to protect our nation and its partners from an increasingly assertive China. We are no longer turning a blind eye to the People’s Republic of China’s conduct nor are we hiding our criticism of its Communist Party behind closed doors.”[1]

It is in this sense that some of Trump’s most prominent collaborators have spoken out. Tibor Nagy, Trump’s former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs and former Ambassador to Guinea and Ethiopia, insists that Trump was the first to raise awareness about the enormous threat that China poses to US interests in Africa, and expressly states: “You will again see an aggressive fight against Chinese influence in Africa “.[2]

Admittedly, the focus of this transactional approach, typical of Trump, will be to start blocking supply chains for essential minerals in Africa used for green energy batteries used in electric vehicles and phones. Thus states Ambassador J. Peter Pham, former US Special Envoy for the Sahel region of Africa under Trump, “There is no denying that access to the many critical minerals that Africa has in great abundance is necessary for the US economy today, as well as for the technologies that will take us into the future,” and “Moreover, the monopolization of supply chains for these strategic resources by any country, let alone a revisionist power like China, is a threat to US security.”

This geostrategic sense of Africa in which Angola fits is reinforced by the so-called Project 2025, a kind of parallel doctrine of Trumpist ideologues, from which he has departed in some respects, but not in relation to Africa. Kiron K. Skinner writes in that document that Africa’s explosive population growth, large reserves of minerals dependent on industry, proximity to the main maritime transportation routes and its collective diplomatic power guarantee the continent’s global importance .[3]

The truth is that one area of the Biden-Harris approach that has not been criticized by Republicans is the Lobito Corridor, the multi-billion dollar logistics and communications infrastructure project that connects the Port of Lobito in Angola to essential mineral mines in Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. American observers of Africa see the project as a model to be built or replicated, mainly with the aim of taking back some control of essential mineral supply chains from China .[4]

Therefore, what emerges from a first analysis of the pronouncements of Trump’s allies and their own interests and stance towards China, is that Angola and its Lobito Corridor occupy a prominent place, and therefore, if Trump’s attention to China is maintained, Africa and especially Angola will be at a higher level of US strategic options, i.e. US interest in Angola will be maintained.

Business opportunities

A second aspect is Trump’s emphasis on numbers and business opportunities. It is likely that this time, thinking about Africa and Angola, he will see figures reflecting the massive movement of young people to the continent and opportunities for American business. It’s no secret that João Lourenço, albeit with modest success, has been trying to open up Angola to world business, making the country an attractive location for foreign investment. It’s a long road. However, Trump may see a market for US exports here, as Biden has already seen in telecommunications and solar energy .[5]

Conclusions

With all the caution that Trump’s unpredictability advises, as well as his previous contempt for the African continent has shown, it should not be anticipated that there will be a cooling in the rapprochement between Angola and the United States after January 20, 2025.

In fact, what has been at stake on the US side is not any friendship or personal relationship between Joe Biden and João Lourenço, but the strategic American interest in counterbalancing China and guaranteeing access to key minerals, as well as the exploitation of profitable businesses for a mature economy like the US.

In these terms, the US will most likely maintain a clear interest in Africa and Angola, unlike what happened in Trump’s first term. What is at stake is a structural trend in US foreign policy, which will depend less on its actors and more on its interests.

[1] https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Trump-on-China-Putting-America-First.pdf

[2] https://www.semafor.com/article/11/01/2024/trumps-africa-plans-take-pragmatic-turn-for-election

[3] https://static.project2025.org/2025_MandateForLeadership_CHAPTER-06.pdf

[4] https://www.semafor.com/article/11/01/2024/trumps-africa-plans-take-pragmatic-turn-for-election

[5] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/what-africa-can-expect-under-a-second-trump-administration-a-focus-on-the-numbers/

Floating exchange rate is a big mistake in Angola

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João Shang– Research Associate at CEDESA / Kwenda Institute principal investigator

What is a floating exchange rate? A floating exchange rate means that the price level of the national currency is determined by the mechanism of supply and demand without interference from the central bank, either locally or in the external environment.

International currencies, such as the US dollar in the United States and the euro in the European Union, are traded through international currency exchanges in a floating system. However, their governments often try to determine currency prices through indirect monetary policy mechanisms in order to obtain economic benefits. For example, the US can only reduce the profits of third countries that use US dollars by raising interest rates.

The National Bank of Angola introduced the new monetary system in 2018. On January 1, 2018, one US dollar was exchanged for 165.92 kwanzas, after the introduction of the floating exchange rate, on December 30, one US dollar was already worth 308 kwanzas. In the last year, the US dollar reached a maximum of 954.50 Angolan Kwanzas per US dollar on October 2, 2024. The minimum rate for the USD/AOA exchange was 827.48 Angolan Kwanzas per US Dollar on October 27, 2023. The general USD/AOA exchange rate has risen by 10% in the last year.

This means that the US Dollar has gained value against the Angolan Kwanza. The Kwanza currency has not been able to stand up to foreign currencies, so it is continuing to depreciate.

As another example, in 2021, the Sudanese Minister of Finance, Gabriel Ibrahim, announced that the Sudanese pound would have a floating exchange rate, one US dollar could be exchanged for 375 Sudanese pounds, whereas before the decision to implement a floating exchange rate, one US dollar could be exchanged for 55 Sudanese pounds. The price increased by 580% for the exchange of Sudanese pounds.

The implementation of floating exchange rates in developing economies can bring risks with unpredictable consequences. Below I will explain the risks of floating exchange rates.

What types of currency fluctuations do they include?

There are two types of exchange rate fluctuation. The first, which we referred to in the definition of exchange rate fluctuation, is absolute fluctuation, and the second is managed fluctuation, i.e. the central bank intervenes to guide the rise in the exchange rate or to target the national economy.

The controlled float is generally implemented by economically stronger countries, which account for a considerable share of international trade, so they tend to adopt this method to increase or decrease the import or export of goods.

In order to maximize exports and reduce imports, the global economy has been experiencing so-called currency wars since the international financial crisis of 2008.

Countries with weak economies can also adopt floating exchange rate systems, but this will cost them enormously. This is exactly the case in Egypt, which depends on foreign investment to support its debt in order to stabilize the exchange rate of the Egyptian pound.

How to set exchange rates?

Since 1971, the world has abandoned the gold standard to set exchange rates and established a basket of currencies to determine exchange rates. Determinants include foreign exchange reserves, gold reserves and the performance of the gross domestic product, the existence of local products with higher added value, thus greatly increasing the value of its currency. This is because external demand for the country’s products increases the country’s foreign exchange reserves, its balance with the outside world.

There are several types of exchange rate. The first is the administrative exchange rate, which does not depend on the mechanism of supply and demand, but depends on the monetary authority’s decision to set the exchange rate. The second type is the free exchange rate.

The third is the managed exchange rate, i.e. the monetary authority intervenes through the open market mechanism to set the exchange rate. This means that the monetary authority intervenes in the buying and selling of currency to achieve a price it believes to be balanced.

What do its negative effects include?

The decision to float a currency during a period of economic turmoil usually has a series of negative consequences for the economy and society, the most common of which is high inflation. External markets will also be affected because the external debt that the country needs to pay increases, especially when they are short of foreign currency resources.

Floating exchange rates help stop money laundering crimes？ Who benefits?

The biggest beneficiaries of a floating exchange rate are those who had savings in foreign currency.

The second is for debtors, especially those who owe banks and official financial institutions, as they will be able to pay off their debts for less than the real value of the debts they have received and will be able to pay off large debts by selling some of their assets.

The third are the big traders, the so-called wholesalers, agents or big importers.

The fourth is producers of raw materials for export, whose production depends on local supply, but only if they have high production flexibility to meet the demand for local products after the exchange rate fluctuates. After implementing a float, they can take advantage of the currency devaluation to obtain larger quantities of local products that they need in the production of goods for export.

The fifth biggest beneficiary is the government, which reduces the burden on the country’s general budget by significantly devaluing its domestic debt.

Who will suffer?

In countries that adopt floating exchange rate policies, some people will also suffer losses, led by those who hold savings in local currency – their savings will devalue due to the reduction in the currency’s purchasing power. After the implementation of the floating exchange rate, this group of people will lose a large part of their wealth.

The second is creditors denominated in local currency, because the value of the debt they service is lower than the original value after the implementation of the flotation, so the gains they receive cannot compensate for this loss. In these cases, the long-term debt is considered a significant loss for the creditors.

The third are holders of goods that cannot increase their price according to the extent of currency depreciation, such as those who have real estate as an asset. It is difficult for these commodities to increase their prices by 100% in a few days, the market would face a severe recession.

The fourth is importers, who will be faced with high bills for the goods they import, while producers who depend on imported production supplies will also suffer because they are forced to increase the price of their products.

The price of foreign currency is increasing at such a rate that their products are not competitive on the local market or on the international market, so with the implementation of currency fluctuation, industrial activity will decrease, while commercial and service activities will increase.

The fifth largest group to suffer losses are employees on fixed incomes, because their salaries cannot be increased to the same extent as the depreciation of the currency, their salaries by 50% or 100%. So what should we do if a situation like Sudan’s occurs, where a floating exchange rate causes the currency to depreciate by more than 580%?

What are the advantages of floating exchange rates?

The implementation of floating exchange rates in developing economies can bring risks of unpredictable consequences, especially in countries with weak political institutions, a lack of transparency and fragile rule of law.

However, from an economic perspective, a number of positive effects can be achieved through the implementation of the floating exchange rate process, the most important of which is the elimination of the black market, since traders will receive a single rate for foreign currency within banks and all other institutions.

In theory, floating exchange rates can help suppress money laundering crimes, because money laundering crimes are an important way of committing crimes on the parallel or black market exchange rates. In the case of floating exchange rates, foreign exchange transactions can only be carried out through official channels, channels that money laundering gangs cannot use.

But in reality, the floating exchange rate failed to prevent money laundering, which is why on October 25, 2024, the Financial Action Task Force announced that it had placed Angola on the institution’s gray list for money laundering, terrorist financing and arms proliferation.

At the same time, the floating exchange rate in Angola has also caused serious foreign exchange illiquidity, with domestic and foreign entrepreneurs unable to send foreign currency abroad to buy goods, and having to use the informal market to keep their businesses afloat.

When they don’t send the money abroad to buy new goods, domestic consumer prices rise sharply. This situation has been going on for a long time in Angola. The main reason is that the Kwanza is a weak currency against Western currencies, which is why since the introduction of the floating exchange rate in 2018 the Kwanza has been devaluing and never stops. Canceling this floating exchange rate system is a priority.

China’s new strategy for Angola

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João Shang – Research Associate at CEDESA (China-Africa area)

In November 2010, China and Angola established a strategic partnership.

On March 15, 2024, the two heads of state (Xi Jinping and João Lourenço) announced that they would improve China-Angola relations by promoting a comprehensive strategic partnership.

Despite some problems, relations between Angola and China have always evolved positively. Since 2002, political cooperation and trade between the two countries have reached their peak. But in the case of cooperation and exchange in the area of culture and education, there is still a need to work together.

In the 41 years since diplomatic relations were established, the relationship between the two countries has become an example of friendly South-South cooperation. The deep China-Angola friendship has its origins in the arduous struggle of the two peoples to achieve national liberation. The two sides are naturally good partners and good brothers.

China always adheres to mutual respect and equal treatment. It never attaches political conditions to cooperation and never interferes in Angola’s internal affairs. The two countries have always helped each other, supporting each other on issues concerning fundamental interests and major concerns, jointly safeguarding the international system and multilateralism with the UN as the center.

We have set an example of mutual benefit and win-win cooperation between China and Africa. China-Angola pragmatic cooperation has been continuously developed and consolidated.

I am pleased to tell you that China is a champion of cooperation with Angola in various sectors, such as the largest economic and trade partner, the largest importer of Angolan products, and the main source of investment for Angola. We have set an example of friendship between the people of China and Angola. China has actively supported Angola’s development and provided assistance through various donation projects, such as CINFOTEC Huambo, the Luanda General Hospital, the Agricultural Technology Demonstration Center in Mazozo, and the Venâncio de Moura Diplomatic Academy. The Confucius Institute of the University of Agostinho Neto and other Chinese language educational institutions have given wings to Sino-Angolan cooperation, more and more Chinese films and cultural products and art groups have entered Angola, and the literary works of Angolan writers have been translated in China, helping the people of both countries to better understand each other’s history and culture.

In 2023, high-level exchanges between China and Angola were frequent and close, while interaction at all levels flourished. Visiting Angola were China’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, China’s Minister of Commerce, Cda. Yin Li, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and Secretary of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the Party, Cda. Su Hui, Vice-Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and Chairman of the Central Committee of the Taiwan Democratic Autonomy League. A delegation from the National People’s Assembly came to Angola to take part in the 147th IPU Assembly. Several high-level party and central and local government delegations traveled to China, including the delegation of the Angolan Minister of Industry and Trade to the third edition of the China-Africa Economic and Trade Exhibition and the delegation of the Minister of Energy and Water to the third edition of the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation. Angola’s Foreign Minister successfully visited China. China’s Shandong province and Angola’s Bengo province signed a letter of intent for cooperation.

Strategic communication between China and Angola is growing closer, friendship is deepening and cooperation and exchanges in various fields have gained momentum. So far there are 12 more Angolan literary works translated by me, for example, Estórias do Musseque, UANGA, Nga Mutúri, Luuanda, A Montanha da água lilás, Que Me Dera Ser Ondas, A Morte do Velho Kipacaça, Bola com Feitiço, A Dívida da Pexeira, O Principe Merdroso, Undengue, Uma vida sem trégua.

Through works translated into Mandarin, the Chinese people are getting to know Angola. At the same time, the promotion of Angolan tourism can attract more Chinese tourists.

In 2023, there was a lot of good news for China-Angola pragmatic cooperation. The annual volume of bilateral trade reached 23.05 billion US dollars. Angola once again became China’s second largest trading partner in Africa. The second meeting of the China-Angola Economic and Trade Cooperation Steering Committee was successfully held and the Agreement between China and Angola on Reciprocal Investment Promotion and Protection was signed. Progress was made on the major China-Angola infrastructure cooperation projects. The Caculo Cabaça Hydroelectric Plant completed the first phase of the provisional detour of the Kwanza River. The New Luanda International Airport and the Luachimo Hydroelectric Plant were inaugurated. CINFOTEC Huambo, offered by China, was officially handed over to the Angolan government. The New Port of Caio, Angola’s National Broadband Project and the Lobito Refinery are progressing steadily. China-Angola cooperation continues to expand in the energy and mining, manufacturing, agriculture and fisheries sectors, and investment projects have been launched successively, helping Angola to achieve its goal of economic diversification.

In 2023, cultural exchanges between China and Angola were vibrant. The “China-Angola Friendship Day” was celebrated with great success. Journalists, academics and young talents from Angola visited China for friendly exchanges. The Chinese Language Proficiency Contest “Chinese Bridge” and the Reading Contest of Chinese Classical Works were held in Angola. The Confucius Institute at Agostinho Neto University and the Venâncio de Moura Diplomatic Academy jointly opened Chinese language courses. Dozens of Angolan friends won prizes in the #ChinAnGood series of photo and short video competitions. Thousands of people took part in the 2nd Chinese Film Cycle. The Chinese Embassy in Angola, in partnership with the Catholic University of Angola, organized a Conference focused on development, where academics from both countries exchanged ideas, contributing their wisdom to the development and cooperation of our countries. We are very pleased to see that enthusiasm for the Chinese language and culture continues to grow in Angolan society, especially among young people.

It should be noted that the development of the motherland and the deepening of China-Angola relations cannot be separated from the hard work of Chinese companies and institutions and Chinese residents in Angola. We have noted that in the face of separatist activity in pursuit of “Taiwanese independence”, Chinese compatriots in Angola issued early statements of condemnation, strengthening the international voice in support of China’s unification. We have noticed that under the scorching heat of the sun, Chinese builders insist on fighting on construction sites to promote the inauguration and operation of China-Angola cooperation projects with benefits for the local community. We have noticed that during the heavy rains in Angola, Chinese companies and Chinese organizations have voluntarily provided accommodation centers and donations to help the affected community. We have noticed that despite the difference in skin color and language, our compatriots and Angolans are able to relate to each other and create fraternal and brotherly bonds.

China has steadfastly followed the path of peaceful development, actively opening up to the world and participating in global governance. Challenged by the historic question of “what kind of world will we build and how will we build it”, China has put forward the important concept of building a community with a shared future for humanity and has set up the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative and the Global Civilization Initiative. China joins hands with more than three quarters of the world’s countries to jointly build the “Belt and Road”. It calls for equitable and orderly global multipolarity and economic globalization that benefits all, injecting Chinese wisdom and strength into promoting the world towards a promising future of peace, security, prosperity and progress.

Secondly, the 2024 Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was successfully held in Beijing last month. Heads of State and Government and representatives from 53 African countries met in Beijing to discuss plans for friendly China-Africa cooperation in the new era. The China-Africa relationship has been elevated to a community with a shared China-Africa future of all times in the new era.

The Chinese president announced that over the next three years, China will work with Africa to take the ten partnership actions for modernization, including the ten areas of mutual learning between civilizations, trade prosperity, supply chain cooperation, connectivity, development cooperation, health, agriculture and people’s welfare, people-to-people exchanges, green development and common security. To implement the ten partnership actions, the Chinese government will provide financial support of 360 billion yuan over the next three years. This includes a 210 billion yuan credit line, 80 billion yuan of assistance in different forms, and at least 70 billion yuan of investment in Africa by Chinese companies, providing strong support for pragmatic China-Africa cooperation in various fields.

Therefore, in the coming years, Angola may also have more opportunities for cooperation with China. To make things easier, Angolan entrepreneurs have already been exporting goods to China tax-free since December 2024. Around 98% of Angolan goods imported into China have tax benefits. In this way, Angolan entrepreneurs can earn more foreign currency.